Arroyo v. J.S.T. LLC
| Decision Date | 03 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:18-cv-01682-DAD-SAB |
| Parties | RAFAEL ARROYO, JR., Plaintiff, v. J.S.T. LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Rafael Arroyo Jr's ("Plaintiff") motion for default judgment filed on August 9, 2019. (ECF No. 15.)1 The Court attempted to hold a hearing on Plaintiff's motion, however, no parties appeared for the hearing set for September 25, 2019. (ECF No. 20.) Nonetheless, the Court finds the matter suitable for decision based on the record before it, and having considered the moving papers, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto, supplemental briefing, as well as the Court's file, the Court issues the following findings and recommendations.
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Plaintiff bring this action against Defendants J.S.T. LLC ("JST") and Chase, Inc. ("Chase") (collectively "Defendants") alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51, et seq. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff, a California resident, is a paraplegic who cannot walk and uses a wheelchair for mobility. (Id. at ¶ 1.) In September of 2018, and at the time of the filing of the complaint, Defendant JST owned the real property located at 27574 Bernard Drive, Kettleman City, California (hereinafter the "Property"). (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.) In September of 2018, and at the time of the filing of the complaint, Defendant Chase owned the 76 gas station located at the Property (hereinafter the "Gas Station"). (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.)
The Gas Station is a facility open to the public, a place of public accommodation, and a business establishment. (Id. at ¶ 11.) In September of 2018, Plaintiff went to the Gas Station with the intention of availing himself of its good or services, "motivated in part to determine if the [D]efendants comply with the disability access laws." (Id. at ¶ 10.) Paths of travel are one of the facilities, privileges, and advantages offered by Defendants to patrons of the Gas Station store. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Some wheelchair users, including Plaintiff, travel onto the Property from the exterior public sidewalks, however, there was no safe wheelchair accessible route of travel from the boundary of the Property to the accessible entrance of the Gas Station store. (Id. at ¶ 13.) The public sidewalks terminate after entering the boundary of the Property leaving no safe path of travel after that point, and Plaintiff was forced to travel in the vehicular drive paths or behind parked cars to gain access to the Gas Station store. (Id.) Additionally, the driveways located on the Property had running slopes ranging from about 7% to 8% and cross-slopes ranging from about 6% to 7%. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed to maintain, in operable working condition, those features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities at the Property. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that he personallyencountered these barriers, and the inaccessible features of the facility denied Plaintiff of full and equal access, causing him difficulties. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have failed to maintain the features required to provide ready access to persons with disabilities, and that the barriers identified are easily removed without undue difficulty or expense. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiff alleges these are the type of barriers identified by the Department of Justice as presumably readily achievable to remove, and that in fact, these barriers are readily achievable to remove. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Additionally, there are numerous alternative accommodations that Defendants could make that would provide a greater level of access if complete removal were not achievable. (Id.)
Plaintiff states he will return to the Gas Station to avail himself of its good or services and to determine compliance with the disability access laws but is currently deterred from doing so because of his knowledge of the existing barriers. (Id. at ¶ 19.) If the barriers are not removed, Plaintiff will be faced with unlawful and discriminatory barriers again. (Id. at ¶ 20.)
By way of relief, Plaintiff seeks: (1) injunctive relief compelling Defendants to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Unruh Civil Rights Act; (2) damages under the Unruh Civil Rights Act which provides for actual damages and a statutory minimum of $4,000.00; and (3) reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and California Civil Code § 52. (Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff filed this action on December 11, 2018. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant Chase was served with a summons on February 17, 2019, and the executed summons was filed with the Court on March 4, 2019. (ECF No. 6.) Defendant JST was served with a summons on February 17, 2019, and the executed summons was filed with the Court on March 4, 2019. (ECF No. 6.)
No Defendants filed an answer, responsive pleading, or otherwise appeared in this action. On March 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed requests for entry of default against Defendants. (ECF Nos. 8, 9.) On March 27, 2019, default was entered against Defendants. (ECF Nos. 10, 11.) On July 11, 2019, the Court ordered Plaintiff to either file a motion for default judgment, or a written response showing why this action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (ECF No.13.) On August 9, 2019, Plaintiff file the motion for default judgment that is currently before the Court and set a hearing for September 25, 2019. (ECF No. 15.)
As discussed in greater detail below, infra Section III(A)(2), prior to the scheduled hearing, the Court noticed a discrepancy concerning the proofs of service of the summonses filed in this action, and on September 19, 2019, the Court ordered supplemental briefing to be filed by September 24, 2019, the day prior to the September 25, 2019 hearing on the motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 16.) On September 24, 2019, Plaintiff filed a corrected proof of service of summons form for Defendant Chase, along with further documentation by way of an affidavit from the process server demonstrating unsuccessful attempts and the successful attempt of service on Defendant Chase. (ECF No. 17.) However, Plaintiff did not file anything in the form of supplemental briefing directly responding to the questions posed in the Court's September 19, 2019 order requiring supplemental briefing, prior to the scheduled hearing. (ECF No. 17.) On September 25, 2019, the Court attempted to hold the hearing on Plaintiff's motion, however neither Plaintiff nor Defendants made any appearance. (ECF No. 20.) Immediately following the hearing on September 25, 2019, the undersigned issued an order requiring Plaintiff to show cause, within five days of service of the order, why this action should not be dismissed for failure to appear at the hearing and failure to prosecute this action. (ECF No. 19.) Prior to the Court's order to show cause was docketed, Plaintiff untimely filed a response to the Court's September 19, 2019 order requiring supplemental briefing, and apologized to the Court for not filing the supplemental briefing by the Court imposed deadline of September 24, 2019. (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff's supplemental briefing, filed after the scheduled hearing time on September 25, 2019, made no mention of the hearing nor any statement explaining why Plaintiff was unable to appear at the hearing, and thus it appears at the time of filing, Plaintiff's counsel was oblivious to the fact that no counsel for Plaintiff made an appearance at the hearing scheduled for that morning on Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 18.) On September 30, 2019, Plaintiff filed a response to the Court's September 25, 2019 order to show cause. (ECF No. 22.) On October 2, 2019, the Court discharged the September 25, 2019 order to show cause. (ECF No. 23.)
"Our starting point is the general rule that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored," as "[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible." NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986)). Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55, obtaining a default judgment is a two-step process. Entry of default is appropriate as to any party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought that has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and where that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After entry of default, a plaintiff can seek entry of default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) provides the framework for the Court to enter a default judgment:
The decision to grant a motion for entry...
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