Arruda v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 27 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2:12-cv-2701 AC,2:12-cv-2701 AC
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: NANCY RUTH ARRUDA, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

NANCY RUTH ARRUDA, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 2:12-cv-2701 AC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DATED: December 27, 2013

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are pending. For the reasons discussed below, the court will grant in part plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and will deny the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB and SSI on May 17, 2007, alleging disability beginning on May 12, 2004. Administrative Record ("AR") 184-88, 189-91. Both applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. AR 83-89, 107-11, 115-20. On January 26, 2009, a hearing was held before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Sandra K. Rogers. AR 61-82.Plaintiff appeared with attorney representation at the hearing, at which she and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. Id. In a decision dated March 25, 2009, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d) of the Act as to her DIB claim and not disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act as to her SSI claim.¹ AR 93-102. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council, which granted plaintiff's request for review on February 23, 2010 and remanded plaintiff's claim back to the ALJ for further consideration. AR 103-06.

On August 31, 2010, a second hearing was held before ALJ Rogers. AR 39-60. Plaintiff again appeared with attorney representation at the hearing, at which she and a VE testified. OnJanuary 10, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled. AR 26-33. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2011.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 12, 2004, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairment: chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can have only moderate exposure to dues [sic], fumes, odors, gasses and poor ventilation.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a cashier-checker (211.462-014, light, svp 3) and theater projectionist (960.362-010, light, svp 6). This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity.

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 12, 2004, through the date of this decision.

AR 26-33.

The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review of this decision, leaving the ALJ's January 10, 2011 decision as the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. AR 1-6.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiff was born on September 22, 1953. AR 63. She was 50 years old on her alleged onset date, 55 years old at the first ALJ hearing, and 57 years old on the date of the ALJ's January 10, 2011 decision. Plaintiff has a high school education. AR 65. Her past relevant work includes cashier (she worked only two weeks in this position), theatre assistant manager, and, most recently, worker in a cat sanctuary (she worked part-time in this position). See AR 28.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Commissioner's decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were applied. Schneider v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); Morgan v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).

The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). "It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

"The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). "Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the ground that the ALJ erred when she found that plaintiff did not have an arthritic impairment that was severe at the second step of the sequential evaluation process. Relatedly, plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding her only partially credible and in giving reduced weight to certain medical opinion evidence.

A. Plaintiff's Arthritis as a Severe Impairment

Plaintiff argues first that the ALJ erred in failing to find that plaintiff's arthritis constitutes a severe impairment at the second step of the sequential evaluation process.

1. Legal Standards

"The step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). The purpose is to identify claimantswhose medical impairment is so slight that it is unlikely they would be disabled even if age, education, and experience were taken into account. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987). At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determines which of claimant's alleged impairments are "severe" within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). "An impairment is not severe if it is merely 'a slight abnormality (or combination of slight abnormalities) that has no more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work activities.'" Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-3p (1996)). The step two severity determination is "merely a threshold determination of whether the claimant is able to perform his past work. Thus, a finding that a claimant is severe at step two only raises a prima facie case of a disability." Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007).

At the second step, plaintiff has the burden of providing medical evidence of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings that show that his or her impairments are severe and are expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.909, 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An ALJ's finding that a claimant is not disabled at step two will be upheld where "there are no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the existence of medically determinable physical or mental impairment." Ukolov, 420 F.3d at 1005.

If a severe impairment exists, all medically determinable impairments must be considered in the remaining steps of the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. The ALJ "must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's impairments on her ability to function, without regard to whether each alone [i]s sufficiently severe." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.

2. Analysis

At the second step of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that plaintiff has only one severe impairment: chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder ("COPD"). AR 29. Although plaintiff is correct that the ALJ failed to discuss plaintiff's arthritis at this stage of her analysis, the court finds any error to be harmless because the ALJ did consider plaintiff's arthritis at the subsequent steps. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the ALJ's classification of one of claimant's impairments as non-severe at the second step washarmless error because claimant was found to have other severe impairments, and the ALJ extensively discussed claimant's non-severe impairment symptoms in the fourth step).

Moreover, in arguing that the ALJ erred at the second step by finding certain impairments to be non-severe, plaintiff misunderstands the function of the second step as a gate-keeping mechanism to dispose of groundless claims. Once a claimant prevails at the second step by achieving a finding of some severe impairment, regardless of which condition is found to be severe, the Commissioner proceeds with the sequential evaluation, considering at each step all other alleged medically determinable impairments that may impact the claimant's ability to work. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) ("In determining whether an individual's physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that such impairment or impairments could be the basis of eligibility under this section, the Commissioner of Social Security shall consider the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity.").

Here, plaintiff prevailed at the second step. Therefore, any error in the second step was harmless because the ALJ found that plaintiff's COPD was severe and continued on with...