Arnona v. Smith
| Decision Date | 21 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 1998-CA-01360-SCT.,1998-CA-01360-SCT. |
| Citation | 749 So.2d 63 |
| Parties | Francis J. ARNONA and Patricia W. Arnona v. J. Lonnie SMITH. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Glenn Louis White, Attorney for Appellants.
S. Robert Hammond, Jr., Hattiesburg, Robin Blackledge Blair, Laurel, Attorneys for Appellee.
BEFORE PRATHER, C.J., MILLS AND COBB, JJ.
MILLS, Justice, for the Court:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. Francis J. Arnona and Patricia W. Arnona appeal from the judgment of the Pearl River County Circuit Court granting J. Lonnie Smith's Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss their legal malpractice lawsuit against Smith alleging negligence and negligent misrepresentation in the preparation of a title opinion on their home.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶ 2. In 1996, Francis and Patricia Arnona contracted to sell their home to Edward and Shelia Fellhauer. Shortly thereafter, the Fellhauers had attorney J. Lonnie Smith prepare a title opinion on the property. Smith's opinion showed that the Arnonas did not have good and marketable title to the subject property. He relied partially on a 1991 survey and found that a portion of the Arnona home extended outside the record title. Based on his findings, he informed the Fellhauers that the title could be perfected by simply obtaining a quit claim deed or, alternatively, by confirmation of title by adverse possession. Based on Smith's opinion, the Fellhauers renounced their contract with the Arnonas.
¶ 3. Following the Fellhauers' renouncement of the contract with the Arnonas, the Arnonas' attorney spoke with Smith concerning two quitclaim deeds which covered the subject property that the Arnonas had received when they purchased their home. Smith asserts that he was aware of the deeds when he prepared the title opinion.
¶ 4. The Arnonas claim that Smith published to third parties his opinion that the Arnona property was not marketable, and as a result local realtors no longer showed or offered the Arnona property to potential buyers. Sixteen months after entering into the contract with the Fellhauers, the Arnonas sold their home for a price $22,900 less than the contract price with the Fellhauers.
¶ 5. On November 3, 1997, the Arnonas filed a complaint in the Pearl River County Circuit Court alleging negligence and negligent misrepresentation by Smith. Smith filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion was granted by an order of the court on July 30, 1998. However, the trial judge allowed the Arnonas thirty (30) days to amend their complaint. The Arnonas failed to amend their complaint within the allotted time and opted instead for appealing the ruling of the trial court as to the motion to dismiss. The issues now before this Court as taken from the Arnonas' brief are as follows:
ANALYSIS
¶ 6. In their first assignment of error, the Arnonas' claim that the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review in granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. This Court has stated the following regarding the Rule 12(b)(6) motion:
T.M. v. Noblitt, 650 So.2d 1340, 1342, (Miss.1995).
¶ 7. The Arnonas assert that the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should have been treated as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment because the trial court considered more in ruling on the motion than the complaint. They base their claim on the trial court's reference to "the record" in the order dismissing the case. While it is proper for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to be treated as a Rule 56 motion when matters outside the pleadings are considered, the Arnonas fail to support their contention. There is no evidence that the circuit court considered anything outside the pleadings. This is especially true where no discovery has been propounded to date. Additionally, the motion was disposed of by reference to what was or was not pleaded in the complaint. The proper standard to employ was that for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. There is no merit to the assertion that the wrong standard of review was used by the circuit court.
¶ 8. The Arnonas asserted two causes of action in their complaint. The first was a claim of negligence, and the second was a claim of negligent misrepresentation. The trial court reformed the legal claims to conform with the facts asserted by the Arnonas because the Arnonas had not pleaded all of the necessary elements to establish claims of negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The circuit court addressed the Arnonas' complaint as asserting claims of professional negligence and slander of title. This method of disposing of a complaint is not unusual. A court must look to the content of the pleading to determine the nature of the action. West v. Combs, 642 So.2d 917, 920 (1994) (citing Pierce v. Chapman, 165 Miss. 749, 143 So. 845, 847 (1932)). "Substance is considered over form." Id. (citing Lancaster v. Jordan Auto. Co., 185 Miss. 530, 545, 187 So. 535, 537 (1939)). The label is not controlling. Id. Therefore, this Court will address the Arnonas' claims as professional negligence and slander of title claims, as did the trial court. We will, however, first look at the claims as presented by the Arnonas.
¶ 9. To establish a prima facie claim of negligence, the following elements must be proven: (a) duty or standard of care, (b) breach of that duty or standard, (c) proximate causation, and (d) damages or injury. Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 399 (Miss.1991). The Arnonas failed to show how Smith owed a duty to them. Although privity is not required for an attorney to be liable to a person, the Arnonas in no way relied on Smith's title opinion. In fact, they openly disagreed with it. Smith prepared a title opinion for the buyers, the Fellhauers. He performed no services for the Arnonas, and they did not rely on him in any way. It is obvious that the Arnonas did not rely on the Smith title opinion due to their assertion in their complaint that they attempted to contact Smith to provide him with copies of quitclaim deeds to the area encroached upon. They did not agree with the opinion and attempted to show him that his opinion was inaccurate. This Court has held "[a]n attorney performing title work will be liable to reasonably foreseeable persons who, for a proper business purpose, detrimentally rely on the attorney's title work, suffering loss proximately caused by his negligence." Century 21 Deep South Properties, Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So.2d 359, 374 (Miss.1992). Therefore, with the necessary element of reliance missing, the Arnonas' claim of negligence fails.
¶ 10. The trial court reformed this cause of action as a claim asserting professional negligence. The court found, however, that the requisite reliance was absent from the pleading of a claim for professional negligence. Therefore, the court properly dismissed the Arnonas' claim of professional negligence with prejudice.
¶ 11. The elements necessary to support a claim of negligent misrepresentation are: (a) a misrepresentation or omission of a fact; (b) the representation or omission is material or significant; (c) a failure by the defendant to exercise reasonable care; (d) reliance on the misrepresentation or omission; and (e) damages caused directly and proximately by reasonable reliance on the representation or omission. Stonecipher v. Kornhaus, 623 So.2d 955, 964 (Miss.1993).
¶ 12. In order to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must first show that some misrepresentation was made to them. No representation was made to the Arnonas. The representation was made to the Fellhauers. In addition, the Arnonas allege that the Fellhauers relied upon the title opinion in their decision to rescind the contract. As shown above, the Arnonas fail to show that they relied upon Smith's title opinion. Therefore, the absence of the requisite element of reliance, as well as the element of a misrepresentation, causes the negligent misrepresentation cause of action to fail.
¶ 13. The court did find that the Arnonas may have had a claim for slander of title, but that the necessary element of malicious intent was not pleaded. The court allowed the Arnonas thirty (30) days to amend their complaint to allege malicious intent if the facts supported such an allegation. However, the Arnonas chose to take a different route from that suggested by the court and appealed the circuit court's ruling on the motion to dismiss. In the meantime, their claim for...
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