Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC
| Decision Date | 30 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-cv-6859 |
| Parties | LUZMARIA ARROYO, Plaintiff, v. VOLVO GROUP NORTH AMERICA, LLC, d/b/a VOLVO PARTS NORTH AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff LuzMaria Arroyo sued Defendant Volvo Group North America, LLC, d/b/a Volvo Parts North America ("Volvo") for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA") and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. ("USERRA"). Before the Court are (1) Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial, or, in the alternative, remittitur and amendment of judgment [192] and (2) Plaintiff's motion to alter judgment [204]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion [192] is granted to the following extent: the Court will enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's ADA discrimination claim and grant a new trial on Plaintiff's USERRA claim. Defendant's remaining requests for relief are denied. In addition, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion to alter judgment [204] in its entirety as moot. This case is set for further status hearing on October 10, 2019 at 9:30 a.m.
I. Background
Plaintiff LuzMaria Arroyo worked at Defendant Volvo Group North America, LLC (d/b/a Volvo Parts North America) from June 2005 until November 2011. In Plaintiff's third amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., and Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. ("USERRA"), along with a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. [See 51.] The Court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Court's ruling with respect to Plaintiff's claims for retaliation, failure to accommodate, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and with respect to the Court's analysis of Plaintiff's ADA discrimination claim under the now defunct "indirect method" of proof. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the Court's ruling with respect to Plaintiff's USERRA claim and Plaintiff's ADA discrimination claim under the "direct method" of proof.
After a trial on the merits of Plaintiff's remaining ADA and USERRA claims, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on both claims. [See 161.] The jury awarded Plaintiff $2,600,000.00 in compensatory damages and $5,200,000.00 in punitive damages on Plaintiff's ADA discrimination claim. [Id. at 2.] The jury concluded that Defendant did not prove its affirmative defense under USERRA by a preponderance of the evidence. [Id. at 3.] The jury further concluded that Defendant willfully violated the USERRA when it terminated Plaintiff's employment. [Id.] After post-trial briefing, the Court awarded Plaintiff $141,388.53 in back pay, $84,131.92 in front pay, $41,348.61 in other employment-related compensation, $8,546.10 in prejudgment interest, and $275,415.16 in liquidated damages. [177, at 1.] Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), the applicable damages cap under the ADA, the Court also reduced the jury's $2.6 million compensatory damages award to $300,000 and vacated the jury's $5.2 million punitivedamages award. [Id.] The Court denied all other forms of equitable relief. [Id.] Defendant filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial, or, in the alternative, remittitur and amendment of judgment [192]. Plaintiff filed a motion to alter judgment [204]. These motions currently are before the Court.
The trial evidence established that Plaintiff was employed as a material handler at Defendant's facility in Joliet, Illinois from June 2005 until her employment was terminated in November 2011. When Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant, she was in the Army Reserves. [Tr. 1059.] Plaintiff informed Defendant of her status as an active reservist in the Army by noting it on her resume. [Tr. 492.] Throughout her employment, Plaintiff was subject to the facility's attendance policy (the "Attendance Policy"), which was administered by supervisors Keith Schroeder and Michael Temko. After Plaintiff was employed with Defendant for a couple months, she had a discussion with Schroeder and Human Resources Manager Celia Jarvis (who was present telephonically) about time off of work to travel to and from Fort Benning, Georgia for Plaintiff's Army Reserves duties. [Tr. 807.] During that discussion, Jarvis told Plaintiff that the extra time she needed to travel to and from Fort Benning was not authorized. [Tr. 807-08.] Plaintiff responded that the time should be authorized under USERRA. [Tr. 808.]
Plaintiff presented emails indicating that Plaintiff's supervisors were unhappy with Plaintiff taking time off to travel to and from her military service in Fort Benning, Georgia. [See, e.g., 205-1 (Pl.'s Ex. 19); 205-2 (Pl.'s Ex. 20); 205-3 (Pl.'s Ex. 21); 205-4 (Pl.'s Ex. 22); 205-6 (Pl.'s Ex. 24); 205-7 (Pl.'s Ex. 25); 205-8 (Pl.'s Ex. 32); 205-9 (Pl.'s Ex. 50).] For example, Plaintiff presented an email in which Temko questioned Plaintiff about why she needed the additional travel time. [205-1 (Pl.'s Ex. 19), at 2.] Temko also emailed Schroeder to ask whetherDefendant was required to provide this time for travel. [205-3 (Pl.'s Ex. 21), at 1-2.] Schroeder forwarded the inquiry to Bruce Olin, stating "I find myself with a dilemma if I were to discipline a person for taking too much time off for military reserve duty * * * I certainly give her credit for serving our country but of course I am also responsible for our business needs." [Id. at 1.]
