Arnold v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 19 November 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 12278.,12278. |
Citation | 260 F.2d 161 |
Parties | Horace A. ARNOLD, as Administrator of the Estate of Robert Eugene Arnold, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Joseph L. Kivett, Silas C. Kivett, Jr., and Kivett & Kivett, Indianapolis, Ind., for appellant.
Earl C. Townsend, Jr., John F. Townsend, and Townsend & Townsend, Indianapolis, Ind., for appellee.
Before SCHNACKENBERG, HASTINGS and PARKINSON, Circuit Judges.
In a prior suit in an Indiana state court, plaintiff (appellee), as administrator of his son's estate, recovered a default judgment of $15,000 against an individual who, while driving a truck with permission of the insured owner, negligently struck and killed plaintiff's son.1 In this present diversity action appellee seeks to recover from the defendant insurance company (appellant), an Illinois corporation and insurer of the owner of the truck, the amount of the default judgment. At the conclusion of all the evidence the trial court directed the jury to return a verdict for plaintiff, upon which judgment was entered and from which this appeal is taken. The errors relied upon arise out of the denial of defendant's motion to direct a verdict and the granting of plaintiff's similar motion.
A statement of the pertinent facts is a necessary prelude to a definition of the issues at this point, and we adopt the outline set out in Judge Steckler's memorandum opinion in the district court, 1958, 158 F.Supp. 1, 2, as follows:
The first contention to be resolved is whether, under Indiana law, the foregoing omnibus clause in Section III of the policy affords protection to a permittee of the owner, in this case his employee, or whether this omnibus clause is limited in its coverage to benefit the owner of the vehicle by virtue of the Indiana courts' interpretation of a statute, Burns' Ind.Ann.Stat., § 39-4309 (1952 Repl.), requiring that omnibus clauses be inserted in all automobile policies issued in Indiana.
Appellant contends that the omnibus clause is for the benefit of the insured and not the permittee, and relies on three Indiana cases construing the statute cited above to this effect.2 The applicable part of this statute reads:
* * *"(Our emphasis.)
The Spicklemeier, Shadow and Culley cases (supra note 2) cited by appellant, are distinguishable on their facts from the case at bar. In each of these cases there was no omnibus clause in the policies and the plaintiffs there sought to read into the policies the foregoing statute for the benefit of the permittee. These opinions held that this could not be done and construed the statute to be solely for the protection of the owner of the vehicle and not his permittee. These holdings were again affirmed by the Supreme Court of Indiana in American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 1947, 225 Ind. 559, 568-569, 76 N.E.2d 562, 566, but were expressly limited to a situation where no omnibus clause appears in the policy.
The Cornell case also concerned a suit brought by the holder of a judgment against a permittee driver seeking recovery from an owner's insurance carrier under a policy containing an omnibus clause. The court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff against the insurance company, holding that such a policy provision extended coverage to a permittee and that it was error to attempt to apply this statute to such a situation; and, on this ground, expressly limited and distinguished the Spicklemeier, Shadow and Culley cases. This was consistent with an earlier holding of the Appellate Court of Indiana in Mercer Casualty Co. of Celina, Ohio, v. Kreamer, 1937, 105 Ind. App. 358, 11 N.E.2d 84. Thus, it seems quite clear to us that, under Indiana law, where the policy in suit contains an omnibus clause, the coverage under the policy is extended to and is for the benefit of the permittee.
This leads us then to the question of whether or not this coverage is terminated if the permittee deviates from the use of the motor vehicle contemplated by the owner at the time such initial permission was granted. The precise question here is whether an employee who uses his employer's motor vehicle with the latter's permission remains within the protection of the omnibus clause when he deviates from the purpose and use for which the permission was granted.3 The Indiana courts have not passed upon this question of deviation.
As applied to the instant situation the courts have generally taken one of three views: (1) the "strict" rule to the effect that the motor vehicle "must have been used for a purpose reasonably within the scope of the permission given, during the time limits expressed, and within the geographical limits contemplated"; (2) the moderate...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Indiana Ins. Co. v. Noble, 569A84
...806 (1965); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Automobile Underwriters, Inc., 371 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1967); Arnold v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1958); Wright v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y., 270 N.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 100 (1967); McCaffery v. St. Paul Fire......
-
Simpson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
...1967, 374 F.2d 739; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Automobile Underwriters, 7 Cir., 1967, 371 F.2d 999; Arnold v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 7 Cir., 1958, 260 F.2d 161. The question as to what construction applies when all available coverages total more than the actual damage......
-
National Union F. Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Aetna Cas. & S. Co.
...12 (1964). 15 See, e.g., Yorkshire Indemnity Co. of New York v. Collier, 172 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1949); Arnold v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1958). 16 See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Ronan, 37 F.2d 449, 72 A.L.R. 1360 (2d Cir. 1930); Maryland Casualty C......
-
Wiglesworth v. Farmers Ins. Exchange
...Act. We thus reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand for reinstatement of the judgment. 1 Arnold v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir.1958); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 294 Ark. 444, 745 S.W.2d 589, 594 (1988); Clark v. Hartford Accident & ......
-
The Responsibility of the Insuror Once a Driver Is Given Initial Permission
...v. Travelers Ins. Co., 121 F.2d 838 (Ca., 1941); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. De Cuers, 33 F.Supp. 710 (DCLa., 1940). 10. 260 F.2d 161 (Ind., 1958). 11. 293 Ill.App. 97, 11 N.E.2d 993 (1937). 12. Small v. Schuncke, 42 N.J. 407, 201 A. 2d 56 (1964), revg 80 N.J. 407, 201 A.2d 146......