Arregui v. Gallegos-Main

• Decision Date: 04 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 38496.,38496.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Martha A. ARREGUI, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Rosalinda GALLEGOS–MAIN, an individual; Full Life Chiropractic, P.A., an Idaho professional association, Defendants–Respondents, and John and Jane Does I through X, whose true identities are unknown, Defendants.

153 Idaho 801

291 P.3d 1000

Martha A. ARREGUI, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Rosalinda GALLEGOS–MAIN, an individual; Full Life Chiropractic, P.A., an Idaho professional association, Defendants–Respondents,andJohn and Jane Does I through X, whose true identities are unknown, Defendants.

No. 38496.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, February 2012 Term.

May 4, 2012.

Rehearing Denied June 7, 2012.

Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P., Boise for appellant. D. Samuel Johnson argued.

Greener, Burke & Shoemaker, P.A., Boise, for respondents. Loren K. Messerly argued.

W. JONES, Justice.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal involves a medical malpractice claim brought against a chiropractor for negligently causing a patient to suffer a stroke

after treatment. On or about June 4, 2007, Appellant, Martha Arregui, sought treatment for her neck and back pain from the Respondent, a local chiropractor, Dr. Rosalinda Gallegos–Main. Arregui originally alleged that Dr. Gallegos–Main owed her a duty to treat her in a medically competent manner under Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act, and failed to do so when Arregui was diagnosed several weeks later as having suffered a stroke after a neck manipulation by Dr. Gallegos–Main. Arregui filed suit against the chiropractor and the facility, Full Life Chiropractic, on April 1, 2009. Dr. Gallegos–Main deposed Arregui's expert witness, Dr. Sarah Tamai, a chiropractor practicing in Oceanside, California, and discovered that she had no knowledge of the local standard of care in Nampa–Caldwell. Consequently, Dr. Gallegos–Main filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Arregui failed to meet the requirements for establishing a claim for medical malpractice which requires expert testimony regarding the local standard of care. Three days after the deadline, Arregui filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and included an affidavit from her expert, Dr. Tamai, with a sworn statement that she consulted a local chiropractor and was now familiar with the local standard of care. Dr. Gallegos–Main filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tamai as untimely and as a sham affidavit.

After hearing oral arguments on both pre-trial motions, the district court granted the Motion to Strike Dr. Tamai's affidavit and Dr. Gallegos–Main's Motion for Summary Judgment. Arregui filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that the court erred in striking Dr. Tamai's affidavit and presented a new argument in the alternative that the court improperly granted summary judgment because the Medical Malpractice Act does not apply to chiropractors. The district court entered a final order denying Arregui's Motion for Reconsideration. Arregui now appeals to this Court.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On or about June 4, 2007, Appellant, Martha Arregui ("the Patient"), sought chiropractic treatment of her back and neck pain with Respondent, Dr. Rosalinda Gallegos–Main. Dr. Gallegos–Main diagnosed the Patient's presented symptoms as torticollis and used a Pettibon Tendon Ligament Muscle Stimulator device and an ArthroStim device to loosen the muscles in the Patient's neck. The Patient returned to Dr. Gallegos–Main's office later that day for more treatment and to discuss an on-going treatment plan. The Patient alleges that during one of the two visits to Dr. Gallegos–Main's office, the chiropractor performed a cervical adjustment (commonly referred to as a neck manipulation). Dr. Gallegos–Main denies that she ever performed an adjustment on the Patient and the chiropractor's records do not indicate that a cervical adjustment was ever performed. The next day, on June 5, 2007, the Patient went to the emergency room complaining of a painful, stiff neck and dizziness. The Patient was evaluated, given a diagnosis of torticollis, and sent home. Several weeks later, the Patient went to another health care provider who diagnosed her as having suffered a posterior inferior cerebellar artery stroke

, referred to as a "PICA stroke."

