Arrington v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 10 June 2022
• Docket Number: 17 C 05345,17 C 04839
• Parties: JUANITA ARRINGTON, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of RONALD ARRINGTON, deceased, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, an Illinois municipal corporation, et al., Defendants. ISIAH STEVENSON and MICHAEL COKES, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, an Illinois municipal corporation, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

JUANITA ARRINGTON, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of RONALD ARRINGTON, deceased, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, an Illinois municipal corporation, et al., Defendants.

ISIAH STEVENSON and MICHAEL COKES, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, an Illinois municipal corporation, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 17 C 05345, 17 C 04839

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

June 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin United States District Judge

Plaintiffs filed two lawsuits asserting various federal and state law claims in connection with a police pursuit that ended in a vehicle collision. The cases were consolidated for pretrial discovery and are now before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment and motions to exclude certain expert witness opinions. A summary of the Court's resolution of these motions is set forth at the conclusion of this opinion.

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Background

I. Factual History

The following facts are undisputed except where otherwise indicated. On July 1, 2016, plaintiff-decedent Ronald Arrington left Chicago in a gold Pontiac Grand Prix to pick up plaintiff Isiah Stevenson in Matteson, Illinois. R. 202 ¶ 9.^[1] When the car left Chicago, plaintiff Michael Cokes was seated in the rear seat on the passenger side, while non-party Jimmy Malone was seated in the front passenger seat. R. 202 ¶ 10. Once Arrington picked up Stevenson, Cokes moved to the rear driver's side seat while Stevenson sat in the rear passenger side. R. 202 ¶ 11.

After picking up Stevenson, Arrington started to drive back toward the highway to return to Chicago. Malone pointed Arrington to another area, saying he had to take care of some business quickly. R. 224-1 ¶ 8. The car eventually made its way to an Arby's parking lot. Id. Once there, Malone got out of the car, leaving the front passenger door open; the other occupants remained in the car. R. 202 ¶ 15. Malone then allegedly robbed a woman in the parking lot before returning to the car and telling Arrington to drive away. R. 202 ¶ 14.

Arrington drove the Pontiac to the highway, at which point he stopped the vehicle on the side of the road and refused to drive any farther. R. 202 ¶¶ 18-19. He moved from the driver's seat to the rear, and Malone then moved into the driver's seat and continued driving on the highway. R. 202 ¶¶ 19-20.

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Illinois State Police (“ISP”) Troopers Brian Walker and Charles Dixon later received an emergency broadcast that a gold Pontiac with tinted windows and no registration was being sought in connection with an armed robbery. R. 202 ¶¶ 27. After hearing this broadcast, Walker and Dixon relocated to Interstate 57 north and waited to see if they spotted the Pontiac. R. 202 ¶¶ 28-29. Eventually, Walker saw a vehicle matching the description traveling northbound on I-57, and both troopers began to follow it. R. 202 ¶¶ 30-31. Although the troopers did not activate their lights or initiate a stop, after some time, the Pontiac exited I-57 and stopped on the exit ramp. R. 202 ¶ 32. Walker and Dixon told the occupants to exit the vehicle, but nobody did. R. 202 ¶ 33. About 20 seconds after it stopped, with Malone still at the wheel, the vehicle drove off. R. 202 ¶¶ 34-36. Walker pursued the Pontiac through Calumet Park, Illinois and continued into Chicago. R. 202 ¶¶ 37-38. During the ISP pursuit, Malone violated several traffic laws, including running red lights, crossing lane markers, and driving on road shoulders. R. 202 ¶¶ 42-46.

Meanwhile the same day, defendant Dean Ewing, an officer with the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”), was on patrol in his unmarked Ford Explorer. R. 199-1 ¶ 1. Officers Ortiz, Caulfield, and Barango were passengers in the Ford. Id. Ewing heard a CPD radio transmission from another person asking the dispatcher if she was monitoring an outside frequency. R. 199-1 ¶ 5. Ewing then heard the dispatcher state, “OK I am getting westbound from 124th and Wallace ... OK wanted for armed robbery ... Gold Pontiac ...” R. 199-1 ¶ 7. The dispatcher did not state how many people were in the Pontiac or how many suspects were being sought. R. 199-1 ¶ 8.

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Ewing knew that an outside agency was involved in the pursuit but did not know which one. R. 199-1 ¶ 9.

Ewing turned the Ford onto Halsted Street and proceeded south, intending to drive to the area where the chase was occurring. R. 199-1 ¶ 11. He was not assigned to the pursuit, nor did he inform his supervisor or CPD dispatch that he was driving to the pursuit area. R. 199-1 ¶¶ 15, 17. While driving, he continued to listen to dispatch and altered his course based on callouts of the pursuit location. R. 199-1 ¶ 20.

