Arredondo v. City of Dallas

• Citation: 79 S.W.3d 657
• Decision Date: 04 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 05-99-01819-CV.,05-99-01819-CV.
• Parties: Anthony ARREDONDO, et al., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. The CITY OF DALLAS, Texas, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

Page 657

79 S.W.3d 657

Anthony ARREDONDO, et al., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. The CITY OF DALLAS, Texas, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 05-99-01819-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

June 4, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bill Boyd, Boyd & Veigel, P.C., McKinney, for Appellant.

James B. Pinson, Office of City Attorney, Dallas, for Appellee.

Before Justices KINKEADE, MOSELEY, and FITZGERALD.

OPINION

Opinion By Justice FITZGERALD.

Anthony Arredondo, et al. (Plaintiffs),¹ and the City of Dallas, Texas, appeal the trial court's summary judgment granting Plaintiffs unpaid back wages pursuant to a 1979 ordinance that constituted part of Plaintiffs' employment contract with the City. Plaintiffs bring one point of error contending the trial court failed to award them sufficient back wages. The City brings nine cross points contending the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment for Plaintiffs because the ordinance is ambiguous and because Plaintiffs failed to establish as a matter of law the amount of back wages to which they are entitled. The City also contends the trial court erred in severing Plaintiffs' claims from those of the remaining 808 firefighters who brought identical claims against the City. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the severance. We further conclude the ordinance is ambiguous. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 8, 1978, the Dallas Police and Fire Action Committee presented the City with a signed petition seeking an ordinance for the purpose of: (1) obtaining a pay increase effective October 1, 1978 for City sworn police officers and firefighters equal to no less than fifteen percent of the October 1, 1977 base salary of a third-year officer; (2) maintaining the "current percentage pay differential between grades in the sworn ranks" of police officers and firefighters; and (3) maintaining salary and benefits at levels not less than those in effect in October 1977.² The City Secretary approved the petition and submitted it to the City Council. Under the City Charter, the City Council had two choices it could either pass the ordinance embodied in the petition without alteration or call a special election submitting the ordinance to a vote of the people. See DALLAS, TEX., CHARTER ch. XVIII, § 13. The City Council decided to call a special election on January 20, 1979 to submit the ordinance to a vote of the people. Before the election, the City passed a resolution concerning the pay scale of the fire department. Resolution 78-2735,³ passed September 27, 1978 and effective October 1, 1978, established a new pay scale for the City's employees, including police and fire department personnel. At the January 20, 1979 special election, the voters approved the referendum.

On January 22, 1979, the City Council adopted the ordinance approved by the voters in Ordinance 16084 (the Ordinance).⁴ See Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 16,084 (Jan. 22, 1979). On January 24, 1979, the City Council passed Resolution 79-0348, purporting to implement the Ordinance.⁵ To implement the pay scale provisions mandated by the Ordinance, Resolution 79-0348 rescinded the pay scale established in Resolution 78-2735. Resolution 79-0348 established a pay scale maintaining the percentage pay differential in effect during fiscal year October 1977-78 between the ranks of police officers and firefighters at the rank of Deputy Chief and below and giving each rank a fifteen percent pay raise. On January 31, 1979, the City Council passed Resolution 79-0434, which recognized the need to give "the Assistant Police Chiefs, Assistant Fire Chiefs, Chief of Police, and Fire Chief" a raise "to maintain the percentage of pay differential between these grades and other grades in the sworn ranks," and the resolution approved new salary rates for the police and fire chiefs and assistant chiefs.⁶

In the succeeding years, the City raised the salary of all firefighters through the annual pay resolutions. Over time, however, the Fire Chief's salary crept higher in relation to the salary of the other firefighters. By October 1, 1994, the percentage pay differential between the Fire Chief's pay and the pay of the other firefighters was twelve to fifteen percentage points higher than it had been in 1979.

