Arnold v. White

• Decision Date: 25 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 20100780.,20100780.
• Citation: 2012 UT 61,289 P.3d 449,718 Utah Adv. Rep. 8
• Parties: Gina M. ARNOLD and Charles S. Arnold, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Gary B. White, M.D., Uintah Basin Medical Center, and David GRIGSBY, M.D., Defendants and Petitioner.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

289 P.3d 449

718 Utah Adv. Rep. 8

2012 UT 61

Gina M. ARNOLD and Charles S. Arnold, Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.Gary B. White, M.D., Uintah Basin Medical Center, and David GRIGSBY, M.D., Defendants and Petitioner.

No. 20100780.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Sept. 25, 2012.

Roger P. Christensen, Karra J. Porter, Robert S. Gurney, for respondents.

Larry R. White, Paul D. Van Komen, Daniel R. Harper, for petitioner.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Chief Justice DURRANT, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 In this case, we consider whether the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitations is triggered when a patient merely suspects that she has received negligent medical treatment. We also consider what a defendant must demonstrate, in a case where a plaintiff has alleged a course of negligent treatment, to show that the claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

¶ 2 In the summer of 1999, Gina Arnold underwent several medical procedures performed by Dr. David Grigsby and Dr. Gary White.^FN1 Two years and three months after the treatment ended, Ms. Arnold filed a medical malpractice claim, alleging that these doctors were negligent in the course of their treatment. Dr. Grigsby moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Arnold's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The district court granted his motion and dismissed Ms. Arnold's claim.^FN2 But the court of appeals reversed, holding that Dr. Grigsby had failed to show that Ms. Arnold's claim was barred by the statute of limitations because he had failed to show that, more than two years before Ms. Arnold filed her complaint, she “knew or should have known which procedure ” caused her injuries.^FN3 We granted Dr. Grigsby's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.

¶ 3 We conclude that the court of appeals correctly reversed summary judgment. First, we hold that the court of appeals correctly found that, as a matter of law, Dr. Grigsby failed to show that Ms. Arnold filed her claim more than two years after she discovered or should have discovered her legal injury. But second, we hold that when a plaintiff alleges a course of negligent treatment, a defendant may show that the claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations without identifying the specific procedure within the course of treatment that caused the patient's injury. Rather, to prevail, a defendant need only show that the plaintiff filed her claim more than two years after she discovered that the course of treatment was negligent. Thus, although we conclude that the court of appeals was correct in its decision to remand this case, we disagree, in part, with its reasoning.

BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On July 22, 1999, Dr. White performed a colonoscopy on Ms. Arnold. The following day, she experienced pain in her lower abdomen and sought treatment at the emergency room at the Uintah Basin Medical Center (UBMC). Dr. White diagnosed her as having a perforated colon and admitted her to UBMC, where he treated her with antibiotics.

Over the next few weeks, Dr. White and Dr. Grigsby performed four laparoscopic procedures to treat her and to eliminate the infection that the perforation had caused.^FN4

¶ 5 Their efforts were unsuccessful, and Ms. Arnold's condition worsened. Concerned that his wife's condition was not improving, Ms. Arnold's husband requested that she be transferred out of the care of Dr. White and Dr. Grigsby. Ultimately, on August 16, 1999, Ms. Arnold was transferred from UBMC to St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City.

¶ 6 The following month, Ms. Arnold consulted an attorney because she thought “something had gone wrong” with her treatment at UBMC and that she might “have a malpractice action.” And on November 16, 1999, Ms. Arnold's attorney sent a letter to UBMC requesting Ms. Arnold's medical records. The letter stated that his office represented Ms. Arnold “relative to treatment she received following complications arising from an initial diagnosis and treatment of her for an intestinal condition” and that “complications following the initial treatment ... rendered her totally incapacitated and prohibited her from maintaining her gainful employment.” The letter also explained that they were “still in the investigatory stage” of their representation.^FN5

¶ 7 Ms. Arnold ultimately filed her malpractice action against Dr. White and Dr. Grigsby on December 4, 2001. In her complaint, she alleged that she was a patient at UBMC “[c]ommencing on July 23, 1999, and continuing thereafter,” and that “[t]he procedure and other care” she received “were performed in a negligent manner, causing ... severe injuries and damages which have resulted in permanent disabilities.”