Eventually, Ewing turned on 124th Street, traveling eastbound. R. 199-1 ¶ 25. At that point, he believed he was driving on a street parallel to the pursuit and in the same direction. R. 199-1 ¶ 28. He drove through a stop sign at Emerald Avenue going 46 mph, above the posted 30 mph speed limit on 124th Street. R. 199-1 ¶¶ 29-30. Officer Ortiz could hear the sirens from the ISP cars, but Ewing did not activate the sirens on his car. R. 199-1 ¶¶ 33, 36. Ewing testified that had he been in pursuit, he would have had his siren on. R. 199-1 ¶ 39. He knew that he was exceeding the speed limit on 124th Street. R. 199-1 ¶ 47.

As he accelerated down 124th Street, the Ford reached 55 mph. R. 199-1 ¶ 38. Ortiz testified that at one point when approaching an intersection, Ewing slowed down because the occupants did not want to collide with the suspect or pursuit vehicles. R. 199-1 ¶ 41. As Ewing approached the 124th Street and Union Avenue intersection, roughly 2.0 seconds before the collision, the throttle on the Ford dropped

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to 0%. R. 199-1 ¶ 42. Ewing drove through the stop sign controlling eastbound traffic on 124th Street without stopping or slowing the Ford. R. 199-1 ¶¶ 53-54.

In the seconds leading up to the crash, the gold Pontiac driven by Malone and carrying Plaintiffs was traveling northbound on Union Avenue at around 60 mph. R. 199-1 ¶ 56. Union is a one-way southbound street with a posted speed limit of 30 mph and a stop sign for southbound traffic at the intersection with 124th Street. Id.; R. 202 ¶¶ 77, 80. The Pontiac entered Ewing's field of vision 1.0 seconds before impact. R. 199-1 ¶ 48. At that moment, the throttle on the Ford was depressed 52.2%, and its speed was 55 mph. R. 199-1 ¶¶ 49-50. A few tenths of a second before the collision, Ewing applied the brakes. R. 202 ¶ 67. The vehicles collided in the intersection, the front of the Ford hitting the driver's side of the Pontiac. R. 199-1 ¶ 57. Arrington was seated in the driver's side rear passenger seat of the Pontiac; he died due to injuries sustained in the crash. R. 199-1 ¶ 58. Stevenson and Cokes were seated on the passenger side of the Pontiac; both sustained injuries in the crash. R. 199-1 ¶ 59. Malone also died due to his injuries. R. 202 ¶ 84.

Following the collision, Stevenson and Cokes were both arrested and indicted on charges of felony robbery. R. 208 ¶¶ 85-90. Each later pled guilty to misdemeanor theft in connection with the incident. R. 208 ¶¶ 87, 90.

II. Expert Witness Opinions

a. Adam Hyde (Plaintiffs' Accident Reconstruction Expert)

Adam Hyde conducted a traffic accident reconstruction analysis in which he reviewed the scene of the crash and data collected from the Event Data Recorders (“EDRs”) of both the Ford and the Pontiac. The EDR records vehicle operation data

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including speed, accelerator and brake pedal depression, and steering input. In his report, Hyde discusses the meaning of the data collected by both vehicle's EDRs. He also discusses the layout of the intersection, including visibility obstructions.

In his initial report, Hyde offers several opinions regarding the crash, including opinions on the length of time the drivers of both vehicles would have had to react to each other (incorporating a concept called “Perception and Response Time” or “PRT”) and the estimated stopping distance for the Ford as it approached the 124th and Union intersection. Hyde opines that had Ewing “stopped at the stop sign controlled intersection of 124th Street and South Union Avenue the crash would not have occurred.” R. 220-1, at 36. He also opines that Ewing violated the law by failing to stop at this stop sign. R. 220-1, at 36.

Hyde's supplemental declaration includes an opinion that the collision between the Ford and Pontiac was “clearly avoidable” and likely would not have happened had Ewing altered his driving behavior in various ways, such as by slowing or stopping his vehicle at the stop sign controlling the 124th Street and Union Avenue intersection, or by driving within the 30-mph speed limit on 124th Street. R. 220-2, at 3. This declaration also includes an opinion that any attempt by the passengers in the Pontiac to seize control of the vehicle as it traveled on Union Avenue would have been likely to cause an accident accompanied by serious harm to the vehicle occupants, bystanders, or surrounding property. Id. Hyde also produced a supplemental report which elaborated on some of these opinions, such as describing

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particular risks with the various means by which the passengers in the Pontiac might have attempted to take control from Malone, the driver. R. 220-3.

b. Andrew Scott (Plaintiffs' Police Practices Expert)

Andrew Scott's opinions cover generally accepted police practices and procedures and offer an appraisal of Ewing's actions. Scott opined that the force Ewing used to seize Plaintiffs was unreasonable, that he improperly participated in the ISP's pursuit of the Pontiac, that Ewing's conduct was willful and wanton and undertaken without regard for the general public, and that if Ewing was not engaged in the pursuit (and by extension was not enforcing the law), his driving was negligent. R. 220-4. Scott supports these conclusions with references to CPD...