On June 30, 1994, more than eight hundred present and former members of the sworn ranks of the Dallas Fire Department sued the City of Dallas. The firefighters interpreted the phrase "[t]he current percentage pay differential between grades ... shall be maintained" as requiring the City to keep the 1979 percentage pay differential in all subsequent pay resolutions. They alleged the City had failed to maintain the percentage pay differential because the Fire Chief earned proportionally more than they did compared to 1979. The firefighters sought back wages for the higher salaries they would have received had the City maintained the percentage differential between their pay and the Fire Chiefs pay. The firefighters also sought a declaration that the beginning base salaries for the grades of Battalion Chief and below do not comply with the Ordinance and a declaration establishing the base salary for those grades for the City to be in compliance with the Ordinance. The firefighters also sought attorney's fees under section 37.009 of the civil practice and remedies code for their declaratory judgment action and under section 38.001 of the civil practice and remedies code for their breach of contract claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. §§ 37.009, 38.001 (Vernon 1997).

On June 7, 1995, the City filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance merely prohibited the City from decreasing the percentage pay differential between grades but did not prohibit the City from increasing the differential. The City also sought declarations that if all of the resolutions authorizing payment of salary after October 1, 1978 to the sworn ranks of the fire fighter and rescue officers failed to comply with the Ordinance, then those resolutions were ultra vires and void. The City alleged that if the resolutions authorizing payment of salary to the firefighters were void, then the salaries paid to the firefighters after October 1, 1978 were an illegal donation of public funds, and the City sought to recover all of the amounts paid to the firefighters as salary after October 1, 1978 to the extent they exceeded the salaries authorized under Resolution 78-2735 or Resolutions 79-0348 and 79-0434.

On April 10, 1995, Plaintiffs, who are sixteen of the firefighters suing the City, moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability for back pay and declaratory relief. On June 7, 1995, the City filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims because they waived the claims, ratified them, or were estopped from asserting them by accepting salary benefits under the resolutions passed after January 20, 1979. The City also asserted that the legislature had validated the City's acts. The City also requested judgment against Plaintiffs for the gross salary paid them to the extent it exceeded the salaries authorized under Resolution 78-2735 or Resolutions 79-0348 and 79-0434.

On December 4, 1995, the trial court entered an order stating the court "finds and declares that there is no genuine issue as to the material fact that the City of Dallas has failed to maintain the percentage pay differentials between grades in the sworn ranks of the fire fighter and rescue force as those differentials existed on October 1, 1978." The court overruled Plaintiffs' motion in all other respects. The December 4, 1995 order did not reference the City's motion for summary judgment.

The parties stipulated on June 18, 1996, to the base pay of the Fire Chief on January 22, 1979, the base pay of the different grades of the other firefighters under Resolutions 78-2735 and 79-0348, and the percentage difference between the Fire Chiefs base pay and each of the other levels of firefighters' base pay under Resolutions 78-2735 and 79-0348. The parties also stipulated to the base pay of the Fire Chief and to the base pay of each grade of the other firefighters from 1989 through 1995.

On October 11, 1996, Plaintiffs filed their first supplemental motion for partial summary judgment. This motion asserted the fact that the Fire Chief had received proportionally higher pay raises since 1979 than the lower ranks of the fire department. Plaintiffs relied on the stipulations and other evidence and prayed the trial court to adjudge the City liable for back pay from 1990, based on the percentage pay differential established by Resolution 79-0348. On January 9, 1997, the City filed its motion for summary judgment asserting that it was entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defenses. The City also argued that if its affirmative defenses did not bar Plaintiffs' suit, then the evidence shows the salary paid to Plaintiffs was illegal, and the City is entitled to judgment for all salary paid to Plaintiffs exceeding the amount authorized by Resolution 78-2735 or Resolutions 79-0348 and 79-0434, plus interest.

On August 1, 1997, the trial court ruled on the October 11, 1996 and January 9, 1997 motions for summary judgment by granting Plaintiffs' motion in part and denying the City's motion. The trial court concluded:

The City had failed to maintain the percentage pay differential between the grades in the sworn ranks of the fire department as those differentials existed on October 1, 1978;

The percentage pay differential in effect on January 20, 1979 was established by Resolution 78-2735;

Ordinance 16084 implemented the requirements of the special referendum election of January 20, 1979;

Resolution 79-0348 failed to maintain the percentage pay differentials;

From January 24, 1979 to the...