Art Metal Const. Co. v. Knight, 1238.

Decision Date11 May 1936
Docket NumberNo. 1238.,1238.
Citation185 A. 136
PartiesART METAL CONST. CO. v. KNIGHT.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Appeal from Superior Court, Newport County; Hugh B. Baker, Presiding Justice.

Petition by the Art Metal Construction Company against Edward C. Knight, Jr., wherein, on defendant's motion, E. D. Hackman, trustee in bankruptcy for Milton W. Young, was added as a party respondent. From decrees in favor of respondents, petitioner appeals.

Appeal sustained, and decrees reversed in part, with directions.

Burdick, Corcoran & Perkham and Edward J. Corcoran, all of Newport, for petitioner.

Sheffield & Harvey and William P. Sheffield, all of Newport, for respondent Knight.

Greenough, Lyman & Cross and Harvey S. Reynolds, all of Providence, for respondent Hackman.

CAPOTOSTO, Justice.

This is a petition, under General Laws 1923, c. 301, for the enforcement of a lien on the real estate of the respondent Edward C, Knight, Jr., in the town of Middletown, for finished materials and labor furnished by the petitioner, a Massachusetts corporation, and used in the construction of an addition to a building. The addition was being constructed on that real estate by Milton W. Young, of Philadelphia, Pa, as general contractor, under an oral contract with the respondent. The materials and labor for which a lien is sought were furnished under and in accordance with a subcontract in writing, between the petitioner and the general contractor, for the furnishing and installation of five monel metal doors and screens for the sum of $11,500, of which $6,000 was paid by the original contractor. The lien is claimed for the balance of $5,500, overdue and unpaid.

The petitioner, on February 21, 1933, gave the respondent Knight written notice of its intention to claim a lien, and on February 23, 1933, left a copy of this notice, for record, with the town clerk of Middletown. This notice stated that within sixty days the petitioner had placed certain building materials on the respondent's land in Middletown, and that within forty days it had performed certain labor in installing said materials in the building that was being erected thereon. This notice referred generally to General Laws 1923, c. 301, "Of Liens," and made no reference to any particular section of said chapter.

On April 26, 1933, the petitioner lodged in the office of the town clerk of Middletown its account or demand for the purpose of commencing legal process to enforce its claim of lien and stated therein that the lien was ."created by virtue of the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of chapter 301 of the General Laws of the State of Rhode Island, 1923." It ended as follows:

"Newport, R. I, April 21, 1933. "Account

"Art Metal Construction Company, Account with Milton W. Young for materials and labor furnished for the Edward C. Knight, Jr., house, on Indian Avenue, Middletown, R. I.

"To contract to furnish and install five monel metal sliding doors and screens for the addition to the residence of Edward C. Knight, Jr., Middletown, R. I. $11,500

"Received on account 6,000

"Balance due 5,500."

On May 13, 1933, the petitioner filed in the superior court the present petition to enforce its lien against the respondent Knight, alleging that the lien was claimed under a subcontract in writing with Milton W. Young, the general contractor, and "that within four (4) months after said sum of Fifty-Five Hundred ($5,500.00) Dollars became due and payable, to wit, the 26th day of April, A. D, 1933, the petitioner commenced legal process to enforce its lien by giving and recording the notice prescribed by the statute." The respondent Knight duly entered his appearance by counsel and filed an answer; and on his motion E. D. Hackman, trustee in bankruptcy for Milton W. Young, was added as a party respondent, and entered his appearance. In December, 1933, at the request of the petitioner, the testimony of certain witnesses was taken by deposition in Philadelphia.

Subsequently thereto each respondent separately moved to dismiss the petition because (1) the petitioner's account claims a lien for materials by virtue of section 5 of chapter 301 and no such lien is given by said section; (2) the petition does not set forth that any, or, if any, what labor was furnished or done by the petitioner within forty days next preceding service upon the respondent Knight of the petitioner's notice of intention to claim a hen (3) it does not state that petitioner's notice of intention to claim a lien was given to the respondent Knight and a copy thereof placed on record within sixty days after any materials were placed upon the land of said respondent; (4) it does not set forth the particulars of petitioner's account or demand; (5) it does not set forth the terms of the subcontract; (6) it does not set forth a copy of the subcontract; (7) it does not set forth when the payments became due and payable under the subcontract.

