Arnold v. Cabot Corporation, CIVIL ACTION No. 1:99CV75 (N.D. W.Va. 5/8/2000)
| Decision Date | 08 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 1:99CV75. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | PATRICK E. ARNOLD, Plaintiff, v. CABOT CORPORATION, GERALD MATHENY, AND RAYTHEON ENGINEERS & CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Defendants. |
Plaintiff, Patrick Arnold ["Arnold"], filed his motion for summary judgment on Count Two of his complaint on January 31, 2000 [Docket No. 48]. Defendants' filed a response brief on February 29, 2000 [Docket No. 51], and Arnold replied on March 10, 2000 [Docket No. 52].
Defendants, Cabot Corporation ["Cabot"], Gerald Matheny ["Matheny"], and Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc. ["Raytheon"], filed their own motion for summary judgment as to all counts of the complaint on January 31, 2000 [Docket No. 47]. Arnold responded on February 29, 2000 [Docket No. 50], and defendants replied on March 10, 2000 [Docket No. 53].
In addition, Arnold filed a motion to remand the case to the Circuit Court of Pleasants County on March 17, 2000 [Docket No. 55], to which defendants responded on March 31, 2000 [Docket No. 72]. Arnold filed his reply on April 11, 2000 [Docket NO. 73].
The Court heard oral argument on all three motions at the final pretrial conference held in this matter on April 20, 2000. Arnold appeared in person and through his counsel, Barbara Arnold. Eric Whytsell, counsel for all of the defendants, appeared in person with his client Matheny.
At the hearing, the Court found that it has original jurisdiction to hear this case and that it would need to refer to and interpret the collective bargaining agreement ["CBA"] in order to evaluate the merits of plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIED plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and DENIED plaintiff's motion to remand. The Court GRANTED defendants' motion for summary judgment for the reasons discussed more fully below.
This case was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Pleasants County on March 13, 1999. An amended complaint was filed on March 24, 1999. Defendant Raytheon removed the case to federal court on April 14, 1999, on the ground of federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ["LMRA"], 29 U.S.C. § 185. Co-defendants Cabot Corp. and Matheny filed notices of their consent to removal on April 16, 1999.
The determinative facts are undisputed. Arnold, a full-time Raytheon employee, performed work on the premises of Cabot's carbon black facility in Waverly, West Virginia from November 11, 1995 through to May 11, 1998. Raytheon provides maintenance, minor construction and renovation services at the Cabot facility, pursuant to an October 1995 agreement. Raytheon has approximately 23 employees drawn from different crafts working under the agreement. All of its employees are members of various trade unions that are signatories to the General Presidents' Project Maintenance Agreement. Arnold is a member of the Millwright Local Union No. 1755, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners. Cabot Corp. is not a signatory to the CBA, nor is Matheny, Cabot's reliability technician at the Waverly facility.
Apparently on April 24, 1998, Matheny advised Arnold that if he refused to perform work on his private property, then he would not have a job the following Monday. Arnold did not do the requested work for Matheny. Defendants claim that Matheny was speaking in jest and never intended his comments to be taken seriously.
On May 7, 1998, Arnold was called out at midnight and worked until 3:18 a.m. on the morning of May 8, 1998. He was paid time and a half for four hours work.1 Arnold did not report to work for his regular shift on May 8, 1998 but Dale Prim, Raytheon's site manager, credited plaintiff with four and a half hours work. Defendants characterize this payment as being made under Prim's discretionary authority. Arnold argues that, based on past practices, Raytheon should have paid him for a full eight hours.
On the next work day, Monday, May 11, 1998, Arnold appeared for work in jeans, T-shirt and tennis shoes. This was not his normal work attire although some employees did come to work in "street clothes." He indicated to another employee, Mr. Smith, that he wished to speak to Dale Prim about Friday's pay.
