Arnold v. BLaST Intermediate Unit 17

• Decision Date: 25 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-5330,87-5330
• Citation: 843 F.2d 122
• Parties: 58 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1789, 46 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,906, 108 Lab.Cas. P 35,062, 46 Ed. Law Rep. 44 Mary Jane ARNOLD, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, and Bonnie Y. Avery, Kathy L. Jennings, Dawn Bell, Patricia L. Bennett, Laura Gilson, Kathryn B. Thomas, Patricia M. Ault, Joyce S. Ritter, and Alta E. Loveland, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BLaST INTERMEDIATE UNIT 17 and Dr. Robert M. Mitstifer. Appeal of Mary Jane ARNOLD, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 122

843 F.2d 122

58 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1789,

46 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,906,

108 Lab.Cas. P 35,062, 46 Ed. Law Rep. 44

Mary Jane ARNOLD, Individually and on behalf of others

similarly situated, and Bonnie Y. Avery, Kathy L. Jennings,

Dawn Bell, Patricia L. Bennett, Laura Gilson, Kathryn B.

Thomas, Patricia M. Ault, Joyce S. Ritter, and Alta E.

Loveland, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BLaST INTERMEDIATE UNIT 17 and Dr. Robert M. Mitstifer.

Appeal of Mary Jane ARNOLD, Individually and on behalf of

all others similarly situated.

No. 87-5330.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Dec. 2, 1987.

Decided March 25, 1988.

Clifford A. Rieders (argued), Robert Vesely, Rieders, Travis, Mussina, Humphrey & Harris, Williamsport, Pa., for appellant.

Lawrence B. Fine, Michael L. Banks (argued), Philadelphia, Pa., David R. Bahl, McCormick, Reeder, Nichols, Sarno, Bahl & Knecht, Williamsport, Pa., for appellee, BLaST Intermediate Unit 17.

Before WEIS, HIGGINBOTHAM and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROSENN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal raises an important question pertaining to the enforcement of a federal judgment obtained under a federal employment discrimination statute against an unincorporated public entity established by a state legislature. The Pennsylvania legislature conceived and created BLaST Intermediate Unit 17 (BLaST) and charged it with providing educational services to mentally and physically handicapped children within a central four-county region of the state. The plaintiffs, teacher aides employed by BLaST, obtained an award against it in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in the sum of $161,025 under the Federal Equal Pay Act because they were paid less than males in comparable positions. This court upheld the jury verdict under the Equal Pay Act in August of 1986. Arnold et al. v. BLaST Intermediate Unit 17, 800 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir.1986) (per curiam).

Armed with their valid federal judgment, the plaintiffs returned to the district court for enforcement proceedings. They first sought a writ of mandamus execution against BLaST to compel payment of the judgment out of funds contained in a BLaST bank account of $210,509.96 that had been garnished in the course of prior proceedings. ¹ After BLaST moved to quash the petition for mandamus execution, but before its motion had been decided, the plaintiffs sought and obtained a writ of execution from the district court clerk on the funds in the garnished bank account. They then withdrew their petition for mandamus execution, believing that it had become moot.

The district court, however, stayed the writ of execution pending briefing and then denied the plaintiffs' attempt to reinstate their petition for mandamus execution on the ground that the use of this writ was inappropriate against an entity that was not a school district. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24, Sec. 6-611 (Purdon 1962). The court then vacated the clerk's execution order because BLaST was either "an alter ego of the Commonwealth or at the very least a public authority," neither of which was subject to execution by garnishment under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Pa.R.Civ.P. 3101(a).

Finally, having failed in their attempts to satisfy their judgment through statutorily established mandamus execution or garnishment proceedings, the plaintiffs filed a simple petition for a writ of mandamus against BLaST. The district court denied the writ, holding that the Board had no "specific plain ministerial duty" to pay the judgment. Plaintiffs appeal and we reverse. ²

I.

The legislation establishing state intermediate units invested them with all the powers and duties of the former county boards of school directors with respect to special pupil services and vocational-technical education. 24 Pa.Stat.Ann. Secs. 9-958, 959 (Purdon 1987 Supp.). It is unclear how the units fit within the framework of state and local government. They are neither "political subdivisions," see 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Sec. 1991 (Purdon 1987 Supp.) (like counties, cities, or school districts), nor "public authorities," see Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 53, Sec. 302 (Purdon 1974) (bodies politic and corporate). Intermediate units, unlike school districts, are not separately incorporated entities with a general statutory right to sue and be sued. Cf. 24 Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24, Secs. 2-211, 2-213 (Purdon 1962), but see 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Sec. 8501 (Purdon 1982) (intermediate units are subject to suit under tort claims act).

