Arnold v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 11 March 2014
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 3:12-CV-02417
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: LORI A. ARNOLD, Plaintiff v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant

LORI A. ARNOLD, Plaintiff
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant

CIVIL NO. 3:12-CV-02417

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: March 11, 2014

(Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM

Background

The above-captioned action is one seeking review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff Lori A. Arnold's claim for social security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits.

Disability insurance benefits are paid to an individual if that individual is disabled and "insured," that is, the individual has worked long enough and paid social security taxes. The last date that a claimant meets the requirements of being insured is commonly referred to as the "date last insured." It is undisputed that Arnold met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2011.

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Tr. 26, 28 159 and 166.^* In order to establish entitlement to disability insurance benefits Arnold was required to establish that she suffered from a disability¹ on or before that date. 42 U.S.C. §423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a)(2008); see Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1990).

Supplemental security income is a federal income supplement program funded by general tax revenues (not social security taxes). It is designed to help aged, blind or other disabled individuals who have little or no income. Insured status is irrelevant in determining a claimant's eligibility for supplemental security income benefits.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and relevant case law, the court is limited to reviewing the administrative record to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. "The substantial evidence standard is the standard of review for all factual issues. It is not the standard of review for legal questions, which the court reviews de novo. However, it has been held that an ALJ[']s errors of law denote[] a lack of substantial evidence." Carolyn

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A. Kubitschek & Jon C. Dubin, Social Security Disability Law and Procedure in Federal Courts, 991 (2014)(footnote omitted). Counsel for the parties are familiar with the five-step sequential evaluation process² that the Commissioner utilizes and the substantial evidence standard of review.³

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Arnold is 43 years of age, has a high school education and is able to read, write, speak and understand the English language and perform basic mathematical functions. Tr. 34. Her past relevant work was as an office clerk described by a vocational expert as semiskilled, light work; a materials coordinator described as unskilled, light work; and a salvage laborer described as unskilled, medium work. Tr. 33.

Arnold protectively filed⁴ her applications for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits on December 29, 2009. Tr. 26, 148-154 and 166. Arnold claims that she became disabled on January 1, 2006, as the result of migraine headaches and musculoskeletal impairments, including impairments of the cervical spine and left knee. With respect to the cervical spine Arnold was diagnosed

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as suffering from "moderate to severe bilateral foraminal stenosis at C3-C4; mild to moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis C4-C5 and C5-C6." Tr. 267. With respect to the left knee Arnold was diagnosed as suffering from degenerative joint disease which was described as being at the end stage. Tr. 251 and 261.

Arnold's applications were initially denied by the Bureau of Disability Determination⁵ on February 24, 2010. Tr. 26 and 86-94. On April 21, 2010, Arnold requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. Tr. 26 and 98-100. After about 11 months had passed, a hearing was held on March 24, 2011. Tr. 38-83. Arnold was represented by counsel at the hearing. Id. On April 4, 2011, the administrative law judge issued a decision denying Arnold's applications. Tr. 26-35. The administrative law judge found that Arnold was not disabled because she was able to perform a limited range of sedentary work and identified four positions she could perform: food and beverage order clerk, callout operator, final assembler and surveillance system monitor. Tr. 29 and 34.

The administrative law judge at step two of the sequential evaluation process found that Arnold suffered from the following severe impairments: "Left shoulder impingement syndrome, degenerative joint (acromioclavicular) disease of

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the left shoulder, degenerative joint disease of the right knee, degenerative disc disease (lumbar spine), migraines, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, obesity, right foot fracture (fifth metatarsal), and Irritable Bowel Syndrome[.]" Tr. 28.

The administrative law judge did not address in his decision two medical conditions raised in the record and rejected the opinion of a treating physician. The vocational expert testified that if the opinion of the treating physician regarding Arnold's work-related functional abilities was accepted as an accurate depiction of her abilities that she would be unemployable. There was no statement in the administrative record from a state agency physician or other physician delineating Arnold's work-related functional abilities, including her ability to sit, stand, walk, and lift and carry items.

Supporting and opposing briefs were submitted and the appeal⁶ became ripe for disposition on June 7, 2013, when Arnold filed a reply brief.

For the reason set forth below we will remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings.

Discussion

The administrative record in this case is 412 pages in length, primarily

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consisting of medical and vocational records. Arnold argues that the ALJ erred by failing to address two medical conditions revealed in the record and by rejecting a treating physician's opinion. Arnold further argues that the ALJ in setting his residual functional capacity failed to appropriately consider the medical evidence and his credibility, and the ALJ inappropriately relied on his own lay analysis of the medical records. We have thoroughly reviewed the relevant portions of the record and find substantial merit in Arnold's arguments.

The administrative law judge at step one of the sequential evaluation process found that Arnold had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since January 1, 2006. Tr. 28.

Step two is the first point where the administrative law judge erred. At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the administrative law judge as stated earlier failed to address Arnold's cervical spine and left knee impairments. The administrative judge did not make a definitive determination as to whether or not Arnold suffered from (1) degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine which involved foraminal stenosis and (2) end stage degenerative joint disease of the left knee.

The Social Security regulations contemplate the administrative law judge considering whether there are any medically determinable impairments and then

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when setting a claimant's residual functional capacity considering the symptoms of both medically determinable severe and non-severe impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The determination of whether a claimant has any severe impairments, at step two of the sequential evaluation process, is a threshold test. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520©. If a claimant has no impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental abilities to perform basic work activities, the claimant is "not disabled" and the evaluation process ends at step two. Id. If a...