Arrington v. Courtyard Citiflats, LLC (Ex parte Courtyard Citiflats, LLC)

• Decision Date: 12 June 2015
• Docket Number: 1140264.
• Citation: 191 So.3d 787
• Parties: Ex parte COURTYARD CITIFLATS, LLC, and Action Property Management, L.L.C. (In re Coretta Arrington v. Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management, L.L.C. ).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

191 So.3d 787

Ex parte COURTYARD CITIFLATS, LLC, and Action Property Management, L.L.C.(In re Coretta Arrington

v.Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management, L.L.C. ).

1140264.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 12, 2015.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 18, 2015.

William H. Brittain II, E. Hamilton Wilson, and Emily C. Marks of Ball, Ball, Matthews & Novak, P.A., Montgomery, for petitioners.

Gary E. Atchison, Montgomery; and J. Carlton Sims, Jr., Montgomery, for respondent.

SHAW

, Justice.

Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management, L.L.C. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Citiflats”), the defendants below,¹ petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff, Coretta Arrington, as untimely filed. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

Facts and Procedural History

On July 18, 2014, Arrington filed, both individually and in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of her deceased minor child, a complaint against Citiflats. Arrington's complaint alleged tort-based claims in connection with the death of Arrington's child as the result of injuries allegedly sustained on July 24, 2012, on premises owned and managed by Citiflats. Arrington's complaint was accompanied by an “Affidavit of Substantial Hardship” (hereinafter referred to as “the hardship statement”) alleging that Arrington was unable to pay the corresponding filing fee. See § 12–19–70, Ala.Code 1975

.² It is undisputed that, at the time it was filed, the hardship statement had not been approved by the trial court as required by § 12–19–70(b). Arrington's complaint was also accompanied by the summonses necessary for service on the named defendants, which were stamped “filed” by the clerk of the trial court on the filing date.

On August 18, 2014—after the July 24, 2014, expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations—the trial court entered an order purporting to approve the hardship statement. On August 19, 2014, the clerk of the trial court issued the previously filed summonses for service.

Citiflats filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P

., seeking to dismiss Arrington's complaint on the ground that the statutory limitations period had expired without the payment of a filing fee or the approval of a hardship statements—either of which, according to Citiflats, was necessary to commence the action and to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. Relying on prior authority from this Court, notably De–Gas, Inc. v. Midland Resources, 470 So.2d 1218 (Ala.1985), and Mace v. Centel Business Systems, 549 So.2d 70 (Ala.1989), Citiflats alleged that the mere filing of Arrington's complaint without payment of the filing fee or approval of the hardship statement was insufficient to commence the action for statute-of-limitations purposes; thus, Citiflats contended, all of Arrington's claims were time-barred.

In her opposition to the dismissal motion, Arrington, among her other arguments, attempted to distinguish the present case from the authorities cited by Citiflats and requested, pursuant to Hornsby v. Sessions, 703 So.2d 932 (Ala.1997)

, that the trial court enter an order nunc pro tunc deeming its approval of the hardship statement as having been “retroactively entered” on the original filing date.

After a hearing, the trial court, on November 5, 2014, entered, over Citiflats' opposition, an order approving the hardship statement “Nunc Pro Tunc retroactive to [the original] filing date”; shortly thereafter, the trial court entered a second order denying Citiflats' motion to dismiss. Citiflats promptly filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.

Standard of Review

A writ of mandamus will be granted where there is

“ ‘ “(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” ’

“Ex parte Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 872 So.2d 810, 813 (Ala.2003)

(quoting Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991) ). Mandamus will lie to direct a trial court to vacate a void judgment

or order. Ex parte Chamblee, 899 So.2d 244, 249 (Ala.2004)

.”

Ex parte Sealy, L.L.C., 904 So.2d 1230, 1232 (Ala.2004)

.

Discussion

In its petition, Citiflats maintains that either the payment of the requisite filing fee or the trial court's approval of the hardship statement was a jurisdictional prerequisite for the commencement of Arrington's action. More specifically, Citiflats contends that the trial court exceeded its discretion in issuing an order “nunc pro tunc ” in an effort to cure a jurisdictional defect. Although this Court is aware of the unfortunate result from Arrington's perspective, and despite her attempts to demonstrate that the authorities cited by Citiflats are inapposite, we must agree that the authorities cited by Citiflats are both applicable and controlling: caselaw clearly dictates that the payment of a filing fee or the preapproval of the hardship statement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the commencement of Arrington's action.