The units have some attributes of state agencies. The organizing statute proclaims that they "shall be a part of the public school system of this Commonwealth" and each school district of the Commonwealth is assigned to an intermediate unit for services in accordance with the program of the assigned unit. 24 Pa.Stat.Ann. Sec. 9-951 (Purdon 1987 Supp.). Like local school districts, the units are regulated by the State Board of Education and must submit a program of services to the Superintendent of Public Instruction for budgetary approval. 24 Pa.Stat.Ann. Secs. 9-955, 956 (Purdon 1987 Supp.).

Intermediate units, however, receive both state "subsidies" for services performed pursuant to and authorized by law and funds from school districts and non-profit organizations. 24 Pa.Stat.Ann. Sec. 9-957 (Purdon 1987 Supp.). ³ Further, intermediate units are infused with local character and control. Each unit has a board of directors drawn from school directors from the school districts within its territorial jurisdiction. 24 Pa.Stat.Ann. Sec. 9-960 (Purdon 1987 Supp.). The Board has the power to elect its officers, to appoint staff personnel as necessary, to adopt a program of services authorized by the State Board of Education, and to engage in certain specified transactions. 24 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Secs. 9-963, 964 (Purdon 1987 Supp.). Moreover, the Board has the power and duty "[t]o receive Federal, State, school district and other moneys and expend the same to conduct programs of services." 24 Pa.Stat.Ann. Sec. 9-964(9) (Purdon 1987 Supp.). BLaST is subject to suit as a "local agency" under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Sec. 8501 et seq. (Purdon 1982).

The plaintiffs' various attempts to enforce their judgment in accordance with Pennsylvania law have been frustrated by the procedural difficulties inherent in the enforcement of a federal judgment against a state or local public agency and by the anomalous position occupied by BLaST in the framework of state and local government. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1982) of the appeal from the district court's denial of the writ of mandamus. United States v. Lee, 786 F.2d 951, 956 (9th Cir.1986).

II.

A district court is required to apply the procedural law of the forum state "in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of execution" unless a federal statute governs. Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a). Rule 69 contemplates the enforcement of judgments by execution "unless the court directs otherwise." Id. The court is free to enforce the plaintiffs' judgment through mandamus if the writ is available under state law, ⁴ although reliance on state procedure must not thwart the supremacy of federal law and substantial compliance with the state procedure may be sufficient. See Collins v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 936, 102 S.Ct. 1992, 72 L.Ed.2d 455 (1982) (supremacy of federal law); 12 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil Sec. 3012, at 66-67, 69 (1973). Pennsylvania permits the use of a writ of mandamus to enforce judgments against public entities. See, e.g., Alberts v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, 2 Pa.Commwlth. 167, 277 A.2d 361, 362 (1971); I Antieau, The Practice of Extraordinary Remedies 325 (1987) (general use of writ of mandamus by judgment creditors of government entities); 24 Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24, Sec. 6-611 (Purdon 1962) (provides for enforcement of judgments against school districts by mandamus execution).

We must review the district court's denial of the writ for an abuse of discretion. Hayakawa v. Brown, 415 U.S. 1304, 1305, 94 S.Ct. 1145, 39 L.Ed.2d 457 (1974). A refusal to grant the writ may be reversed if it is based on clearly erroneous factual findings or an incorrect legal standard. Lal v. Brooks, 98 Pa.Comm. 380, 511 A.2d 277, 279 (1986); Fallini v. Hodel, 783 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.1986). We review the record de novo to determine whether each of the requirements for mandamus have been met as a matter of law. Fallini, 783 F.2d at 1345.

The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Francis v. Corleto, 418 Pa. 417, 421, 211 A.2d 503, 505 (1965); First Jersey Securities, Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 700 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied sub nom. First Jersey Securities, Inc. v. Biunno, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S.Ct. 1020, 62 L.Ed.2d 756 (1980). Pennsylvania law requires that the writ issue only to compel official performance of a "ministerial act or mandatory duty where there exists a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant and want of any other adequate remedy at law." ⁵ County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 360, 372-73, 490 A.2d 402, 408 (1985). It is undisputed that the plaintiffs have a clear legal right to their judgment. However, BLaST argues that it does not have a duty to pay the judgment and that the plaintiffs have an adequate alternative remedy. ⁶

A. BLaST's Clear Duty to Pay

Faced with the complex conundrum thrust upon it, the district court denied the petition for the writ of mandamus because [w]hile BLaST may owe the Plaintiffs a duty to pay the judgment, BLaST does not owe the Plaintiffs a specific plain ministerial legal duty which is devoid of the exercise of judgment or discretion and is positively commanded by law such that this court's enforcement of it is...