Arrington v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2005-0243.,2005-0243.
• Citation: 109 Ohio St.3d 539,849 N.E.2d 1004,2006 Ohio 3257
• Parties: ARRINGTON, Appellant, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION. et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

849 N.E.2d 1004

109 Ohio St.3d 539

2006-Ohio-3257

ARRINGTON, Appellant, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION. et al., Appellees.

No. 2005-0243.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted November 30, 2005.

Decided July 12, 2006.

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Kelley & Ferraro, L.L.P., Michael V. Kelley, and Thomas M. Wilson, Cleveland, for appellant.

Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., George H. Rosin, and David W. Hilkert, Akron, for appellee Daimler-Chrysler Corporation.

Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, Elise Porter, Assistant Solicitor, Vincent T. Lombardo, and James A Barnes, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee William E. Mabe, Administrator of Workers' Compensation.

O'CONNOR, J.

{¶ 1} In this appeal involving an asbestos-related workers' compensation claim, we address the propriety of a case-management order requiring all testimony to be presented by videotape rather than through live testimony before the jury. We hold that the right to trial by jury in claims brought pursuant to R.C. 4123.512 is conferred by the General Assembly through statute and does not arise from Section 5, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. We further hold that although the preferred practice is to permit parties to testify live before the fact-finder, the trial court's order that all testimony be submitted through videotaped evidence does not offend the statutory right to trial by jury in claims brought pursuant to the Ohio workers' compensation statutory scheme, R.C. Chapters 4121 and 4123 ("the act").

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} The appellant, James Arrington, claims that he developed asbestosis as a direct result of occupational exposure to asbestos during the 31 years he was employed by appellee DaimlerChrysler Corporation. He sought compensation and medical payments pursuant to the act. The Industrial Commission denied him the right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund, and he appealed to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, demanding trial by jury.

{¶ 3} The trial court conducted an initial case-management conference governing all asbestos-related workers' compensation claims ("AWC cases") pending before it including that brought by Arrington. According to minutes of the conference, the trial court announced its "vision" of trials by videotape for the pending claims. It acknowledged that the envisioned process was "experimental" and subject to modification. Arrington and other claimants objected consistently to the order for a video trial.¹ In response, according to minutes of a later case-management meeting, the trial court reiterated its "firm insistence" that the trials proceed by videotape, indicating that cases could be dismissed for want of prosecution if the parties did not prepare videotaped testimony.

{¶ 4} Arrington nevertheless persisted in his efforts, moving to vacate the order, submitting supporting documents, including affidavits and analyses of similar cases pending in other courts of common pleas. Relying on our decision in Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 601, 597 N.E.2d 474, Arrington argued that there was no compelling need to mandate videotape trials and that the order violated his constitutional right to a jury trial and would prejudice his case.

{¶ 5} In disputing the need for trial by videotape, Arrington compared the AWC docket in Summit County to those of other Ohio jurisdictions. He argued that other courts had far more AWC cases pending, but still allowed live testimony in each. He further suggested that using videotaped evidence would not save time or court resources and that the identity of the legal issues in the AWC cases was not a "compelling reason" to order video trials.

{¶ 6} As to prejudice, he contended that the use of videotape would limit his use of large-scale exhibits, hamper his ability to adjust the order of his witnesses and to respond to evidence as it was presented, and deter attorneys from representing plaintiffs in such cases. Relying on his counsel's long experience as a litigator and vague references to opinions of unnamed "jury consultants," Arrington also argued that jurors would not give as close attention to the witnesses on videotape as to those testifying live and that jurors could not as easily assess credibility of witnesses on videotape.

