Arnold v. McClain

• Decision Date: 21 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-5074,89-5074
• Citation: 926 F.2d 963
• Parties: Randy ARNOLD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lantz McCLAIN, individually as District Attorney of Creek County; Board of County Commissioners, County of Creek; Board of County Commissioners, County of Okfuskee, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 963

926 F.2d 963

Randy ARNOLD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lantz McCLAIN, individually as District Attorney of Creek County; Board of County Commissioners, County of Creek; Board of County Commissioners County of Okfuskee Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-5074.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

Feb. 21, 1991.

Chadwick Smith, Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert A. Nance, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, Okl. and Michael S. Loeffler, Sapulpa, Okl. (Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen., J. Bruce Schultz, Asst. Dist. Atty., Sapulpa, Okl., with them on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.

Randy Arnold (Plaintiff) appeals the grant of a motion to dismiss his civil rights complaint against two defendant counties ¹ and the grant of summary judgment in favor of District Attorney Lantz McClain (Defendant).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a police officer for the City of Sapulpa, Oklahoma. On November 6, 1987, at 2:30 p.m., Plaintiff was summoned to the office of District Attorney McClain. At that time, Plaintiff was informed by Defendant that because of inconsistencies in testimony given by Plaintiff under oath, criminal perjury charges would be filed against him unless he resigned from the Sapulpa police force by 5:00 p.m. that day. ²

After two phone conversations with his wife, and a brief meeting with his attorney, Plaintiff tendered his resignation to the City of Sapulpa and it was accepted. Several days later, Plaintiff reconsidered and unsuccessfully attempted to rescind his resignation.

On November 10, 1987, Plaintiff was invited to a meeting of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to discuss the circumstances surrounding his resignation from the police force. Plaintiff attended the meeting with counsel and expressed to the officers present his version of the events surrounding his resignation. Defendant also came to the meeting and made statements regarding Plaintiff's resignation and the reasons behind it. Members of the press were admitted into the meeting and portions of Defendant's statements, as well as the earlier statements of Plaintiff and his counsel, were videotaped and later broadcast on television.

On November 13, 1987, Plaintiff filed this action. Initially, the defendants were: Jack McKenzie, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the City of Sapulpa; Roger Miner, individually and in his official capacity as the City Manager of the City of Sapulpa; the City of Sapulpa (Oklahoma); Lantz McClain, individually and in his official capacity as District Attorney; and the Boards of Commissioners of Okfuskee and Creek Counties. Plaintiff and defendants City of Sapulpa, Roger Miner and Jack McKenzie, reached a settlement and Plaintiff was reinstated as a police officer. District Attorney McClain and the two counties were not involved in the settlement. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint against Defendant and the two counties, and they filed Motions to Dismiss. The motion of Creek and Okfuskee Counties was granted, and the motion of Defendant was granted only as to a pendent state claim for breach of contract. Defendant then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment raising the defenses of absolute and qualified immunity.

After Plaintiff's filing of his complaint, Defendant proceeded to file the perjury charge against him. Plaintiff sought and secured a Writ of Prohibition from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals prohibiting the prosecution of the perjury charge. In its order the court stated "[b]oth parties agree that the[ ] negotiations amounted to an agreement between the State and petitioner regarding criminal prosecution." The court found the agreement was binding; that Plaintiff had fulfilled his obligations under the agreement by resigning that day; and that "respondents [were] estopped from further prosectution [sic] of [the] action."

The district court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff now appeals claiming the district court erred: 1) in granting Creek and Okfuskee Counties' Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the conclusion that District Attorney McClain is a state officer for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 liability and Eleventh Amendment immunity; ³ 2) in finding Defendant was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for his "constructive discharge" of Plaintiff; 3) in finding Defendant was entitled to qualified or good faith immunity from suit for his "constructive discharge" of Plaintiff; 4) in finding that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently establish his liberty interest claim; and 5) in declining to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. We affirm.

DISCUSSION

When reviewing a district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, we must accept as true the factual allegations of the plaintiff and resolve all reasonable inferences in his favor. Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir.1989). We will uphold the district court's dismissal if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief. Id.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we resolve all factual disputes and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 979 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3241, 111 L.Ed.2d 752 (1990). However, summary judgment is mandated "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A failure by the nonmoving party to establish an essential element of its case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial, resulting in there being "genuine issue as to any material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Finally, this court is " 'free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court.' " Schepp v. Fremont County, 900 F.2d 1448, 1454 (10th Cir.1990) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff first contends the district court erred in granting Creek and Okfuskee Counties' Motion to Dismiss and in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on its finding that Defendant is a state official for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Eleventh Amendment immunity. We shall address these two rulings of the district court separately.

Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims Against Creek and Okfuskee Counties

Plaintiff argues Creek and Okfuskee Counties are liable for the official acts of Defendant as these counties comprise District Number 24, the district for which Defendant serves as district attorney. In a recent case, we decided this issue in regard to the very same defendants, stating:

In contrast to the extensive funding and control exercised by the state over the office of district attorney, there is little in the record to show that the two counties comprising District No. 24 exercise control over the district attorney or his officers. Although the voters of Creek and Okfuskee Counties elect the district attorney, the office as it is arranged by statute seems to be an extension of the state. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on the issue, but there is some indication that it would view the district attorney as a state officer. We agree with the district court's conclusion that under Oklahoma law the district attorney is an arm of the state.

Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d at 1391-92 (citations omitted and emphasis added). We find this case dispositive.

Recognizing Defendant is a state official under Oklahoma law, we affirm the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim in favor of the two counties.

Grant of Defendant Lantz McClain's Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant both individually and in his official capacity as district attorney. We deal first with Plaintiff's claims against Defendant in his capacity as district attorney.

A. District Attorney Lantz McClain--Official Capacity

Official capacity suits represent " 'another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.' " Laidley, 914 F.2d at 1392 (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 n. 55, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). As we have already determined that Defendant is a state officer, Plaintiff, in effect, is bringing his claim against the state of Oklahoma. Such a claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits bringing an action for damages against a state in federal court. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3107, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); see also Rozek v. Topolnicki, 865 F.2d 1154, 1158 (10th Cir.1989) (holding that when a district attorney is a state officer, he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in regard to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant in his official capacity.

B. District Attorney Lantz McClain--Individual Capacity

We next turn to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant in his individual capacity. Plaintiff asserts both liberty and property interest deprivations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. In support of his claims Plaintiff argues: 1) that Defendant's "constructive discharge" of Plaintiff was a due process violation of his property interest based on his employment contract; and 2) that Defendant's alleged...