Here, it is undisputed that Arrington timely filed her complaint—accompanied by the hardship statement—within the applicable limitations period. This Court has repeatedly cautioned, however, that mere filing, alone, is not always sufficient to commence an action and to toll the running of the limitations period:

“Although Rule 3, Ala. R. Civ. P

., states that ‘[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court,’ this Court has held that the filing of a complaint is not the sole factor in determining when an action is ‘commenced.’ A major function of Rule 3, Ala. R. Civ. P., is to identify, with certainty, the specific time when a civil action is initiated. The filing of a complaint is, therefore, a significant factor in commencing an action and suspending the operation of the applicable statute of limitations; however, it is not the sole factor. Ward v. Saben Appliance Co., 391 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Ala.1980). This Court has held that the filing of a complaint, standing alone, does not commence an action for statute-of-limitations purposes.”

Ex parte East Alabama Mental Health–Mental Retardation Bd., Inc., 939 So.2d 1, 3 (Ala.2006)

.

In De–Gas, supra, the plaintiffs delivered both summonses and a complaint to the clerk of the trial court, who stamped the items “filed” on the date they were delivered. 470 So.2d at 1219

. However, the plaintiffs neglected to pay the filing fee at that time. Over one month later, the plaintiffs paid the filing fee, and service was then effected; however, the statute of limitations on at least one of the plaintiffs' claims had expired between the filing of the complaint and the payment of the filing fee. In rejecting the claim that the delivery of the complaint and summonses without the payment of the filing was sufficient to commence the action for statute-of-limitations purposes, this Court explained:

“The use of the term ‘shall’ in [§ 12–19–70

] makes the payment of the filing fee mandatory. See Prince v. Hunter, 388 So.2d 546, 547 (Ala.1980). It was the obvious intent of the legislature to require that either the payment of this fee or a court-approved verified statement of substantial hardship accompany the complaint at the time of filing. ”

470 So.2d at 1220

(first emphasis added).

In reaching that conclusion in De–Gas, we further noted that “ ‘[t]he most important and essential element of interruption of [the running of the limitations period] is that defendant be judicially notified of the rights which are sought and of plaintiff's intent to proceed with the action.’ ” 470 So.2d at 1221

(quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 264 at p. 294 (1948)). Thus, we held that “the payment of the fees required by § 12–19–70

or the filing of a court-approved verified statement of substantial hardship is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the commencement of an action for statute of limitations purposes.” 470 So.2d at 1222 (emphasis added). See also Reynolds v. Sheppard, 818 So.2d 389, 391 (Ala.2001) ( “Unless the filing fee is paid or a court-approved verified statement of substantial hardship is filed within the limitations period, the action has not been commenced within that period.” (emphasis added)); Ex parte Beavers, 779 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Ala.2000) (concluding, where the circuit court had ruled on the merits of postconviction petition after it had denied petitioner's request to proceed in forma pauperis, that, solely “[b]ecause the circuit court denied [petitioner's] request to proceed in forma pauperis, it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of his petition”); Vann v. Cook, 989 So.2d 556, 559 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (“The payment of a filing fee or the filing of a court-approved verified statement of substantial hardship is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the commencement of an action.” (emphasis added)); Carpenter v. State, 782 So.2d 848, 850 (Ala.Crim.App.2000) (dismissing the appeal as from a void judgment where trial court had purported to rule on affidavit of substantial hardship at the conclusion of the underlying proceeding on ground that “[a] trial court does not obtain jurisdiction of an action until either a filing fee is paid or the fee is properly waived according to § 12–19–70 ” (emphasis added)); and Goldsmith v. State, 709 So.2d 1352, 1353 (Ala.Crim.App.1997) (“[A]bsent payment of the filing fee or approval of the in forma pauperis declaration, the circuit court does not acquire subject-matter jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)).

Mace, supra, similarly involved a plaintiff who filed a complaint at or near the statutory deadline with an accompanying, but unapproved, affidavit of substantial hardship. Relying on De–Gas, among other cases, we affirmed, on direct appeal, a summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the applicable statute of...