The Patient filed her Complaint on April 1, 2009, suing Respondents Dr. Gallegos–Main in her capacity as a health care professional, and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A., in its capacity as a chiropractic facility (collectively referred to as "Dr. Gallegos–Main"). In her Complaint, the Patient alleged that Dr. Gallegos–Main owed the Patient a duty as a health care professional to treat her in a non-negligent manner under the Medical Malpractice Act. See I.C. §§ 6–1012 –1013. The Patient argues that Dr. Gallegos–Main's negligent treatment of the Patient's torticollis proximately caused the Patient to suffer a stroke

. On August 16, 2010, the Patient disclosed Dr. Sarah Tamai as her expert witness to testify at trial about whether Dr. Gallegos–Main breached the standard of care ordinarily exercised by chiropractors working in the Nampa–Caldwell area under similar circumstances.

On October 15, 2010, the Patient submitted Dr. Tamai's expert report outlining Dr. Tamai's opinions on Dr. Gallegos–Main's alleged breach of care in her treatment of the Patient on or about June 4, 2007. A few days later, on October 19, 2010, counsel for Dr. Gallegos–Main deposed Dr. Tamai in Oceanside, California. In her deposition, Dr. Tamai acknowledged that she had no personal knowledge of the local standard of care for chiropractors in the Nampa–Caldwell area. Near the end of Dr. Tamai's deposition, she testified that she was not planning on altering her opinion "[u]nless something in terms of evidence comes up that someone would ask me to render my opinion upon."

On October 26, 2010, Dr. Gallegos–Main filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the Patient failed to present any direct expert testimony establishing the local standard of care among chiropractors, and as such, the Patient failed to submit evidence that Dr. Gallegos–Main breached the applicable standard of care in her treatment of the Patient. Three days after the deadline to file opposing affidavits, on November 12, 2010, the Patient filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment accompanied with an affidavit from Dr. Tamai. In opposing summary judgment, the Patient contended that Dr. Tamai contacted a local Idaho chiropractor and familiarized herself with the applicable standard of care as set forth in Dr. Tamai's affidavit. On November 16, 2010, Dr. Gallegos–Main filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tamai, arguing that the affidavit was untimely under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), that it was a sham affidavit, and that it did not satisfy the foundational requirements of admissibility under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Idaho Code section 6–1013(c)(1).

On November 23, 2010 the district court held a hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Motion to Strike. The court granted the Motion to Strike Dr. Tamai's affidavit, ruling that it was untimely and contradicted Dr. Tamai's prior deposition testimony. The court then granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that based on Dr. Tamai's deposition, the Patient failed to prove that Dr. Tamai was familiar with the local standard of care and thereby was not allowed to offer expert testimony indicating that Dr. Gallegos–Main was negligent under Idaho Code section 6–1013. On December 2, 2010, the court entered Final Judgment dismissing the case. On December 3, 2010, the Patient filed a Motion for Reconsideration under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B), arguing that the court erred in striking Dr. Tamai's affidavit and in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gallegos–Main. In the Patient's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, the Patient argued that the affidavit was not a sham affidavit and that Dr. Tamai laid a proper foundation for the affidavit to be admissible under Idaho Code section 6–1013(c)(1). Alternatively, the Patient also raised a new argument that the Medical Malpractice Act does not apply to chiropractic physicians. Dr. Gallegos–Main filed her opposing brief, arguing that the Patient improperly filed her Motion for Reconsideration one day after the court entered its Final Judgment dismissing all claims.

On January 27, 2011, the court held a hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration and concluded that no error was committed. The lower court considered Dr. Tamai's affidavit, which was timely filed regarding the Motion for Reconsideration and found that it was still a sham affidavit. The court ruled orally from the bench, without drafting a memorandum decision, and did not articulate its ruling in great detail, but the record shows that the district court did consider the admissibility of the affidavit and found that it lacked a proper foundation to establish admissibility as expert testimony. The court also considered the Patient's alternative argument and held that Idaho Code sections 6–1012 and 6–1013 applied to chiropractors. The Patient timely filed her Notice of Appeal on January 28, 2011.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred in striking Dr. Tamai's affidavit?

2. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment?

3. Whether the district court erred in denying the Patient's motion for reconsideration?

4. Whether Dr. Gallegos–Main is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal?

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When considering whether the evidence shows a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must...