¶ 8 Dr. Grigsby moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Arnold's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. He argued that Ms. Arnold had discovered her injury by the time she was transferred to St. Mark's Hospital on August 16, 1999, which would mean that the statute of limitations period expired on August 17, 2001—more than three months before Ms. Arnold filed her complaint. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Grigsby. Ms. Arnold appealed.

¶ 9 The court of appeals reversed, noting that “[t]o take the determination away from the jury, Dr. Grigsby had the burden of demonstrating as a matter of law that [Ms. Arnold's] complaint against him was time-barred when it was filed on December 4, 2001.” ^FN6 And relying on our decision in Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC,^FN7 the court of appeals held that Dr. Grigsby “failed to make this showing because he has not demonstrated that [Ms. Arnold] knew or should have known which procedure was the causal event of [her] injuries more than two years prior to filing [her] complaint.” ^FN8

¶ 10 Dr. Grigsby filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this court, seeking review of the court of appeals' decision. We granted his petition to resolve only one issue: whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the district court's order dismissing Ms. Arnold's complaint for failure to file within the period allowed by the statute of limitations. We have jurisdiction under section 78A–3–102(3)(a) of the Utah Code.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] [2] [3] ¶ 11 “When reviewing a case on certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness.” ^FN9 Additionally, summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ^FN10 Thus, in considering whether the court of appeals properly reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, we consider the facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.^FN11

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Because it concluded that disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment, the court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in this case.^FN12 Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that Dr. Grigsby failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that Ms. Arnold filed her claim more than two years after she discovered or should have discovered her legal injury.^FN13 We agree. But we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that Dr. Grigsby could not have prevailed on his motion without identifying the specific procedure within the course of treatment that allegedly caused Ms. Arnold's injury. Ultimately, although we disagree, in part, with the court of appeals' reasoning, we agree that this case should be remanded so that a jury may resolve the disputed factual issues and determine whether Ms. Arnold filed her claim more than two years after she discovered, or should have discovered, her legal injury. We first discuss the legal standard for determining whether a defendant has shown that a plaintiff's claim is barred by the Medical Malpractice Act's statute of limitations. We then apply this standard to the question of whether Dr. Grigsby showed that Ms. Arnold's claim was barred.

A. To Show That a Medical Malpractice Claim Is Barred by the Two–Year Statute of Limitations, a Defendant Must Show That the Plaintiff Filed Her Claim More than Two Years After She Discovered, or Should Have Discovered, Her Legal Injury

[4] [5] ¶ 13 Dr. Grigsby argues that Ms. Arnold discovered her injury more than two years before she filed her claim, and that as a result, her claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides both a two-year statute of limitations and a four-year statute of repose for the filing of medical malpractice actions.^FN14 Specifically, it requires that a medical malpractice action “be commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, ... neglect, or occurrence.” ^FN15 Generally, determining whether and when an injured patient discovered or should have discovered her legal injury is a fact-intensive question that requires a jury to consider “whether the actions taken in response to an injury and the efforts extended to discover its cause were adequate.” ^FN16

¶ 14 As discussed below, we hold that an injured patient has not discovered her legal injury when she merely suspects that her injuries resulted from negligence. Further, we clarify our holding in Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC^FN17 and explain that a course of treatment can trigger the two-year statute of limitations, even if a particular procedure within the course of treatment has not been identified as causing the legal injury.

1. The Two–Year Statute of Limitations Is Not Triggered When a Patient Merely Suspects That Her Injury Was Caused by Negligence

[6] ¶ 15 Dr. Grigsby argues that the two-year ...