{¶ 7} The trial court denied the motion, noting that there were more than 300 AWC cases pending in Summit County (many for more than one year). The court quoted its statement at an earlier case-management meeting:

{¶ 8} "`The court, upon examination of all these cases, and consultation with other courts around the state, has determined that video trials are highly appropriate in all of these cases. In reaching this conclusion the court has determined that the costs will be minimalized [sic], the nature of each of the actions is particularly appropriate to the presentation of testimony in such fashion, and the relevant, material testimony [that] will ultimately be presented to the jury will be minimal. This court has also considered the cost and convenience to jurors and potential jurors of the facility of considering the evidence via video in a continuous fashion as against the time and delay involved in a general trial. The video process will also free up courtroom facilities in Summit County, already overburdened and undergoing renovation. It also offers the possibility of cutting costs for experts by allowing an expert to give testimony in several different cases in quick sequence.'"

{¶ 9} The court further noted that Civ.R. 40 and Sup.R. 13(B)² allowed video trials and that the use of videotaped evidence would significantly reduce trial time. The court found that the "issues to be resolved in each case by a jury are simple and direct" and that the plaintiffs were "entitled to a prompt, fair, and efficient day in court in order that they might get compensation to which they may be entitled." The court reaffirmed its earlier order that the jury charge, testimony, and exhibits would be presented by videotape, while jury selection and opening and closing statements would be presented live.

{¶ 10} The trial court's case-management order required all parties to file all videotaped testimony prior to trial. Although Arrington timely filed a witness list, he did not file videotaped evidence, maintaining that he and his witnesses were prepared for trial and ready to testify before the jury. One week prior to his scheduled trial date, the trial court acknowledged that Arrington and his witnesses were available to proceed with live testimony but, because he had failed to have testimony recorded, dismissed his case.

{¶ 11} Arrington appealed. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, concluding that Arrington had no constitutional right to a jury and thus no entitlement to "sit face-to-face with a jury, to interact with a jury, or to present live testimony to a jury." 2004-Ohio-7180 at ¶ 23. The appellate court further rejected his claims that Civ.R. 40 violated the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Open Courts Clauses of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at ¶ 26.

{¶ 12} We accepted a discretionary appeal to define the rights associated with the act and to consider the critical interests that compete in this case: a litigant's interest in presenting live witnesses in the prosecution of his claims and the trial court's interests in conducting a trial as expeditiously and efficiently as permitted by constitutional and other guidelines.

Analysis

{¶ 13} As we recently described, the act "provides the statutory mechanism for providing cash-wage benefits and medical care to victims of work-connected injuries and for allocating the ultimate cost of such injuries to consumers by augmenting the cost of goods or services that are a product of that work in order to reimburse employers for a prescribed insurance premium." Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 41, 741 N.E.2d 121.

{¶ 14} The origins of the act date from 1911, when the General Assembly enacted Ohio's first comprehensive law pertaining to compensation for industrial injuries. 102 Ohio Laws 524. Although the statute, which set up a voluntary system, survived constitutional challenge, State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer (1912), 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N.E. 602, it was displaced in 1913 by a compulsory system after Ohio amended its Constitution to include Section 35, Article II, "the fount for all subsequent workers' compensation laws." Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 643-644, 576 N.E.2d 722 (Holmes, J., dissenting); 103 Ohio Laws, 72. Section 35 specifically empowered the General Assembly to impose a regime through which a worker who suffers injury or occupational disease caused by conditions in the workplace is compensated through a fund established by compulsory contributions from employers.

{¶ 15} That early incarnation of the act was born of more than simple Progressive Era social interventionism and general public beneficence toward workers. Rather, it was also a specific pragmatic response to the social dissatisfaction with the lack of compensation available to injured workers at common law. Village v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 129, 131, 15 OBR 279, 472 N.E.2d 1079; Indus. Comm. v. Weigandt (1921), 102 Ohio St. 1, 7, 130 N.E. 38. As we explained in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 115, 118-119, 748 N.E.2d 1111:

{¶ 16} "Prior to 1913, the employee's ability to receive compensation for work-related injuries was governed by the common law of torts. Although the principle of vicarious liability had long been recognized at common law, it was far more difficult for the injured worker to recover damages from his or her employer than it was for the stranger to the employment relationship. The injured employee was required to prove that the employer violated a...