Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. C 93-0079 TEH.,C 93-0079 TEH. |
| Citation | 866 F. Supp. 433 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | Connie ARNOLD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED ARTISTS THEATRE CIRCUIT, INC., Defendant. |
Laurence W. Paradis, Miller Starr & Regalia, Oakland, CA, Elaine Feingold, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Inc., Berkeley, CA, for Connie Arnold.
Laurence W. Paradis, Miller Starr & Regalia, Oakland, CA, Brad Seligman, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Inc., Berkeley, CA, for remaining plaintiffs.
Peter I. Ostroff, Sidley & Austin, Los Angeles, CA, Michael W. O'Neil, Orinda, CA, for United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. dba UA Emery Bay.
David H. Raizman, Los Angeles, CA, for amici curiae California Association of Persons with Handicaps, California Foundation of Independent Living Centers.
Jane Curran Pandell, Randy Wright, Pandell Norvich & Borsuk, Walnut Creek, CA, for Raad/Uesugi & Associates, Stan Stanovich, Heidenfrost/Harowits & Associates.
Patrick M. Glenn, Hanson Bridgett Marcus Vlahos & Rudy, San Francisco, CA, for Irwin Seating Co.
Stephen B. Goldberg, Spierer Woodward Denis & Furstman, Redondo Beach, CA, Thomas J. Wolf, Myer Swanson & Adams, Denver, CO, for Proctor Co.
Timothy L. McInerney, McInerney & Dillion, P.C., Oakland, CA, for Tolladay Const. Co., Inc.
This case is a suit by disabled persons who use wheelchairs or who walk using aids such as crutches, brought against United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. ("United Artists" or "UA"). Plaintiffs charge that defendant's movie theaters do not afford disabled persons full and equal access to their accommodations, in violation of California and federal law.
United Artists has moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under California Civil Code § 54.1 ("§ 54.1") and California Civil Code § 51 ("§ 51") insofar as the claims seek damages on the basis of incidents in which disabled plaintiffs do not allege that they were actually afforded legally inadequate accommodations at UA theaters, but rather claim that they were "deterred" from attending UA theaters by their knowledge of the theaters' failure to conform with the disability access standards mandated under those two laws. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on February 14, 1994. After careful consideration of the parties' written and oral arguments, the Court DENIES UA's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for damages under § 54.1 and § 51 based on incidents of deterrence. The reasons for this ruling are set forth in the memorandum opinion and order that follows.
In their pleadings, plaintiffs attempt to assert claims for relief on behalf of persons who allege that they were "deterred" or "dissuaded" from attending or attempting to attend one or more of defendant's theaters as a result of their knowledge that one or more of the theaters did not provide legally adequate accommodations for disabled persons. Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 5, 6, 15; Proposed Class Certification Order ¶ B(2)(b). Of the various California and federal causes of action that they plead, plaintiffs seek relief in the form of damages only on their claims under California Civil Code § 54.1 and California Civil Code § 51. Defendants have thus moved to dismiss the request for damages for instances of deterrence on the ground that California Civil Code § 54.1 and § 51 do not extend to deterred persons a cause of action for a damages remedy.
Dismissal of a claim alleged in a complaint is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the cause of action pleaded fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether a particular cause of action may be asserted by a particular category of plaintiff over a particular type of alleged harm. Geir v. Educational Service Unit No. 16, 144 F.R.D. 680, 687-88 (D.Neb.1992). Such dismissal should be granted where the claim in question is one that, as a matter of law, may not be asserted by the category of plaintiff at issue with respect to the type of harm alleged.
The question of the availability of damages for "deterrence" claims under § 54.1 and § 51 appears to be an issue of first impression as the parties have located no California case law directly addressing the issue. California courts have prescribed the following analytic approach for interpreting California statutes: where the words of the statute are not ambiguous and their plain meaning can be given effect, that meaning controls; however, where statutory text is ambiguous and does not resolve the issue in question, courts must then consult the variety of canons and rules of statutory construction that California courts have prescribed for application in different contexts. Estate of Wilson, 265 Cal.App.2d 943, 950, 71 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1st Dist.1968) (citing County of Sacramento v. Hickman, 66 Cal.2d 841, 59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593 (1967)).