Shortly before a 7:00 a.m. safety meeting, Dale Prim asked Arnold to come to his office. Arnold and Prim discussed the additional payment Arnold believed he was entitled to for May 8, 1998, as well as his relationship with Matheny. As a result of the discussions, Arnold took a voluntary layoff. Arnold believes that he is also entitled to two hours pay for showing up and being ready to work on May 11, 1998. Dale Prim refused to give him two hours of "show up" or "reporting pay" because, in his opinion, plaintiff had not come to work intending to stay and work, given his attire and the nature of their conversation.
The parties agree that the collective bargaining agreement ["CBA"] discusses the "reporting pay" to which Arnold believes he is entitled for May 11, 2000. The parties also agree that the CBA does not mention the so-called "incentive pay" to which Arnold believes he is entitled even though he did not work his regular shift on May 8, 2000. Arnold alleges that Raytheon had an unwritten pattern and practice of giving extra compensation as an incentive to get employees to come out to work at unusual hours. The extra compensation was paid in addition to payment, at a rate of time and a half, for actual hours worked. He alleges that he had been paid such incentive pay in the past and that defendants failed to abide by their established pattern and practice, thereby incurring liability under the Wage Act.
Defendants claim that although nothing in the CBA requires that employees be paid for hours not worked on the day after a callout, Raytheon employs a discretionary practice which, under its Site Manager, Dale Prim, sometimes allows Raytheon employees to report to work late or not at all on the day following a callout and to be paid as if they actually worked the entire shift that day. The decision regarding payment for hours not worked is based on a case-by-case consideration of various factors, including the nature and timing of the callout in question.2
Arnold also contends that he is entitled to payment for two hours based on "show up" time under the CBA. Whether or not Arnold appeared at the work site "intending to work" at 7:00 a.m. on Monday, May 11, 1998, is a disputed question of fact.
The CBA provides that:
When an employee or new hire reports to work on any shift between the established hours of his/her regular work and is not given the opportunity to work because none was available and was not notified before the completion of the previous day's work, he/she shall be paid two (2) hours reporting time. . . . If an employee refuses to start or stops work on his/her volition, the minimum set forth herein shall not apply.
In his complaint, Arnold alleges that in March and April of 1998, Matheny tried to force him to work on his private property in exchange for his continued employment at Cabot. Arnold further alleges that Dale Prim (Raytheon's site manager) forced him to take a voluntary layoff from his employment on May 11, 1998, even though work was available for him to perform. Count One of the Amended Complaint alleges that Matheny tortiously interfered with Arnold's employment contract by attempting to force him to work on his private property and then causing the termination of his employment contract with Raytheon when he refused to do so. In Count Two of the Amended Complaint, Arnold alleges that he was not paid all wages due him, within 72 hours of his termination, as required by West Virginia's Wage Payment and Collection Act [Wage Act] and that he still has not been paid such wages.
Arnold's complaint essentially raises three legal issues:
(1) Whether Cabot and Methany tortiously interfered with Arnold's employment contract with Raytheon, thereby causing him to be constructively discharged?
(2) Whether Arnold is entitled to a full eight hours of pay for May 8, 1998, even though he did not report work for his regular shift that day and he received four and a half hours worth of pay?
(3) Whether Arnold is entitled to two hours of reporting pay for May 11, 1998?
Before addressing the merits of Arnold's claims, the Court must first decide if it has original jurisdiction over this action. This is key because if Arnold has alleged purely state law claims and no interpretation of the CBA is required, then this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the plaintiff's motion to remand should be granted.
Alternatively, if Arnold's state law claims are preempted and the case was properly removed to federal court, then any federal claims that he might have had are time-barred as Arnold failed to grieve his claims through the grievance procedure set forth in the CBA. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Leuck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (); Smith v. United Parcel Service, 902 F. Supp. 719, 722 (S.D.W. Va. 1995) ().
Whether this Court has original jurisdiction hinges on whether the Court is required to consult and interpret the CBA in order to resolve the issues pending before it. See generally Lingle v. Norge Div. Of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (); McCormick v. AT& T Technologies, Inc., 934...
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