Arrington v. State

• Decision Date: 09 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. S09P1028.,S09P1028.
• Citation: Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438 (Ga. 2009)
• Parties: ARRINGTON v. THE STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

687 S.E.2d 438

286 Ga. 335

ARRINGTON v.THE STATE.

No. S09P1028.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

November 9, 2009.

Reconsideration Denied December 15, 2009.

William J. Sussman, Jeffrey S. Bowman, Augusta, for appellant.

Ashley Wright, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Theresa M. Schiefer, Assistant General, for appellee.

HINES, Justice.

A jury convicted Robert Owen Arrington of malice murder and felony murder and recommended a death sentence.The trial court denied Arrington's motion for new trial, and he appeals.¹For the reasons set forth below, this Court affirms.

General Grounds

1.The evidence adduced at trial showed that on April 3, 2001, deputies from the Richmond County Sheriff's Department responded to a domestic dispute involving Arrington and the victim, Kathy Hutchens, at the victim's duplex apartment.As a result, Arrington, who had been living with Hutchens for two months, went to a neighbor's home to stay.Ten days later officers were again called to Hutchens's apartment after her sister discovered her severely decomposed body inside.Hutchens had sustained numerous blunt force head injuries, and the stage of decomposition of her body was consistent with her death's occurring approximately ten days prior to the autopsy, which was performed on April 14, 2001.Hutchens had cashed a check for over $600 on April 3, 2001, and Arrington's neighbor testified that on that same day an intoxicated Arrington told him that he had won $500 in the lottery.A bloody fingerprint found at the crime scene matched Arrington's fingerprint; bloody boot impressions found at the scene were connected to Arrington's boots; and blood on Arrington's boots matched Hutchens's blood.

James Griffin testified that, while incarcerated with Arrington, Arrington told him that he had entered the victim's apartment when she left to cash her disability check and that he had hidden in a hallway until Hutchens returned and showered.According to Griffin, Arrington said that he confronted Hutchens after she came out of the shower, they argued, and he began attacking her in the bathroom.The crime scene investigator testified that, based on blood spatter pattern analysis, Hutchens's beating began in the bathroom.We find the evidence sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Arrington guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.Jackson v. Virginia,443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560(1979).SeeOCGA § 16-5-1.

Constitutional Issues

2.Qualifying prospective jurors on the basis of their views regarding the death penalty "does not deny capital defendants their right to an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community and is not otherwise unconstitutional.[Cits.]"Walker v. State,281 Ga. 157, 162(8), 635 S.E.2d 740(2006).SeeWainwright v. Witt,469 U.S. 412, 418-426(II), 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841(1985).

3.Arrington's contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the indictment because it did not include the statutory aggravating circumstances has previously been decided adversely to him.SeeJones v. State,282 Ga. 784, 791(2), 653 S.E.2d 456(2007)(holding under Georgia law and reaffirming under federal constitutional law that statutory aggravating circumstances need not be included in indictments).

4.Arrington contends that Georgia's statutory death penalty scheme unconstitutionally promotes the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.Georgia's death penalty statutes have been repeatedly upheld as constitutional.SeeNance v. State,280 Ga. 125, 126(2), 623 S.E.2d 470(2005);Gregg v. Georgia,428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859(1976).See alsoZant v. Stephens,462 U.S. 862, 876-879(I), 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235(1983)(stating that Georgia's statutory aggravating circumstances constitutionally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants).The prosecutorial discretion given to district attorneys has also been upheld as constitutional based on the fact that "[a]prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty is limited by the jury's ultimate decision to impose it.[Cit.]"Jenkins v. State,269 Ga. 282, 285(2), 498 S.E.2d 502(1998).See alsoMcCleskey v. Kemp,481 U.S. 279, 311-312, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262(1987)."[T]he U.S. Constitution and Georgia law authorize the death penalty for [Arrington's] crimes and [Arrington] has failed to show that the prosecutor acted in an unconstitutional manner with respect to his case.[Cit.]"Jenkins,269 Ga. at 285(2), 498 S.E.2d 502.SeeRower v. State,264 Ga. 323, 324(2), 443 S.E.2d 839(1994).

