Aronson v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12–CV–20129. |
| Citation | 30 F.Supp.3d 1379 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | S. William ARONSON, Plaintiff, v. CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC., and Wrave Ltd., d/b/a Whacky Rollers, Defendants. |
Carlos Felipe Llinas Negret, Law Offices of Lipcon, Margulies & Alsina P.A., Jacqueline Garcell, Jason Robert Margulies, Lipcon, Margulies, Alsina, Winkleman, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.
Darren Wayne Friedman, Elisha Sullivan, Jeffrey Eric Foreman, Brian Hugo McGuire, Foreman Friedman, PA, Bianca Zuluaga, Diaz Briscoe Medina, PA, Miami, FL, for Defendants.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Celebrity Cruises, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [D.E. 9], and Wrave Ltd.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 65]. For the reasons stated below, Wrave Ltd.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 65] is GRANTED and Celebrity Cruises, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 9] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
This case arises from injuries Plaintiff, an “elderly gentleman,” sustained in a fall from a rope bridge in Roseau, Dominica, on or about March 17, 2011, while on a “shore excursion” arranged for passengers traveling on the Celebrity Equinox, a vessel owned and operated by Defendant Celebrity Cruises, Inc. [D.E. 1]. The Complaint alleges that Defendant Wrave Ltd., a foreign corporation, owned and/or operated the tour on which Plaintiff was injured. Id. at ¶ 7. The Complaint further alleges that trips with Wrave were organized by Celebrity for its cruise-ship passengers pursuant to a contractual agreement between Wrave and Celebrity. Id. at ¶ 8.
On January 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants. Id. The Complaint contains single counts of negligence against both Celebrity and Wrave, although each count alleges more than 25 different theories of liability, respectively. Id. at ¶¶ 19–33. The Complaint also includes a claim for apparent agency or agency by estoppel against Celebrity, a joint venture claim against both Celebrity and Wrave, and a third-party beneficiary claim.Id. at ¶¶ 34–51.
In its Motion to Dismiss, Celebrity argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [D.E. 9]. Wrave argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim and that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation [D.E. 65]. Plaintiff has filed responses in opposition to the motions [D.E. 20; D.E. 70; D.E. 71]. The Court heard oral arguments on these motions on April 2, 2014 [D.E. 83].
A federal court in Florida may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent that a Florida court may, as long as the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal due process requirements. Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir.2008). The Court must therefore determine whether a Florida court could exercise jurisdiction over Wrave, Ltd. under Florida's long-arm statute. Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 846 (11th Cir.2010). The reach of the long-arm statute is a question of Florida law, which a federal court must construe as would the Florida Supreme Court. Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1271 (11th Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted). In the absence of Florida Supreme Court precedent, federal courts must adhere to decisions of Florida's intermediate courts. Id. (internal citations omitted).
Wrave argues that it is not subject to either specific or general jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193, and that the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause [D.E. 65 at 2–19]. Plaintiff argues that Wrave's activities in Florida suffice to confer both specific and general jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, and that the exercise of jurisdiction would satisfy due process [D.E. 71].
It is Plaintiff's burden to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort and Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir.2006). When a defendant has submitted affidavits challenging a court's jurisdiction, the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction, unless the defense affidavits contain only conclusory assertions. Meier, 288 F.3d at 1269. Where the plaintiff and defendant have submitted conflicting evidence, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id.
In support of its motions, Wrave has submitted a declaration from its managing director, Phillip Rolle, who asserts that Wrave is not incorporated in Florida, that the company has no business operations in Florida, and that Wrave has no property or employees in Florida [D.E. 16–1]. In response, Plaintiff has submitted a series of exhibits demonstrating Wrave's contacts with Florida, mainly through its business ties with Florida-based cruise lines [D.E. 72].
Plaintiff argues that Wrave is subject to this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), which confers jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for claims arising against a defendant who is “operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state.” Wrave argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead any jurisdictional facts supporting specific jurisdiction, and that Plaintiff has failed to rebut the declaration of Phillip Rolle, who asserts that Wrave has no business operations in Florida [D.E. 65 at 3–5].
In response to Wrave's motion, Plaintiff has offered a cursory, conclusory argument that Wrave's conduct in Florida meets the criteria for specific jurisdiction [D.E. 71 at 3], but Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing that Wrave is a business operating in this state, or that Wrave has an office or agency in Florida as required by § 48.193(1)(a)(1). Moreover, Plaintiff does not rebut or otherwise challenge Phillip Rolle's declaration asserting that Wrave has no employees, offices or property in Florida [D.E. 16–1]. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence supporting specific jurisdiction over Wrave under the long-arm statute. See Meier, 288 F.3d at 1269.
A Florida court may also exercise jurisdiction over a defendant “who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise ... whether or not the claim arises from that activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2). The reach of this provision is coextensive with the limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause. See Fraser, 594 F.3d at 846. Therefore, in examining general jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, the Court must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant is constitutionally permissible—that is, whether defendant has “established certain minimum contacts with the forum such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
To establish whether a foreign defendant was engaged in “substantial and not isolated activities” in Florida, the defendant's activities must be “considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the state for pecuniary benefit.” Stubbs, 447 F.3d at 1361 (internal citations omitted). However, because general personal jurisdiction is based on contacts unrelated to the cause of action being litigated, the due process requirements for general jurisdiction must be assessed under a “stricter standard” than those for specific jurisdiction. Consolidated Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir.2000). Under this more exacting standard, a defendant's contacts with the forum state “must be so extensive to be tantamount to [a defendant] being constructively present in the state to such a degree that it would be fundamentally fair to require it to answer in [the forum state's courts] in any litigation arising out of any transaction or occurrence taking place anywhere in the world.” Exhibit Icons, LLC v. XP Cos., LLC, 609 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1295 (S.D.Fla.2009) (internal citations omitted). In other words, a defendant's activities must be “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum state.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 761, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) ) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff does not dispute that Wrave has no office or employees or property in Florida. Instead, Plaintiff argues that Wrave has engaged in a series of business-related contacts with Florida-based cruise lines over the years such that it is subject to the general jurisdiction of this Court [D.E. 71 at 5–20]. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that: a majority of Wrave's touring business is derived from arrangements with Florida-based cruise line operators, which market and advertise Wrave's tours on their ships and websites; Wrave is paid by the cruise lines through wire transfers from Florida banks; Wrave has submitted bids and tour proposals to these Florida-based cruise lines; Wrave's co-owner travels to Miami annually to attend a trade conference and meet with the cruise line executives; and Wrave is a member of the Florida Caribbean Cruise Association (“FCCA”), based in Pembroke Pines, Florida.Id. Plaintiff further argues that Wrave is susceptible to general jurisdiction because the company has purchased some parts, supplies and insurance in Florida, and that Wrave agreed to personal jurisdiction in Florida in its contracts with Florida-based...
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