Arnold v. State

• Decision Date: 10 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 71168,71168
• Citation: 873 S.W.2d 27
• Parties: Jermarr Carlos ARNOLD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 27

873 S.W.2d 27

Jermarr Carlos ARNOLD, Appellant, v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 71168.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 10, 1993.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 2, 1994.

Carl E. Lewis and Constance Luedicke, Corpus Christi, for appellant.

Grant Jones, Dist. Atty., Corpus Christi, and Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

WHITE, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of capital murder, namely murder during the commission of, or while attempting to commit, robbery.SeeTEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2).Following the presentation of punishment evidence, the jury returned affirmative answers to the four special issues submitted to it.SeeTEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN., art. 37.071(b)(1)(2) and (3).¹The trial court sentenced appellant to death.TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 37.071.Appeal to this Court is automatic.Art. 37.071.We will affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

In six points of error appellant argues: there was insufficient evidence to prove he was sane at the time of the commission of the offense, the trial court erred when it failed to suppress his confessions; the trial court erred when it failed to hold a competency hearing; the instructions at the punishment stage misled the jury concerning the effect of a "no" vote by a single juror; the Texas death penalty statute violates the "Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions against mandatory sentences for any class of capital murders"; and the Texas death penalty statute fails to give the jury an option to impose a sentence of "life without parole."Because appellant raises the sufficiency of the evidence, a review of the facts is necessary.

On July 15, 1983, the Greenberg Jewelry store, located in Corpus Christi, was robbed by a lone gunman.The store's clerk, Christine Sanchez, was killed in the robbery by one gun shot to the top of the head.The victim was found wounded and unconscious by two customers, Harold McGuffy and his daughter, Tammy Lewis.McGuffy and Lewis alerted the local police just after 11:00 a.m.The victim's cause of death was confirmed by testimony of the medical examiner.

Investigation of this robbery/murder had focused on a possible suspect, namely one Troy Alexander.The investigation had further caused the discovery of an eyewitness.Joe Morano testified that he had observed and had a short conversation with a large black male in the Greenberg Jewelry store after 10:30 a.m., but before 11:00 a.m., on July 15, 1983.Morano testified to noticing that the black male was a "big man, about six feet or six feet one ... with big round shoulders."Morano had also noticed the man's eyes "... always like a cat--real small."Morano further testified to the presence of the victim, whom he had known casually.

The investigation into this robbery-murder was stalled for five years or more, because of the lack of further information.Then a letter suddenly appeared, in which the author claimed knowledge of the crime.The local District Attorney received the letter from appellant, who at the time was a California prison inmate.Appellant's letter claimed to have information about the Greenberg Jewelry store robbery/murder in 1983 and about Troy Alexander.Later investigation revealed that appellant had written several letters to the news media, namely to the Caller-Times and one of its reporters, Libby Averyt.Investigation into the contents of appellant's letters to the District Attorney and the news media resulted in appellant's various confessions to this crime.

Appellant, in his second point of error, brings forward a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's rejection of his affirmative defense that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense.Appellant does not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.Appellant argues, "the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was sane at the time of the commission of the offense and the verdict of conviction and the sentence of death violate the defendant's rights on Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Texas Constitution and under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution."²

Appellant filed his Motion for Court Appointed Psychiatrist on October 1, 1990, well in advance of trial.The trial court appointed a psychiatrist to examine the appellant and instructed the named psychiatrist to submit his written report concerning the sanity and competency of the appellant pursuant to the pertinent statutes.On November 14, 1990, also in advance of trial, appellant filed his Notice of Intention to Raise Defense of Insanity.

The State responds to appellant's argument concerning sufficiency of the evidence to prove sanity by saying that the jury's rejection of appellant's affirmative defense was supported by the evidence at trial.The record reveals appellant was found not guilty by reason of insanity in Colorado in 1978.In 1982, in California, appellant was declared to be insane.The 1982 declaration was not shown to have been vacated.The State admits, because of appellant's prior unvacated adjudication of insanity, that it had the burden of proof in establishing the sanity of appellant at the time of the offense, citing Manning v. State, 730 S.W.2d 744(Tex.Cr.App.1987).See alsoRiley v. State, 830 S.W.2d 584, 585(Tex.Cr.App.1992).

Under Manning, this Court held that if there was a prior adjudication for incompetency or a prior adjudication of insanity, the burden of proof shifts to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was competent to stand trial or sane at the time of the commission of the offense.Manning, 730 S.W.2d, at 748-750.In Riley, this Court relied upon Manning to hold where there has been a prior adjudication of insanity that has not been vacated, the burden falls upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the subject was sane at the time of the commission of the offense.Riley, 830 S.W.2d, at 585.

The trial court's instructions to the jury properly placed that burden upon the State.The charge submitted by the trial court instructed the jury that the appellant, "... having been adjudged to be insane prior to the offense ... is presumed to have been insane at the time of ... the alleged offense."The charge further instructed the jury as to the State's burden of proof to show sanity "at the time of the alleged commission of the offense by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt."The charge also instructed the jury that if they"... do not find beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was sane at the time he committed the act, if he did, then you cannot convict him, and in such case you are bound to find him not guilty by reason of insanity."The jury found appellant guilty as charged in the indictment.

Having found the trial court's instructions accurately set out the law on the shift of the burden to the State to prove appellant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, we must review the evidence at trial to determine if the State met that burden.In reviewing that evidence, we must look at that evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found appellant to be sane beyond a reasonable doubt.See, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560(1979);Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, at 238(Tex.Cr.App.1989);andBlankenship v. State, 780 S.W.2d 198, at 207(Tex.Cr.App.1989)("we are not to sit as a thirteenth juror reweighing the evidence or deciding whether we believe the evidence established the element in contention beyond a reasonable doubt.").We will review the evidence is the instant case in light of these standards of review.

The jury here had conflicting testimony from medical experts and lay witnesses concerning appellant's sanity at the time of the offense.Appellant's principal psychiatric witness, Dr. Morall, in response to questions from appellant's attorney, indicated that appellant's mental condition in May 1983, when he escaped from the Colorado State Hospital, was severe enough that appellant would not have known that his criminal conduct was wrong.However, when asked her opinion on cross-examination about the appellant's ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law in July 1983, the time and date of this offense, which was also approximately two months after his escape from the hospital, Dr. Morall's opinion as to appellant's "legal" sanity was less certain.She said:

"Well I think, you know, he remained mentally ill.I'm sure there were times when his behavior was appropriate, but I would think that the most--the driving force, or the most dominant factor at that time would have been the fact that his illness would have been fairly full-blown and with no control."

Dr. Sheppard testified for the State in rebuttal of Dr. Morall.Dr. Sheppard acknowledged appellant's many diagnoses by other medical professionals of psychosis and schizophrenia, paranoid type.Dr. Sheppard further testified that he did not find any evidence of paranoid schizophrenia in his daily observations and several examinations of appellant.Sheppard said that when he examined appellant in 1987he found no evidence of paranoid schizophrenia.Sheppard admitted his awareness that other medical professionals had diagnosed appellant as demonstrating varying degrees of paranoia and schizophrenia.

However, Sheppard testified that:

"A person who is schizophrenic doesn't necessarily mean that they are going to be criminal, and they certainly can appreciate right from wrong.Even in very acutely psychotic states, they can tell right from wrong, I think answers your question."

Sheppard testified that his conclusions were based on his in-depth psychological testing of appellant over a number of days as well as one on one conversations with appellant over...