Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co.

Decision Date15 March 1984
Docket Number81-3114 and 81-3115,81-3065,Nos. 80-3705,s. 80-3705
Citation729 F.2d 1050
Parties1984-1 Trade Cases 65,905 ARTHUR S. LANGENDERFER, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, MacRitchie Materials, Inc., Proposed-Intervenor-Appellant, (81-3115), v. S.E. JOHNSON COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

John M. Curphey (argued), Jack Zouhary, Robison, Curphey & O'Connell, Toledo, Ohio, M. Neal Rains, Arter & Hadden, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants-appellants, cross-appellees.

Thomas Zraik, Reiser, Jacobs, Zraik & Szyperski, Toledo, Ohio, James Porter (argued), Walter J. Rekstis, III, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellees, cross-appellants.

Before LIVELY, Chief Judge, WELLFORD, Circuit Judge, and WILHOIT, District Judge. *

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge.

Defendants, S.E. Johnson Company (Johnson) and other affiliated entities (referred to collectively as Johnson Companies), appeal the judgments and orders entered by the district court against them following a unanimous jury verdict for plaintiffs in this private antitrust action for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1, 2, and Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 18. Plaintiffs, Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. (Langenderfer), and its sister company, Northern Ohio Asphalt Paving Co. (NOAP), claimed defendants had combined and conspired to drive plaintiffs out of business by various monopolistic and anticompetitive practices including, but not limited to, predatory pricing and illegal acquisitions. The jury found actual damages of $982,117.00. The district court trebled the damage award to $2,946,351.00 and enjoined future acquisitions and anticompetitive acts, pursuant to Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 15, 26.

Defendants contend the district court erred by (1) failing to apply the appropriate legal standard to plaintiff's allegation of predatory pricing; (2) allowing the jury to find a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 18, on the basis of purely intrastate acquisitions; and (3) allowing damages for losses suffered outside the relevant market and beyond the statute of limitations period. Langenderfer cross-appeals from the district court's refusal to order divestiture and the refusal to allow post-trial intervention by a company affiliated with Langenderfer. We vacate the judgments below because of prejudicial error on the issues of predatory pricing and intrastate acquisitions.

FACTS

Langenderfer and S.E. Johnson were competitors for many years in the business of supplying "hot-mix," 1 stone, sand and contracting services for highway construction and repair in northwest Ohio. Most of this work is administered and paid for by governmental bodies which invite competitive bids from paving contractors. 2 Federal and state highway projects are administered by the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) and the Ohio Turnpike Commission (OTC) with substantial use of federal funds. 3 For the purpose of this appeal Successful bidders must supply all labor, materials, equipment and supervision to do the work at per-unit prices specified in the winning bid. The primary costs in performing paving projects are the cost of materials and the cost of hauling materials to the job site. Contractors attempt to minimize expenses by purchasing materials from the quarry or hot-mix plant closest to the job. 4

the parties have stipulated the relevant product and geographic market to be asphalt highway paving contracts awarded by the OTC and ODOT in a thirteen county area of northwest Ohio.

Plaintiffs, Langenderfer and NOAP are Ohio corporations with all voting stock owned by Burton R. MacRitchie and his two sons. Langenderfer was in the asphalt paving business for 55 years until it discontinued operations in 1978 due to its inability to compete profitably. Unlike many highway contractors, Langenderfer did not diversify its operations but remained an asphalt paving specialist. While Langenderfer was still in business, NOAP had four hot-mix plants in northwest Ohio. The MacRitchie family also owned MacRitchie Materials, Inc., 5 which operated a quarry in West Millgrove, Ohio, and supplied stone to two of Langenderfer's hot-mix plants.

Defendants are the S.E. Johnson Co. (Johnson), founded as an Ohio corporation in 1929 by Sherman E. Johnson, various associated and subsidiary companies, and John T. Kirkby, the current president of Johnson. Following the Second World War, Johnson established the Maumee Stone Co. and opened a quarry to have an assured source of limestone for road building. The Michigan Stone Co. was set up in 1952 to operate two additional quarries just across the Ohio-Michigan border. With these quarries supplying raw materials and with three hot-mix plants to service the area, Johnson was already the largest asphalt paving contractor in northwest Ohio by the time of Sherman Johnson's death in 1956.

