Arocho v. People of Porto Rico, 2019.
Decision Date | 23 November 1926 |
Docket Number | No. 2019.,2019. |
Citation | 16 F.2d 90 |
Parties | AROCHO v. PEOPLE OF PORTO RICO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Luis Munoz Morales, Frank Antonsanti, and Antonsanti & La Costa, all of San Juan, Porto Rico, for plaintiff in error.
George C. Butte, Atty. Gen., of Porto Rico, for the People of Porto Rico.
Before BINGHAM, JOHNSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
In the Second district court of San Juan, Arocho was, on December 10, 1924, convicted of murder, in the first degree, of a girl under 14 years of age. Under section 202 of the Porto Rican Penal Code, he was, on January 27, 1925, duly sentenced to death. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Porto Rico the judgment was affirmed, in a careful opinion by Chief Justice Toro, concurred in by the entire court.
The case comes here on two assignments of error, raising highly technical contentions, to the effect that Act No. 36 of November 30, 1917, construed under the limitations of section 34 of the Organic Act, abolished the death penalty.
At the outset, we note that these contentions involve the construction of local statutes; that they were carefully considered by both courts in Porto Rico, and were held untenable. Under these conditions, a case must be pretty plain to warrant this court in holding the local courts in error. Fernandez & Bros. v. Ojeda, 266 U. S. 144, 146, 45 S. Ct. 52, 69 L. Ed. 209; Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U. S. 102, 106, 43 S. Ct. 286, 67 L. Ed. 550; Hartman v. Sanchez (C. C. A.) 12 F.(2d) 649, 651, 652.
The pertinent part of section 202 of the Penal Code, as it read prior to the act of 1917 quoted below, is as follows:
The relevant parts of Act No. 36 of 1917 we quote:
The plaintiff in error now contends that the death penalty was abolished: (1) Because the title does not adequately describe the act; (2) because section 202 of Penal Code was not re-enacted in proper form.
The first contention is grounded on the following paragraph in section 34 of the Organic Act:
"No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed."
We agree with the Supreme Court of Porto Rico that this proposition cannot be sustained. The title of Act No. 36 clearly shows that its main objects were to abolish temporarily — which means to suspend — the death penalty; to amend named sections of the Penal Code, including a temporary change in section 202; and to provide for statistics, obviously intended to test the results of the experimental suspension of the death penalty; to limit (under section 6) the suspension of the death penalty to April 30, 1921, unless, meantime, the Legislature should otherwise provide. Every part of the act was germane to every other part. The title was adequately and accurately descriptive.
This provision in the Organic Act is similar to provisions found in many of our state Constitutions, and the scope and effect thereof have been freqently ruled upon. Cf. 25 R. C. L. pp. 834, 835, 837. The principles here applicable are well stated in the quotation from 25 R. C. L. 844, in the opinion of the Supreme Court:
"An act is not unconstitutional, because more than one object is contained...
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