Arrington also contends that this Court's proportionality review does not meet statutory and constitutional requirements.This Court has rejected similar arguments.See, e.g., McMichen v. State,265 Ga. 598, 611(25), 458 S.E.2d 833(1995)(citingMcCleskey,481 U.S. at 306-308, 107 S.Ct. 1756).See alsoGissendaner v. State,272 Ga. 704, 717(19)(a), 532 S.E.2d 677(2000)(stating that this Court's proportionality review concerns whether the death penalty "is excessive per se" or is "substantially out of line" for the type of crime involved and not whether there ever have been sentences less than death imposed for similar crimes).Arrington has presented nothing that supports a contrary conclusion in this case.SeeTerrell v. State,276 Ga. 34, 44(9), 572 S.E.2d 595(2002).

Pre-Trial Issues

5.We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in its denial of Arrington's request for an ex parte hearing on his motion for funds to retain a jury composition expert.The use of a jury composition expert "cannot be considered a secretive trial strategy."Thomason v. State,268 Ga. 298, 309(6), 486 S.E.2d 861(1997).Thus, Arrington was not improperly placed "in a position where, in order to make the showing required for public funds with which to employ an expert, he had to reveal his theory of the case to the State."Id. at 310(6), 486 S.E.2d 861.

6.Arrington contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for funds with which to retain a mitigation specialist and a prison consultant."Absent discretionary abuse, a trial court's ruling on a criminal defendant's motion for the appointment of an expert witness will be upheld.[Cits.]"Thomason,268 Ga. at 310(7), 486 S.E.2d 861.

After an ex parte hearing on Arrington's initial request for a mitigation specialist made two weeks before his case was initially set for trial, the trial court found, among other things, that defense counsel had done considerable trial preparation, including obtaining evidence that could be used in mitigation.The trial court then granted Arrington's motion to continuethe case and granted Arrington funds to assist in the preparation of any additional mitigation evidence that he wished to present.Moreover, no limit was placed on the hours for which counsel would be paid for investigating and preparing the case.We find no abuse of discretion here, as our review of the record shows that Arrington did not establish that the services of a mitigation specialist or a prison consultant were critical to his defense or that without such assistance his trial would be rendered unfair.SeeRoseboro v. State,258 Ga. 39, 41(3)(d) and n. 3, 365 S.E.2d 115(1988).

Jury Selection Issues

7.Arrington contends that the trial court erred in limiting voir dire by excluding several questions from the defense's proposed juror questionnaire and by refusing in some instances to allow the defense to ask jurors certain questions to determine whether they had formed pre-judgments regarding the death penalty.The scope of voir dire is generally a matter for the trial court's discretion.Barnes v. State,269 Ga. 345, 351(10), 496 S.E.2d 674(1998).See alsoJones v. State,263 Ga. 904, 907(9)(b), 440 S.E.2d 161(1994)(holding that whether to send a juror questionnaire out with the summons lies within the trial court's discretion).A comprehensive questionnaire was sent to prospective jurors, and each juror was thoroughly questioned during individual voir dire.Accordingly, this Court finds no error.SeeCurry v. State,255 Ga. 215, 218(2)(b), 336 S.E.2d 762(1985).

8.Arrington complains that the trial court erroneously excused two prospective jurors for cause.The trial court excused prospective jurors Ristroph and Barkley due to their inability to vote for the death penalty as a possible sentence.

The proper standard for determining the disqualification of a prospective juror based upon his views on capital punishment "is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'"A juror's bias for or against the death penalty does not need to be proved with unmistakable clarity; the relevant inquiry on appeal is whether the trial court's finding that a prospective juror is disqualified is supported by the record as a whole.

(Citations omitted.)Presnell v. State,274 Ga. 246, 248-249(3)(a), 551 S.E.2d 723(2001).

Prospective juror Ristroph initially stated that he could not vote for a death sentence except possibly in the case of a serial killer.He explained that voting to impose the death penalty would be morally inconsistent with his belief that all life has inherent value and that he did not believe that he would be able to put his personal beliefs aside and follow the judge's instructions in considering all three sentencing options.Although Ristroph eventually stated that he might be able to "consider" a death sentence under the appropriate circumstances, the trial court was authorized to find from the totality of his responses that he"held a strong personal aversion to the death penalty and was uncertain as to whether []he could actually vote to impose that sentence."Greene v. State,268 Ga. 47, 52, 485 S.E.2d 741(19...