Upon a hearing of the foregoing motions to dismiss, the superior court, on May 14, 1934, decided against the respondents as to grounds 2 and 3 and in their favor as to' grounds 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, with permission to the petitioner to file an amended petition as to grounds 4, 5, 6, and 7, "setting forth therein the particulars of the petitioner's account or demand stating separately therein the amounts of charges for labor, an exact copy of the subcontract in writing made by the petitioner with Milton W. Young, an itemized statement showing the amounts of the various payments received by the petitioner under said contract and the dates when the same were respectively received, and a statement of when payments became due and payable under said contract and of the respective amounts thereof."

Before a decree was entered in accordance with this decision, the petitioner filed a motion to amend its account by striking therefrom all references to sections 5 and 6 of chapter 301. This motion stated that the petitioner claimed a lien under section 4 of that chapter; that the reference, to sections 5 and 6 in the account was made through the inadvertence of counsel who prepared the account; that its subcontract in writing with Milton W. Young is an entire and indivisible contract and not a claim for items of labor and for items of material that can be segregated, but is a claim for a balance due on a contract; and that an error in the pleadings should not defeat the petitioner's right to enforce a lien granted to it by section 1 of chapter 301, Gen.Laws 1923, for a just and meritorious claim.

The superior court denied this motion on July 12, 1934, and entered a decree to that effect. The same day it entered another decree' in conformity with its decision of May 14, 1934. From these two decrees the petitioner has claimed an appeal to this court on the grounds that the superior court erred when it dismissed the petition in so far as it claims a lien for materials, when it refused to allow the petitioner to strike out from its account the reference to sections 5 and 6 of chapter 301, and when it ordered the petitioner to set forth separately the amounts of its charges for labor in the finished product as distinguished from its charges for materials.

The substance of the court's decision on the respondents' objections to the account was that section 1 of chapter 301, rather than section 5, created the lien for materials; that the allegation in the account that the petitioner claimed a lien under section 5 was fatally erroneous and could not be amended; and that therefore the claim so far as it related to a lien for materials should be dismissed. It further held that, as the subcontract was in writing, the petitioner could enforce a lien for labor in accordance with section 4, provided that it amended its petition by setting forth therein the particulars of its account or demand and the separate amount of charges for labor.

The questions presented by this appeal are not without difficulty. The mechanics' lien law, which is of ancient origin in this state, has been the subject of substantial but unco-ordinated amendments on several occasions, it is not surprising that the language in some of the decisions of this court, which had to deal with specific situations in connection with the statute as it developed, may now be open to further consideration. We are aware that there is and for many years has been great uncertainty among the members of the legal profession in this state, as to the interpretation and application of the statute. This uncertainty is traceable, in part at least, to the reasoning and to dicta in some of our cases. It is therefore our purpose in this opinion to construe those sections of the mechanics' lien statute that are pertinent to or reasonably connected with the issues at bar, in the light of their history and the previous decisions of this court, and in such a way as to make them, if possible, consistent and comprehensive. Whenever the language used in any section is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we shall adopt the reasonable interpretation which in our judgment will best carry out the evident purposes of the statute as a whole.

A mechanics' lien, such as we have in this case, is purely a creature of chapter 301, General Laws 1923, and comes into existence when the work begins or the materials are furnished. In Briggs v. Titus, 13 R.I. 136, at page 138, speaking of the nature of a lien, the court says: "It is not acquired by an adverse proceeding after the debt has been incurred, but it accrues as the debt accrues, being incident to the improvement, and therefore the owner of the estate to which it attaches consents to it when he consents to the improvement."

The decision of the instant case depends upon a determination of the questions under what section or sections of chapter 301, Gen.Laws 1923, the petitioner acquired a right to a lien, by which sections the procedure for enforcing such right is...

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