Defendant, John T. Kirkby, succeeded Mr. Johnson as president and operating head of the defendant companies. He soon began an ambitious acquisition program, acquiring twelve different companies within a fifteen year period.

In 1961, Johnson purchased C.P. Calaway, Inc., an independent bridge contractor. This enabled it to perform its own bridge work rather than subcontracting to other companies.

Mr. Kirkby then turned his attention to vertical acquisitions of raw material sources in northwest Ohio. Defendant Maumee Stone acquired the quarries of Wood County Stone & Construction Co. (1961), Lime City Stone Co. (1962), and Auglaize Stone Co. (1965). Maumee Stone opened the Rocky Ridge quarry under a 25-year lease in 1970. In 1974, defendants acquired the Tri-State Sand & Gravel Co., which is described as the most important source of quality sand in northwest Ohio.

In the late 1960's Johnson began a series of horizontal acquisitions of asphalt paving competitors. In 1969 Johnson purchased paving equipment from the Price Construction Co., including two hot-mix plants that served three counties to the east of Toledo. When Price moved a third hot-mix plant to Maumee to compete with defendants' operation, Mr. Kirkby offered to buy out Price, but Price agreed not to compete for ten years. Johnson purchased Ohio Engineering Co. in 1970 and thereby acquired three hot-mix plants that served several counties south of Toledo. Fred R. Creager & Sons, a small contractor on the verge of bankruptcy, was purchased in 1971 for $1 and an assumption of liabilities. Johnson bought two plants and certain gravel leases in 1972 from Northwest Materials, Inc. Substantial evidence indicated that Kirkby, both individually and as chief officer of Johnson, intended to eliminate competition and dominate the market. In addition to the noncompetition agreements previously mentioned, there was considerable testimony that Kirkby or his agents had threatened or coerced several smaller competitors. Kirkby allegedly told one competitor that if he built an asphalt plant to compete with the Maumee plant, defendants would immediately build a larger facility across the street to drive the competition out of business. Another competitor who planned to build a hot-mix plant was told that defendant would not supply the necessary stone for operation of the plant. On another occasion, Kirkby allegedly said that he did not like Langenderfer or Miller (another competitor) and wanted to run them out of business.

which was being liquidated at the time. Except for Creager, each competitor was a viable, profitable, ODOT-qualified paving contractor. Each company except Northwest Materials was acquired under a contract whereby the sellers agreed not to compete with Johnson for a number of years. In 1979, just prior to the trial below, defendants paid $3.5 million for Union Quarries Co., a profitable competitor that owned a quarry, a hot-mix plant and an asphalt paving business that served three counties in northwest Ohio.

Langenderfer presented expert testimony from several economists to the effect that Johnson's acquisitions significantly reduced competition and increased market concentration, thereby creating a monopolistic market structure. Statistical evidence does support this testimony. Defendants' average annual share of ODOT and OTC projects from 1966-1971 was 46.9%, but they took well over half of the available work during the 1972-78 period. 6 Johnson Companies did 75.8% of all turnpike paving in northwest Ohio during this period.

In summary, Kirkby expanded operations of the Johnson Companies from two quarries and three hot-mix plants to seven quarries, fourteen hot-mix plants, and three sand pits. The horizontal acquisitions eliminated a noticeable segment of Johnson Companies' competition, and the vertical acquisitions gave defendants a captive supply of stone and sand for its asphalt paving jobs. Furthermore, defendants became primary stone suppliers for the remaining asphalt paving competitors who did not own conveniently located quarries. As Johnson increased its share of the ever decreasing market, it also increased its profitability. From 1970 to 1978, its annual net profits more than doubled--from $1.168 to $2.717 million. During this same period, the Johnson Companies' competitors went from a combined net profit of $655,000 to a combined net loss.

Langenderfer's claims of unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, monopolization and conspiracy or attempt to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and illegal anticompetitive acquisitions in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act were all submitted to the jury. In support of the Sherman Act claims, Langenderfer alleged twelve separate monopolistic acts including, among others, predatory pricing, monopolistic pricing, price discrimination,...

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