California Civil Code § 54.1, California's chief disability access law known as the Disabled Persons Act, confers on disabled persons a right of full and equal access to places of public accommodation. The particular disability access standards which places of public accommodation must satisfy are set forth in administrative regulations promulgated by the Office of the State Architect pursuant to the statutory authorization contained in California Government Code § 4450. See Calif.Bldg.Code, Cal.Code Regs. tit. 24, Part 2. However, the class of persons who may sue for damages for violations of these access standards, and the circumstances under which non-conforming facilities vest members of that class with a cause of action for damages, are determined by § 54.1 and by California Civil Code § 54.3 ("§ 54.3"), the code section authorizing a damage remedy for violations of the rights conferred under § 54.1.
The text of § 54.1 reads:
Individuals with disabilities shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the general public, to accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of all ... places of public accommodation, amusement, or resort, and other places to which the general public is invited....
Cal.Civ.Code § 54.1(a). California Civil Code § 54.3, the damages provision, in turn states:
Any person, firm, or corporation who denies or interferes with admittance to or enjoyment of the public facilities as specified in Sections 54 and 54.1 or otherwise interferes with the rights of an individual with a disability under Sections 54, 54.1, and 54.2 is liable for certain damages, suffered by any person denied any of the rights provided in Sections 54, 54.1, and 54.2.
(Emphasis added). Defendant argues that the plain meaning of the emphasized language is that in order for a person to be deemed to have been "denied" or to have "suffered interference with" her admittance to or enjoyment of public facilities, the person must actually have attended the place of public accommodation, suffering inferior accommodations there, or attempted to attend, being turned away at the door due to the inadequate accommodations. However, the Court concludes that this interpretation reads too much into § 54.3's language and begs the question of whether violations of access standards that deter disabled people from even trying to attend places of public accommodation constitute "denial of or interference with admittance to or enjoyment of" covered facilities. Particularly in light of the above language providing for damages where an owner "otherwise interferes" with access rights of the disabled, it appears to the Court that the text of § 54.3 could easily be construed as encompassing deterrence claims.
As for case law, there appears to be only one reported case from a California intermediate appellate court that arguably sheds light on this issue. That case, Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc., 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 266 Cal.Rptr. 804 (1st Dist.1990), was a suit by a wheelchair-confined disabled person against a restaurant at which most of the tables were not wheelchair-accessible, in violation of the California Building Code, and the portion of the seating that was wheelchair-accessible was inferior to the seating available for able-bodied persons. The plaintiff, who had actually visited the restaurant in person where he had been told of the sub-standard seating situation, sued under § 54.1 and other state laws. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment for the defendant and ordered that the plaintiff be awarded damages.
Although the case thus did not concern persons suing over instances of alleged deterrence, the court engaged in the following discussion:
Health & Safety Code § 19955 et seq., Government Code § 4450 et seq. and Civil Code § 54 et seq., taken together, provide for a two-fold procedure. A designated public agency or an individual may initiate an action to enforce compliance with the handicapped access standards provided for by § 19955 et seq. and § 4450 et seq. On the other hand, to maintain an action for damages pursuant to § 54 et seq. an individual must take the additional step of establishing that he or she was denied equal access on a particular occasion. Thus, plaintiff was entitled to an award of damages in the instant case.... For example, let us take a restaurant that is required to have 100 percent of its dining area accessible to the handicapped, but in fact only 90 percent of the dining area meets this standard. If the handicapped individual is readily seated and served in the 90 percent primary dining area which meets all handicap access requirements, then he or she would not have a cause of action for damages for denial or interference with admittance pursuant to Civil Code § 54.3, but an individual or a designated...
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