Arthur Johnson v. United States

• Decision Date: 07 June 1912
• Docket Number: No. 1075,1075
• Citation: 225 U.S. 405,32 S.Ct. 748,56 L.Ed. 1142
• Parties: ARTHUR JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

225 U.S. 405

32 S.Ct. 748

56 L.Ed. 1142

ARTHUR JOHNSON, Petitioner,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 1075.

Argued May 1 and 2, 1912.

Decided June 7, 1912.

Messrs. Paca Oberlin and Joseph Salomon, and Mr. Thomas M. Baker (by special leave), for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from Pages 406-407 intentionally omitted] Solicitor General Lehmann for respondent.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

Johnson was indicted, tried, and convicted in the supreme court of the District of Columbia for the crime of murder for killing one Ofenstein, and sentenced to death.

He moved for arrest of judgment and for new trial on certain grounds which, among others, present three questions—(1) whether he had been properly arraigned; (2) the action of the court in giving and refusing instructions in regard to the power of the jury to add to their verdict, if they found him guilty of murder, the words 'without capital punishment;' (3) the legality of the manner of selecting the jury.

(1) The record recites the presence of the attorney for the United States, the defendant in proper person and by his attorney, and adds that 'thereupon the defendant, being arraigned upon the indictment, pleads thereto not guilty, and for trial puts himself upon the country, and the attorney of the United States doth the like.'

The contention is that there is a fatal defect in that the record does not show that the indictment was read to the defendant; and to establish that such reading was necessary counsel invoke the 6th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which provides, among other things, that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the action against him. But to this it may be urged, as it is urged, that information of the charge may be given without reading the indictment. But we may pass that, and grant also that in capital and otherwise infamous crimes both the arraignment and plea are a matter of substance, and must be affirmatively shown by the record. We think that they are shown, if such be the fair intendment of the words of the record. And this is demonstrated by the case that is relied on against it; that is, Crain v. United States, 162 U. S. 625, 40 L. ed. 1097, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 952. In that case the record did not show (and we quote from the opinion) 'that the accused was ever formally arraigned, or that he pleaded to the indictment,' except as an inference from a statement in the bill of exceptions that the jury were 'sworn and charged to try the issues joined.' It was held, after elaborate dis- cussion, three members of the court dissenting, that a plea to the indictment was not a matter of form, but of substance, and should be shown by the record. In the discussion and in the cases cited the arraignment was considered as distinct from the plea, and consisted of formally calling the accused to the bar for the purpose of a trial. We may quote as illustrative the following paragraph from pages 637, 638:

'According to Sir Matthew Hale, the arraignment consists of three parts, one of which, after the prisoner has been called to the bar, and informed of the charge against him, is, the 'demanding of him whether he be guilty or not guilty; and if he pleads not guilty, the clerk joins issue with him, cul. prist, and enters the prisoner's plea; then he demands how he will be tried; the common answer is, by God and the country, and thereupon the clerk enters po. se, and prays to God to send him a good deliverance.' 2 Hale, P. C. 219. So in Blackstone: 'To arraign is nothing else but to call the person to the bar of the court to answer the matter charged upon him in the indictment.' 'After which [after the indictment is read to the accused] it is to be demanded of him whether he is guilty of the crime whereof he stands indicted, or not guilty.' 4 Bl. Com. 322, 323 to 341. Chitty says: 'The proper mode of stating the arraignment on the record is in this form: 'And being brought to the bar here in his own proper person, he is committed to the marshal,' etc. And being asked how he will acquit himself of the premises (in case of felony, and of 'the high treasons' in case of treason) 'above laid to his charge, saith,' etc. If this statement be omitted, it seems the record will be erroneous.' 1 Chitty, Crim. Law. *419.'

