Arnold v. Engleman
| Decision Date | 06 November 1885 |
| Docket Number | 12,184 |
| Citation | 3 N.E. 238,103 Ind. 512 |
| Parties | Arnold v. Engleman |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Huntington Circuit Court.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the reply, and to proceed in accordance with this opinion.
T. G Smith, for appellant.
J. B Kenner and J. I. Dille, for appellee.
The first and second paragraphs of the appellant's complaint count upon promissory notes executed by the appellee, the third is upon an account for goods sold and delivered to her. The answer of the latter is, in substance, as follows: That she was a married woman at the time the notes were executed and the goods purchased; that she still is a married woman and that the notes were not given by her in consideration of her separate property, nor for any improvements or benefits to her real or personal property, nor were they given by her in any business, loan or trade carried on by her, nor by any partnership of which she was a member, "but they were given for goods and necessaries for herself and family in the way of clothing and wearing apparel, and that the same is the debt of her husband, Christian Engleman, who is the head of the family and the father of the children, who are minors."
To this answer the appellant replied, admitting that the appellee was a married woman, and alleging that "the notes were executed in settlement of her account for dry goods, dress goods and other articles of female apparel suitable to the wants and condition of the defendant, which she purchased" of the appellant's assignor, which goods were charged to her on the books of the assignor, "delivered to her, and used by her;" that the goods were sold, delivered and charged to the appellee by the appellant's assignor, "relying solely upon her special promise to pay for the same out of her own separate personal property, and in no way relying upon her husband to pay for the same or any part thereof."
It is proper, and, indeed, necessary for the plaintiff, in a case where coverture is pleaded, to reply the facts which show that the contract declared on is one which the married woman had power to execute. Cupp v. Campbell, 103 Ind. 213, 2 N.E. 565.
The question here is as to the sufficiency of the facts pleaded to avoid the disability of coverture. We have decided that in cases of married women ability is now the rule and disability the exception. Rosa v. Prather, ante...
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