Arnold v. O'Charley's Rest. Props.

• Decision Date: 16 March 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 3:21-cv-76-RGJ
• Parties: LA'DON ARNOLD Plaintiff v. O'CHARLEY'S RESTAURANT PROPERTIES, LLC Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

LA'DON ARNOLD Plaintiff
v.
O'CHARLEY'S RESTAURANT PROPERTIES, LLC Defendant

Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-76-RGJ

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

March 16, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge United States District Court

Defendant O'Charley's Restaurant Properties (“O'Charley's”) moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [DE 21]. Plaintiff La'Don Arnold (“Arnold”) responded in opposition [DE 22] and O'Charley's replied [DE 23]. The matter is ripe. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS O'Charley's Motion to Dismiss [DE 21].^[1]

I. BACKGROUND

Arnold filed this suit against O'Charley's in Jefferson Circuit Court on December 18, 2020 under Civil Action No. 20-CI-7298. [DE 1-1 at 7]. Arnold alleges that he slipped and fell at the O'Charley's restaurant located on Dixie Highway in Louisville, Kentucky on or about January 6, 2020. [DE 21 at 88]. Arnold was visiting the O'Charley's location in the course of his employment with a company he owns called Derby City Geeks. [Id.]. Arnold seeks damages for medical expenses, lost wages, property damage, pain and suffering, and permanent impairment of his ability to earn money. [Id.]. After filing its Answer, O'Charley's propounded requests for admissions upon Arnold. [Id.]. In Arnold's responses dated February 2, 2021, Arnold admitted that he sought damages that exceed $75, 000. [DE 1-1 at 15]. Along with medical expenses,

1

Arnold claims $102, 400 in lost wages, $500, 000 in pain and suffering, and $500, 000 in future pain and suffering. [DE 21 at 89].

On December 29, 2020, approximately eleven days after Arnold filed this lawsuit, Arnold filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Kentucky, Case 20-33026 (“Bankruptcy Action”). [DE 21-1]. Arnold failed to list this lawsuit in Part 4, Question 7 of his Statement of Financial Affairs and Part 4, Question 33 of Schedule A/B. [Id.]. Before confirmation, Arnold filed an amendment to Schedule C adding exemptions. [DE 21 at 89]. Arnold's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed on February 12, 2021. [DE 21-2 at 160]. On September 13, 2021, one day before responding to O'Charley's Motion to Dismiss, Arnold amended the schedules and statements to his Bankruptcy Action adding this civil action. [DE 22 at 1].

Based on the amount in controversy and diversity between the parties, O'Charley's removed this action on February 5, 2021. [DE 1]. O'Charley's moved to dismiss this action under the theory of judicial estoppel. [DE 21 at 90]. Arnold does not dispute O'Charley's timeline of events and factual allegations. [DE 22 at 1].

II. O'CHARLEY'S MOTION TO DISMISS

O'Charley's moves to dismiss Arnold's action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents Arnold from pursuing his personal injury claim because he failed to disclose this action in his Bankruptcy Action. [DE 21 at 87].

A. Documents Outside the Complaint

Before addressing the merits, the Court must first decide whether to consider items relied on by O'Charley's that fall outside Arnold's complaint. If “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court” when ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Federal Rules require that “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”

2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “Whether a district court must provide actual notice that it intends to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Shelby Cty. Health Care Corp. v. Southern Council of Indus. Workers Health and Welfare Trust Fund, 203 F.3d 926, 931 (6th Cir. 2000). The Sixth Circuit explained that there is no surprise when a district court converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if “(a) both sides submit extrinsic material as exhibits to their pleadings, (b) the parties had the opportunity to respond to arguments and exhibits that were submitted by the other side, and (c) the parties had the opportunity to fully address all arguments for dismissal.” Wilkes v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., No. 15-CV-11389, 2015 WL 7889049, at *1 n. 1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 4, 2015) (citing Shelby Cty. Health Care Corp., 203 F.3d at 931-32).

O'Charley's has submitted extrinsic evidence consisting of discovery responses attached to the Notice of Removal and public records from the Bankruptcy Action. [DE 21]. O'Charley's requested that the Court consider this extrinsic evidence and convert its Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Id. at 87]. Arnold did not address this argument in his Response. [DE 22]. Although Arnold does not submit additional extrinsic evidence, Arnold concedes that O'Charley's accurately states the timeline of events and correctly states the legal standards. [DE 22 at 1]. Arnold also references additional filings in his Bankruptcy Action, [Id.], and cites the extrinsic exhibits submitted by O'Charley's in his Response [Id. at 2-3]. The parties have fully addressed and responded to O'Charley's argument for dismissal. [DE 21, 22, 23]. Based on the briefing, the parties had sufficient notice that the Court could consider this outside material and convert O'Charley's Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Because the Court has considered extrinsic evidence provided by O'Charley's, the Court will convert this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary

3

under Rule 56. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); Friends of Tims Ford v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 585 F.3d 955, 965 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2004)).

B. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is required when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of specifying the basis for its motion and showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party must produce specific facts showing a material issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Factual differences are not considered material unless the differences are such that a reasonable jury could find for the party contesting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 252.

The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Williams v. Int'l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2000). But the nonmoving party must do more than show some “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party must present specific facts showing that a genuine factual issue exists by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute[.]” Shreve v. Franklin Cnty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126, 136 (6th Cir. 2014). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.

Rule 56(c)(1) requires that a “party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including

4

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made...