Arnold v. Grigsby
Decision Date | 28 February 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 20060481-CA.,20060481-CA. |
Citation | 2008 UT App 58,180 P.3d 188 |
Parties | Gina M. ARNOLD and Charlie S. Arnold, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. David GRIGSBY, M.D.; Gary B. White, M.D.; and Uintah Basin Medical Center, Defendants and Appellee. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Roger P. Christensen and Karra J. Porter, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.
Larry R. White and Paul D. Van Komen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS, and ORME.
¶ 1Gina M. Arnold and Charlie S. Arnold appeal the trial court's summary judgment order in favor of David Grigsby, M.D., which concluded that the Arnolds' claims were time-barred by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitations.SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1)(2002).By reason of the generally applicable tolling statute, which suspends the running of a statute of limitations when a defendant departs from Utah after a cause of action has accrued against him, seeid.§ 78-12-35, we reverse.
¶ 2 On July 22, 1999, Dr. Gary White performed a colonoscopy and polypectomy on Gina Arnold, in the course of which he negligently perforated her colon.The next day, Gina began experiencing pain in her lower abdomen and sought treatment at the Uintah Basin Medical Center's emergency room.Dr. White determined that her colon appeared to be perforated and admitted her to the hospital, prescribing triple antibiotics.She remained in the hospital for four days, during which time her condition began to improve.Her discharge plan called for her to continue taking one antibiotic tablet orally and to return to the emergency room to receive two additional antibiotics during the next three days.
¶ 3 Gina's condition worsened, however, and on August 3, 1999, she was again admitted to the hospital where Dr. White performed an exploratory laparoscopic surgery.At some point during the course of the surgery, Dr. David Grigsby entered the operating room and began to participate in the procedure.Dr. White's operative report indicates that he was the surgeon while Dr. Grigsby assisted him.Gina later had two more laparoscopic surgeries at the Uintah Basin Medical Center, one performed by Dr. White on August 5, 1999, and another performed by Dr. Grigsby on August 11, 1999.After the August 11 surgery, she was transferred to St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City.
¶ 4 The Arnolds filed a complaint on December 4, 2001, naming Dr. White, the Uintah Basin Medical Center, and Dr. Grigsby as defendants.The Arnolds did not, however, serve Dr. Grigsby with a summons and complaint at that time.They maintain that, while they knew Dr. Grigsby had some level of participation in at least some of the surgeries, they did not originally serve him with the complaint or a pre-suit notice of intent to commence an action because they did not want to bring him into the litigation unless they found evidence requiring them to do so.At the time they filed their complaint, they claim they were under the impression from the medical records that Dr. White was Gina's primary care provider during the events in question, directed her course of treatment, and was primarily responsible for any negligence that caused her injury.
¶ 5 But when Dr. White was deposed on October 29, 2003, he made several statements that contradicted the medical records.He asserted that when Dr. Grigsby entered the operating room during the August 3 surgery, the surgery became Dr. Grigsby's case and Dr. Grigsby became Gina's primary doctor.Because Dr. Grigsby was in charge, Dr. White said he deferred to Dr. Grigsby's judgment.Dr. White stated that he felt Gina needed more vigorous treatment during the August 3 surgery.He thought that trying to locate a hole and "oversew[ing] the hole," if there was one, was the best way to proceed.According to Dr. White, however, Dr. Grigsby decided that just draining and washing out the abdomen was the best course of action.Dr. White further claimed that when he performed the August 5 surgery, he proceeded according to Dr. Grigsby's instructions, even though he would have performed the surgery differently.He asserted that he would have tried, at that point, to close up the hole in her colon and perform a colostomy, if necessary.
¶ 6 After Dr. White's deposition, the Arnolds obtained a dismissal without prejudice as to Dr. Grigsby.They then filed a notice of intent to commence an action, filed an amended complaint on August 6, 2004, and served Dr. Grigsby in Tennessee, where he then lived.Dr. Grigsby moved for summary judgment on September 22, 2005, arguing that the Arnolds' claims were barred by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limitations.SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1)(2002).The Arnolds opposed the motion, claiming that the statute of limitations period was tolled when Dr. Grigsby moved to Tennessee in July 2000, seeid.§ 78-12-35,2 and that the complaint therefore was timely filed.They additionally argued that, regardless of the tolling statute, they timely filed their complaint within two years of the date they learned that Dr. Grigsby played a more integral role in Gina's healthcare than they had previously known.
¶ 7The trial court first determined that the statute of limitations began running in November 1999 because the "[Arnolds] discovered the alleged injury no later than November 1999" and because "[a]t that time, [they] certainly suspected the alleged injury may have been caused by negligence."The trial court reached this determination because "[Gina] Arnold consult[ed] an attorney and initiat[ed] a formal investigation in her potential medical malpractice claim as early as September 1999" and because the Arnolds knew or should have known that Dr. Grigsby had been involved in Gina's healthcare at the time they discovered her injury.Accordingly, the trial court determined that the December 4, 2001, complaint was not filed within the two-year statutory period.
¶ 8 In reaching its decision, the trial court determined that the tolling statute, section 78-12-35, did not apply.SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78-12-35(2002).Rejecting Dr. Grigsby's argument that the tolling statute simply did not apply to medical malpractice cases, the trial court nevertheless determined that because Dr. Grigsby could have been served in accordance with Utah's long-arm statute, seeid.§§ 78-27-24 to -25, the tolling statute did not work to suspend the running of the Malpractice Act's two-year limitations period, even though Dr. Grigsby was a nonresident and absent from the state.Consequently, it granted Dr. Grigsby's summary judgment motion.The Arnolds now appeal that ruling.
¶ 9 The Arnolds claim that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Dr. Grigsby on the theory that section 78-12-35 did not toll the running of the statute of limitations even though Dr. Grigsby had moved from Utah.3"`Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County,2007 UT 72, ¶ 8, 167 P.3d 1080(quotingDairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,882 P.2d 1143, 1144(Utah1994))."When reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, this court gives no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions and reviews the issues presented under a correctness standard."Id."[W]e analyze the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co.,926 P.2d 835, 841(Utah1996)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 10 In addressing the Arnolds' argument, the first issue is whether the trial court properly concluded that section 78-12-35, the tolling statute, seeUtah Code Ann. § 78-12-35(2002), applies to medical malpractice cases, given the statute of limitations provision of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, seeid.§ 78-14-4(2).The second issue is whether the trial court correctly determined that the tolling statute is inapplicable where a nonresident is subject to the jurisdiction of Utah's courts and is amenable to service of process under Utah's long-arm statute, seeid.§§ 78-27-24 to -25.As both the application of a statute of limitations and the interpretation of statutory provisions present questions of law, we review the lower court's determinations on these issues for correctness.SeeRussell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson,2005 UT 14, ¶ 18, 108 P.3d 741()(quotingSpears v. Warr,2002 UT 24, ¶ 32, 44 P.3d 742);Sill v. Hart,2007 UT 45, ¶ 5, 162 P.3d 1099().
¶ 11 Dr. Grigsby argues that "[t]he express statutory language [of section 78-14-4(2)] . . . clearly demonstrates the intent that the [Malpractice]Act be exempted from other tolling statutes."We disagree.
¶ 12 When interpreting a statute, we"construe[ it] as a comprehensive whole."Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,916 P.2d 344, 358(Utah1996)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
[O]ur primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting a statute is the plain language of the statute.We therefore look first to the statute's plain language.
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr., Inc.,2000 UT 90, ¶ 7, 15 P.3d 1030(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)."In so doing, [w]e presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc.,2001 UT...
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