On October 28, Olin responded to an earlier email from Schroeder discussing various legal authorities provided by Plaintiff, stating:
First, we do not have to grant time off for [Plaintiff's] travel time. Her legal obligation is 2 weeks per year, which we do give off, and 1 weekend per month. The drills she attended were most likely extra training, which we do not have to grant the time. We do not have to give extra time for her travel to and from her weekend duty. She does have the option to transfer to a closer unit, we cannot make her transfer.
[205-4 (Pl.'s Ex. 22), at 1.] Schroeder forwarded the email to Temko, predicting "LuzMaria will challenge us." [Id.] As noted by the Seventh Circuit, the advice regarding travel time initially given by Defendant was wrong. [110, at 4.] Jarvis did additional research and concluded that the law treats voluntary and involuntary orders the same, and Plaintiff was entitled to travel time plus an eight-hour rest period following her drill before having to report to work. [205-7 (Pl.'s Ex. 25), at 1.]1 Plaintiff also presented emails in which supervisors complained about a lack of communication from Plaintiff regarding her military leave. [205-1 (Pl.'s Ex. 19), at 2 (Temko); 205-9 (Pl.'s Ex. 50), at 1 (Schroeder).] Temko sent an email to Schroeder and others discussing the benefits to Defendant of Plaintiff transferring to a local Reserve facility in Darien, Illinois so that she would not have to travel to Georgia anymore. [225-1 (Pl.'s Ex. 40); Tr. 542-44.] According to Plaintiff, in 2007, after she returned from a tour of duty in Iraq, Schroeder told herthat her military service was becoming an undue hardship on the company and that it would greatly help the company if Plaintiff could move to a local unit. [Tr. 817-18.]
After Plaintiff forwarded to her supervisors materials regarding Defendant's obligations under USERRA, Plaintiff's supervisor Sherrie Jankowski stated that Plaintiff was "becoming a pain with all this." [211-3 (Pl.'s Ex. 107).] Jankowski testified that she simply meant that Plaintiff was being burdensome by forwarding materials relating to USERRA to Jankowski and not to Schroeder, as had been requested. [Tr. 333.] Plaintiff also asserts that Jankowski and Schroeder did nothing to curtail rumors in the workplace that Plaintiff was on vacation in Hawaii. In support of that assertion, Plaintiff cites to an email from Jankowski to Schroeder discussing these rumors and testimony in which Jankowski explained that she told employees to stop spreading rumors. [211-5 (Pl.'s Ex. 124); Tr. 338-344.]
Plaintiff was deployed twice during her time working for Defendant—these deployments were from April 17, 2006 through May 7, 2007 and from April 15, 2009 through August 15, 2010. [Tr. 210.] When Plaintiff came back from Iraq in 2010, Temko sent an email to Schroeder and Somersett discussing how Plaintiff could decide when she returned back to work. [225-5 (Pl.'s Ex. 62).]2 Upon her return, Temko and Schroeder took steps to offer her a severance package that had been offered to other employees while Plaintiff was on a tour of military duty. [225-6 (Pl.'s Ex. 69); Tr. 163-64.]
Under the Attendance Policy, when an employee was late or absent without providing the required documentation, the employee was issued a whole or fractional "occurrence." [Tr. 1012.]Each time an employee received an occurrence, Defendant applied a four-week and six-month look-back period to determine whether the employee incurred enough occurrences during either of those periods to receive a step in the progressive disciplinary process. [Tr. 1014-15.] Corrective action would be taken if the employee had a total of two occurrence points within the four-week period or a total of five occurrences within the six-month period. [Id.] The disciplinary steps under the policy were (1) verbal warning, (2)...
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