Arnold v. City of Knoxville

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WILKES, J.
• Citation: Arnold v. City of Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 195, 90 S.W. 469 (Tenn. 1905)
• Decision Date: 04 December 1905
• Parties: ARNOLD et al. v. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF KNOXVILLE.

90 S.W. 469

115 Tenn. 195

ARNOLD et al. v. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF KNOXVILLE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December 4, 1905

Appeal from Chancery Court, Knox County; Joseph W. Sneed Chancellor.

Suit by M. D. Arnold and others against the mayor and aldermen of Knoxville to restrain the city from taking certain proceedings to make assessments for local improvements under Acts 1905, p. 585, c. 278. From an order overruling a demurrer to the bill, the city appeals. Reversed.

J. W Culton, City Atty., J. W. Caldwell, Horace Vandeventer, and Clarence W. Barber, for appellant.

John W Green, for appellees.

WILKES J.

This cause questions the constitutionality of chapter 278, p. 585 of the Acts of 1905.

The act, in substance, provides for the creation of improvement districts in the city of Knoxville, and the payment of the expenses incurred thereby for public improvements by special assessments on abutting property.

The caption of the act, which sets out its purpose, is as follows:

"An act to provide for the creation of improvement districts for the purpose of opening, widening, extending, grading, curbing, guttering, paving, gravelling, macadamizing, parking, laying permanent sewers on, upon, or in any street, highway, avenue or alley, within the corporate limits of any town in this state, having a population of not less than 32,000, nor more than 75,000 inhabitants, according to the federal census of 1900, or any subsequent census; to provide for the appointment of improvement district commissioners for said improvement districts; to provide a method of assessing a part of the cost of said improvements upon the land lying in, abutting on or adjacent to said improvement districts, and of paying for said improvements; and to authorize the issuance of bonds, or certificates to pay for the same, and the redemption of said bonds."

The bill was filed by two taxpayers and citizens of Knoxville, owning real estate affected by this act and the ordinances of the city passed thereunder establishing improvement districts, to enjoin proceedings to make assessments as the act provides.

Complainants allege that they have paid all taxes legally assessed or assessable against their property, and they charge that the special assessment attempted to be levied for street improvements is illegal, because unconstitutional, in that it violates article 2, § 28, of that instrument, which provides that "all property shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the Legislature shall direct, so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the state."

The text of the constitutional provision is as follows:

Article 2, § 28: "All property, real, personal or mixed, shall be taxed. *** All property shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the Legislature shall direct so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. No species of property upon which a tax may be collected, shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of the sale value, but the Legislature shall have power to tax merchants, peddlers, and privileges, in such manner as they may from time to time direct."

Section 29. "The General Assembly shall have power to authorize the several counties and incorporated towns in this state, to impose taxes for county and corporation purposes respectively, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law; and all property shall be taxed according to its value, upon the principles established in regard to state taxation."

The bill is filed to enjoin the further execution of the act, and various allegations are made to point out wherein the act is invalid, unjust, oppressive, and unconstitutional.

It is alleged that property adjacent to complainants', but outside the improved districts, will be benefited not less than the property within them, but will be exempt from the special tax.

It is insisted that any improvement of a public nature in the city should be paid for by all the property owners of the city.

It is alleged that the act in question is illegal for the further reason that the improvements on the real estate assessed under it are exempt from the operation thereof, and because the assessments do not extend to personal property, and because the act imposes burdens of taxation which are not equal and uniform, and do not apply to all property.

It is denied that the city had the right to "divide itself wholly, or partly, into improvement districts," and impose taxes on persons owning property in such districts, which are not imposed upon others, or to impose a different rate of taxation upon property owners in different districts.

They allege that under said act the defendant is taking their property for public purposes without just compensation and without due process of law, and is thereby attacking their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States, and is casting a cloud upon their titles.

Finally, they allege that the city is using all possible haste to put said act and the ordinances passed in pursuance of it into operation; and they prayed that said act and ordinances may be decreed to be unconstitutional and void, and for preliminary and perpetual injunction.

The bill was demurred to by the city, and the demurrer was overruled, and the city has appealed.

No question is made but that injunction is the proper remedy, if complainants are entitled to relief upon the ground that the assessment is illegal and invalid. See Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 292, 19 S.Ct. 187, 43 L.Ed. 443.

The sole question presented in this case is the validity of laws authorizing special assessments for local improvements.

It is insisted by complainants that this question has been settled in this state for more than 30 years; the leading case being that of Taylor, McBean & Company v. Chandler, reported in 9 Heisk. 349, 24 Am. Rep. 308, and since followed in a number of cases, the most important being the case of Reelfoot Lake v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 36 S.W. 1041, 34 L. R. A. 725.

It is conceded that, if the doctrine laid down in these cases and on which they rest is adhered to, the constitutionality of the present act cannot be maintained, and we are earnestly asked to overrule them or modify them.

Counsel for the city, in making this request of the court, does so with due deference to the rule laid down in Coleman v. Campbell, 3 Tenn. Cas. 355, that contemporary construction of a constitutional provision, which has been long acquiesced in, is entitled to great weight in determining the meaning of the same.

This court recognizes to its fullest extent the necessity for stability, consistency, and a firm adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis in passing upon and construing any provision of the organic law; but, if an error has been committed, and becomes plain and palpable, the court will not decline to correct it, even though it may have been reasserted and acquiesced in for a long number of years.

The case of McBean v. Chandler, above referred to, was decided by judges who have had no superiors in our judicial history, and after a most painstaking and laborious consideration, and a presentation by an array of counsel of ability rarely to be found in any case, and the opinion is able, comprehensive, exhaustive, and learned.

Granting the premises therein laid down as the controlling feature in the case, and the conclusion reached is inevitable and irresistible.

This controlling feature may be briefly stated to be that special assessments for local purposes fall within the meaning of taxes in the sense in which that term is used in our Constitution, and hence they cannot be maintained, because they are not imposed upon the entire property of a state, county, or municipality, but only upon real estate in a particular locality, that they are not equal and uniform within the state, county, or municipality, as the case may be, and not laid according to value.

If we grant that special assessments for local purposes fall within the provisions of article 2, §§ 28 and 29, of the Constitution, and are taxes within the meaning of those sections, then they cannot be sustained as constitutional, and the present act must be declared invalid.

The McBean Case and the other cases based upon it, especially the Reelfoot Lake Case, are founded upon the ruling that special assessments do fall within the provisions of these sections, and the provisions of the statute authorizing them not being in conformity with the fundamental principles of equality, uniformity, and generality, such statute is invalid.

This question is therefore the crucial one in the case; and with it decided there remains but little ground for controversy.

Briefly stated, it was held in the McBean Case that taxes could be laid for public purposes only and according to some rule of apportionment, and that equality was of the essence of the power. Hence a state burden of taxation could not be laid upon any territory less than the whole state, a county tax must be laid upon the entire county, and a city tax upon the whole of the city, and these requirements are denominated as fundamental.

It was further held that the Constitution of Tennessee does not recognize the principle that taxation may be apportioned according to benefits received, but that all taxation must be imposed upon the fundamental principles of equality and uniformity, and this, necessarily and expressly, excludes the power to levy a tax upon any other basis or principle, either for general or local purposes.

It was also held that the constitutional provision provided the only legitimate means and modes of providing revenues for the state, counties, and municipal...