Arnold v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | 2:15–cv–02049–KOB |
| Citation | 274 F.Supp.3d 1272 |
| Parties | Dorothy ARNOLD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES PIPE & FOUNDRY COMPANY, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Jon Collins Conlin, Richard Allen Wright, Robert Andrew Jones, Cory Watson, PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs.
Douglas S. Arnold, James Charles Grant, Meaghan Goodwin Boyd, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA, Elizabeth H. Huntley, Lightfoot Franklin & White LLC, Irving W. Jones, Jr., Michael A. Vercher, Sharon D. Stuart, Christian & Small LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.
This case is one of 14 consolidated cases involving Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendants operated a pipe-making facility in Birmingham, Alabama that released harmful chemical contaminants into areas occupied or frequented by Plaintiffs, causing personal injury and property damage. This matter is before the court on Defendants United States Pipe and Foundry Company, LLC (USPF) and Mueller Water Products, Inc.'s (Mueller) "Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Eugene Maddox's Time–Barred Claims." (Doc. 9 [redacted]; Doc. 13 [sealed] ). Plaintiff filed a response (doc. 77) and Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 82). Plaintiff then moved for, and was granted, leave to file a sur-reply. (Docs. 88, 89, 91).
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion, the court will GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Eugene Maddox's Time–Barred Claims.
Summary judgment allows a trial court to decide cases when no genuine issues of material fact are present and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. When a district court reviews a motion for summary judgment, it must determine two things: (1) whether any genuine issues of material fact exist; and if not, (2) whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ).
Once the moving party meets its burden of showing the district court that no genuine issues of material fact exist, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce sufficient favorable evidence "to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. , 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should view all evidence and inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. , 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the non-moving party "is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This standard exists because "the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
After both parties have addressed the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant the motion only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
Plaintiff Eugene Maddox asserts several state law personal injury and property damage claims related to Defendants' release of chemical contaminants from USPF's Birmingham pipe-making facility, which closed in 2010. Mr. Maddox does not specifically allege the nature of his injuries or property damage in the Complaint, nor does he provide any information about his dates of discovery or diagnosis. Rather, he claims to have contracted one or more of the "linked diseases" identified in the Complaint and to have generally suffered property damage. The "linked diseases" include hearing loss.
In February 2015, before this lawsuit's filing and as part of a pre-litigation demand, Mr. Maddox's previous attorney submitted a chart with putative plaintiffs' information to USPF and Mueller. This chart contained Mr. Maddox's identifying information and listed his injury as hearing loss and his date of diagnosis as 2006. Mr. Maddox filed this suit on September 21, 2015.
Defendants allege that Mr. Maddox's personal injury claims predicated on his hearing loss are time-barred whether Alabama law governs or federal law preempts Alabama law. Defendants argue that Mr. Maddox cannot invoke preemption because he cannot state a claim under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as the "Superfund" law. Mr. Maddox submits that CERCLA preempts the Alabama statute of limitations in this case and that his personal injury claims are timely; he notes that he asserts personal injury claims other than his hearing loss. Defendants do not contend that Mr. Maddox's property damage claims are time-barred.
Because this court sits in diversity, Alabama substantive law, including the statute of limitations, presumptively governs these proceedings. See Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co. v. Thompson , 802 F.3d 1248, 1251 n.2 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). Alabama law imposes a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Ala. Code § 6–2–38(l). The two-year period begins to run as to toxic substance exposure claims "only when there has occurred a manifest, present injury." Griffin v. Unocal Corp. , 990 So.2d 291, 293 (Ala. 2008) (). An injury is manifest when it "has evidenced itself sufficiently that its existence is objectively evident and apparent, even if only to the diagnostic skills of a physician." Cline , 970 So.2d at 773 (Harwood, J., dissenting). The Alabama Supreme Court in Griffin explicitly overruled its "date of last exposure" rule for toxic substance exposure claims, set forth in Garrett v. Raytheon Co. , 368 So.2d 516 (Ala. 1979).
The Alabama Supreme Court, explaining its statement in Griffin that the decision would apply prospectively, stated that the new "manifest, present injury" rule applied "only to those persons whose last exposure to a toxic substance, and first manifest injury resulting from that exposure, occurred within the two-year period before this Court released its opinion in Griffin ." Jerkins v. Lincoln Elec. Co. , 103 So.3d 1, 5 (Ala. 2011).
Mr. Maddox has not disputed the evidence, which was originally provided by his own attorney to Defendants, showing that he was diagnosed with hearing loss in 2006. Thus, his hearing loss injury manifested, at the latest, in 2006. Without more information, the court cannot determine whether that diagnosis occurred within two years of the January 25, 2008 Griffin decision, so that his diagnosis began the running of the statute of limitations. However, it need not make such a determination, because the USPF pipe-making facility closed in 2010—meaning Mr. Maddox's date of last exposure was, at the latest, December 31, 2010. Cf.Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc. , No. 1:05–cv–01017–KOB (N.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2008), ECF Doc. 186, at 29–30 ().
If Mr. Maddox was diagnosed within two years of January 25, 2008, then the statute of limitations began running when he was diagnosed in 2006 and expired in two years. If, however, his diagnosis occurred prior to January 25, 2006, then his 2010 date of last exposure started the running of the statute of limitations, which would have expired in 2012. Thus, under either the Garrett or the Griffin standard, Mr. Maddox's claims for hearing loss accrued more than two years prior to the date he filed this lawsuit, September 21, 2015, and so are time-barred.
Mr. Maddox argues that federal law under CERCLA preempts Alabama law to start the clock on the statute of limitations at a date later than 2006 or 2010. He does not assert a cause of action under CERCLA. CERCLA governs personal injury and property damages actions involving exposure to hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants released into the environment from a facility. It imposes a "federally required commencement date" (FRCD) on such actions. The FRCD is defined by the law as "the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages ... were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned." 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A). The statute mandates that "if the applicable limitations period for...
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...U.S. 315 (1943).6. Flint Riverkeeper, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1369-70.7. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2018).8. Arnold v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., LLC, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1278 (N.D. Ala. 2017). 9. Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. Nat'l Park Serv., 250 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2017).10. 276 F. Supp. 3d......