There is no explicit provision in the laws of the United States describing what shall constitute an arraignment. But so far as it is expressed it has a definite meaning. By § 1032 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 722) it is provided that 'when any person indicted for any offense against the United States, whether capital or otherwise, upon his arraignment stands mute or refuses to plead of answer thereto, it shall be the duty of the court to enter the plea of not guilty on his behalf in the same manner as if he had pleaded not guilty thereto. And when the party pleads not guilty, or such plea is entered as aforesaid, the cause shall be deemed at issue, and shall, without further form or ceremony, be tried by a jury.'

It will be observed that the word 'arraignment' is used as comprehensively descriptive of what shall precede the plea. If it be so used in the law, it certainly can be used in the record as showing the performance of that which the law prescribes by it. We realize that both the Constitution and the law are careful to direct that information be given to the accused of the charge against him. By § 1033 it is provided that when any person is indicted for any capital offense, if it be treason, three days before the trial, and if it be any other capital offense, two days before the trial, a copy of the indictment and list of jurors and witnesses shall be delivered to him. And this can be insisted on. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 492, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Hickory v. United States, 151 U. S. 303, 38 L. ed. 170, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334. We may presume that the law was complied with in the present case and that Johnson was given a copy of the indictment as well as having had it read to him, which we think the record sufficiently shows; and as the record imports verity, it cannot be contradicted by an affidavit which counsel filed in the case, even if it had been filed for such purpose, which, according to counsel, it was not, but 'to call the attention of the court to the defect on the face of the record.' Evans v. Stettnisch, 149 U. S. 605, 607, 37 L. ed. 866, 867, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 931.

(2) Prior to January 15, 1897, homicide, as a crime against the United States, was divided into murder and manslaughter 'when committed within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or in any place or district or country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,' and upon the high seas and certain waters out of the jurisdiction of any particular state. The punishment for murder was death; for manslaughter, a certain term of imprisonment. Sections 5336, 5340, 5343 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 3624, 3628). The crime of rape, when committed in any of the specified places, was also punished by death. Section 5345.¹

By the act passed January 15, 1897, it was provided 'that in all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crime of murder or of rape under sections fifty-three hundred and thirty-nine or fifty-three hundred and forty-five, Revised Statutes, the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment;' and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for life.' 29 Stat. at L. 487, chap. 29, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3620. It will be observed that § 5339 of the Revised Statutes is made part of the act. By that section, re-enacting earlier acts of Congress, 'every person who commits murder' 'within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or in any other place or district or country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, . . . shall suffer death.' The act was held applicable to the District of Columbia, and under its provisions and § 5339 until January 1, 1902, the date when the District Code became effective, murder was prosecuted. Winston v. United States, 172 U. S. 303, 43 L. ed. 456, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212.

By the District Code murder was divided into two degrees, and it was provided that the punishment for murder in the first degree should be 'death by hanging.' Punishment for manslaughter was fixed at imprisonment for life, or for not less than twenty years. Sections 798, 799 (this section made it murder in the first degree to put obstructions on a railroad or street railroad), 800 and 801 [31 Stat. at L. 1321, chap. 854.]

The District Code also changed the law as to rape, and fixed its punishment at not less than five nor more than thirty years, the jury having the power to add to their verdict, if it be guilty, the words 'with the death penalty.' Section 808.

It necessarily followed that the provision for the qualified verdict ceased to apply in the District. Thereafter the definitions and requirements of the District Code prevailed, and the death penalty was imposed for conviction of murder in the first degree for eight years.

In the meanwhile a commission was at work revising and codifying the criminal and penal laws of the United States, with the result that a Criminal Code was approved March 4, 1909 [35 Stat. at L. 1088, chap. 321, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1588]. It is the asserted clash between its provisions giving power to the jury to qualify their verdict and those of the District Code, under which, we have seen, the jury has not such power, that constitutes the question in this case.

That some provisions of the Criminal Code are applicable to the District is conceded. It is conceded by the government that the first ten chapters are applicable just as they are to the states, territories, and other districts, and that the same is true of chapter 12....