Arnwine v. Trebel

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Joseph M. Ellis
• Citation: Arnwine v. Trebel, 195 S.W.3d 467 (Mo. App. 2006)
• Decision Date: 30 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. WD 65506.,WD 65506.
• Parties: Jennifer Banks ARNWINE, Appellant, v. John M. TREBEL, et al., Respondents.

195 S.W.3d 467

Jennifer Banks ARNWINE, Appellant, v. John M. TREBEL, et al., Respondents.

No. WD 65506.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

June 30, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pettis County, Donald L. Barnes, Judge.

David G. Sperry, Independence, MO, for appellant.

Juliet A. Cox, Kansas City, MO, for respondents.

Before JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Presiding Judge, HAROLD H. LOWENSTEIN, Judge and PAUL M. SPINDEN, Judge.

JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge.

On the morning of October 28, 1999, Appellant Jennifer Banks Arnwine ("Arnwine"), an employee of Waterloo Industries, Inc., sustained severe hand injuries resulting from an accident which occurred when a secondary press machine she was operating at Waterloo's manufacturing plant in Sedalia, Missouri, malfunctioned. At the time of the accident, John M. Trebel, Gerald T. Heinlen, Grant Jones, Kelly Guess, and Steven Hockett (collectively referred to as "Respondents") also worked for Waterloo Industries. Shortly after the accident, Arnwine filed what later turned out to be a successful claim for workers' compensation benefits with the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission of Missouri ("Commission"), which administers Chapter 287, The Workers' Compensation Law ("WCL").¹

On October 22, 2004, Arnwine filed a personal injury action in the Circuit Court of Pettis County seeking an award of compensatory and punitive damages against Respondents for their roles in the events of October 28, 1999. On November 29, 2004, Respondents moved for dismissal of all claims against them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that, since those claims arose out of Arnwine's on-the-job injuries, Respondents were not subject to civil liability to Arnwine for those injuries under section 287.120, the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the WCL. After briefing and oral argument on the issue of its subject matter jurisdiction over Arnwine's claims against Respondents, the circuit court ultimately entered an "Amended Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Petition" on May 4, 2005, leading to this appeal, in which Arnwine challenges the circuit court's determination that her claims were barred under section 287.120.

Section 287.120 governs the determination of when an injury falls under the WCL. In pertinent part, it states:

1. Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefore whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person. . . .

2. The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his wife, her husband, parents, personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such accidental injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter.

The Missouri Supreme Court has held that the WCL was not supplemental or declaratory of any existing rule, right or remedy, but created an entirely new right or remedy which "is wholly substitutional in character and supplants all other rights and remedies, at common law or otherwise." Marie v. Standard Steel Works, 319 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Mo. banc 1959). It provides the exclusive remedy for employees against their employers for injuries covered by its provisions, and subject matter jurisdiction over such matters properly lies only in the Commission. State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 73 S.W.3d 620, 621 (Mo. banc 2002). "This immunity from suit [also] extends to employees of the exempt employer, albeit in a more limited fashion." Id. "A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the proper method to raise as a defense to a tort action the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Law, as provided in Chapter 287." Sexton v. Jenkins & Assocs., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo.App. W.D.2000).

"In determining the question of its subject matter jurisdiction, the circuit court is not only the arbiter of the law, but the facts necessary to decide the question." Kesterson v. Wallut, 116 S.W.3d 590, 594 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). Thus, whether the subject matter of an action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission is a question of fact, resolution of which is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Burns v. Employer Health Servs., Inc., 976 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo.App. W.D.1998). Its decision on this question may be "based not only on facts appearing of record, but facts adduced by affidavits of the parties, oral testimony, and depositions." Kesterson, 116 S.W.3d at 595.

"Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is proper whenever it appears, by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court is without jurisdiction." Missouri Soybean Ass'n v. Mo. Clean Water Com'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Mo. banc 2003); Rule 55.27(g)(3). "As the term `appears' [in Rule 55.27(g)(3)] suggests, the quantum of proof is not high; it must appear by the preponderance of the evidence that the court is without jurisdiction." James v. Poppa, 85 S.W.3d 8, 9 (Mo. banc 2002). Where, as here, the facts bearing on the issue are contested, we review the trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for abuse of discretion, Mo. Soybean Ass'n, 102 S.W.3d at 22; Sexton, 41 S.W.3d at 4. "The trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration." Sexton, 41 S.W.3d at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Arnwine brings three points on appeal. In her first point, she argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in concluding that Respondents had met their burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Arnwine's personal injury claims against Respondents. In Point II, Arnwine asserts that the trial court erred in granting Respondents' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the court overlooked and/or completely failed to address her claim that one or more of the Respondents had violated section 292.040 and were, therefore, guilty of negligence per se. And in her third and final point, Arnwine claims the trial court erred in dismissing her petition as to Respondents Trebel, Heinlen, Jones, and Guess on the grounds they had neither actual supervisory control over her nor knowledge of the circumstances attending her injury and were not present when it occurred.

As noted, our review is for abuse of discretion. The record before the trial court was limited, consisting solely of written materials such as pleadings, affidavits and depositions. Accordingly, we set forth the evidentiary background in detail.

At the time of the accident, Arnwine was working the third shift (12:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.) as a press operator at Waterloo Industries' plant in Sedalia. Hockett, who had been employed by Waterloo Industries for more than ten years, was Arnwine's "group leader." As group leader, Hockett was Arnwine's immediate supervisor. Hockett's supervisor was Guess, who had been employed by Waterloo for over twenty years and served as the secondary press department supervisor for the third shift. The record is bereft of any information regarding Trebel, Heinlen, and Jones other than the allegations in the petition that they were at all relevant times employed by Waterloo Industries, Inc.²

At approximately 3:30 a.m., Hockett came over to the secondary press machine Arnwine was operating and asked her to run a few (about 60) parts that were part of a "rush job" for the welding department. Following Hockett's instructions, Arnwine left her previous machine and began operating machine number 1206, a large secondary press which was about eleven feet high and six feet wide. Machine 1206 housed a press bed and removable die, on which the operator places a piece of metal. A "ram head" hovers above the press bed, which, when activated by the machine's operator using a foot pedal, cycles downward with considerable electrically-accelerated force to press the metal into a particular shape, as determined by the die in use.

Machine 1206 was equipped with a safety device called a "light curtain." The light curtain consists of two or more lamps or lasers on either side of the press bed that engage each other to form a wall of light between the operator and the press. This device is designed to immediately terminate the machine's function, even in mid-cycle, in the event any object, including any portion of the operator's body, breaks the plane of the light curtain. Prior to the accident, Arnwine checked the light curtain safety mechanism on Machine 1206 pursuant to standard procedure, finding it to be "in perfect working order."

According to Arnwine's sworn affidavit of December 20, 2004, "[f]rom the very first piece [she] ran" after commencing her duties on Machine 1206, "problems with the press became evident" to her, because when she "stepped on the foot pedal to activate the cycle, the press seemed to `stick' or `lag' as it came down to bend the metal piece." Arnwine notified Hockett that "the machine was not working right, it was taking too long for the machine to cycle, and these parts were going to take longer than he expected."

As her group leader, it was Hockett's duty to investigate the problem reported by Arnwine. He did so, and, as he explained during his October 19, 2004 deposition in Arnwine's workers' compensation case, noticed that Machine 1206 had "a problem and, you know, it just wasn't normal . . . . It had hesitation...