Arthur v. State, (No. 460.)

CourtGeorgia Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtGILBERT
Citation146 Ga. 827,92 S.E. 637
Docket Number(No. 460.)
Decision Date17 May 1917
PartiesARTHUR. v. STATE.

(146 Ga. 827)
92 S.E. 637

ARTHUR.
v.
STATE.

(No. 460.)

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 17, 1917.


(Syllabus by the Court.)
[92 S.E. 638]

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; B. H. Hill, Judge.

C. H. Arthur was convicted of the statutory misdemeanor of conducting a place of business for dealing in futures on margin, and from the overruling of his demurrer to the indictment, his motion before sentence in arrest of judgment, and bis motion for new trial, he brings error. Affirmed.

C. H. Arthur was indicted for a misdemeanor, under section 4257 of the Code of 1910. In the indictment it was charged that the defendant—

"did establish, maintain, and operate an office and place of business for the purpose of carrying on and engaging in the business commonly called dealing in futures on margin, and did then and there, in said office and place of business established for the purposes aforesaid, maintain and operate and engage in a business commonly called dealing in futures on margin."

A general demurrer to the indictment was overruled. On the trial the accused was found guilty, and, before sentence, moved in arrest of judgment, which motion was overruled. He then moved for a new trial, which was denied. He excepted to the three rulings stated.

Brown & Randolph, Parker & Scott, and Jos. E. Johnson, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

H. M. Dorsey and Eb. T. Williams, Sols. Gen., both of Atlanta, for the State.

GILBERT, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] 1. The protection which the citizen enjoys as to life, liberty, and property, under the guaranty of "due process of law, " has its origin in the twenty-ninth chapter of Magna Charta. This guaranty is found in some form of words in each of the state Constitutions. Though there may be found slight verbal differences in the language employed, the expressions are nearly identical, except that the phrase "due process of law" is sometimes used, and sometimes "the law of the land." The meaning is the same in every case. By the Fourteenth Amendment this guaranty is now incorporated in the Constitution of the United States. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) 430. In Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202, 209, 62 Am. Dec. 160, Edwards, J., said:

"Due process of law undoubtedly means in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those rules and forms which have been established for the protection of private rights."

See Cooley's Con. Lim. 433.

The fundamental idea in "due process of law" is that of "notice" and "hearing." It means that the citizen must be afforded a hearing before he is condemned. There must be a hearing first, and judgment can be rendered only after trial. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519, 4 L. Ed. 629; McGehee on Due Process of Law, 16; 3 Words and Phrases, 2228, 2232. The issue of "due process of law" in this case is sought to be raised by demurrer to the indictment. The demurrer cannot be said in any sense to raise any question of procedure, or that the defendant was not afforded a fair hearing under the same rules of law as were applied to all others charged with a violation of the penal statutes of the state, before condemnation and sentence. When the citizen is accorded such a trial in a court of justice according to the modes of procedure applicable to such a case, it cannot be said that he has been denied "due process of law." Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 105, 24 L. Ed. 616; 8 Cyc. 1081, 1083.

2. Another contention set out in the demurrer is that the statute is null and void, because it offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees to every citizen the "equal protection of the laws." "Equal protection of the laws" means equal security under them to every one, under similar terms, in his life, his liberty, his property, and In the pursuit of happiness, and exemption from any greater burdens and charges than such as are equally imposed upon all others under like circumstances. Hence a statute bearing alike on all individuals of each class, or on all districts in like conditions, does not deny the equal protection of the laws; but such classification must not be arbitrary and without reasonable grounds on which it may be based. 8 Cyc. 1059, 1060. Section 4257 of the Code of 1910, on which the indictment is based, reads as follows:

"It shall be unlawful for any person, association of persons, or corporation, either as principal or agent, to establish, maintain, or operate an office or other place of business in this state for the purpose of carrying on or engaging in the business commonly called dealing in futures on margins; and any person violating the provi-

[92 S.E. 639]

sions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

There is nothing in this section...

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40 practice notes
  • Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, No. 41259
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • May 25, 1965
    ...the person taking the automobile under the above described circumstances. A similar argument was made, and rejected, in Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827, 831, 92 S.E. 637, where it was contended that a business lawful in another State could be carried on in violation of the laws of this State w......
  • Wright v. State, No. 21430
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • November 9, 1961
    ...add facts not so apparent or to supply extrinsic matters must fail as a speaking demurrer. Jackson v. State, 64 Ga. 344; Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827, 92 S.E. 637. See also Walters v. State, 90 Ga.App. 360, 365, 83 S.E.2d 4. Contentions (1) and (2) attack the Code section, on its face, as v......
  • City Of Macon v. Ries, No. 10049.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • March 14, 1934
    ...afforded a hearing before he is condemned. There must be a hearing first, and judgment can be rendered only after trial." Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827, 828, 92 S. E. 637, 638. See Mott v. State Board, 148 Ga. 55, 59, 95 S. E. 867; Shippen Lumber Co. v. El-[176 S.E. 24]liott. 134 Ga. 699, 70......
  • City Of Macon v. Anderson, (No. 3447.)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • May 18, 1923
    ...to be heard are fundamental requirements of due process. Riley v. Wright, 151 Ga. 609, 107 S. E. 857; Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 828, 92 S. E. 637; Mott v. State Board of Optometry, 148 Ga. 55, 95 S. E. 867; City of Jackson v. Kinard, 154 Ga. 692, 115 S. E. 69. But this provision of the city ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
40 cases
  • Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, No. 41259
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • May 25, 1965
    ...the person taking the automobile under the above described circumstances. A similar argument was made, and rejected, in Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827, 831, 92 S.E. 637, where it was contended that a business lawful in another State could be carried on in violation of the laws of this State w......
  • Wright v. State, No. 21430
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • November 9, 1961
    ...add facts not so apparent or to supply extrinsic matters must fail as a speaking demurrer. Jackson v. State, 64 Ga. 344; Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827, 92 S.E. 637. See also Walters v. State, 90 Ga.App. 360, 365, 83 S.E.2d 4. Contentions (1) and (2) attack the Code section, on its face, as v......
  • City Of Macon v. Ries, No. 10049.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • March 14, 1934
    ...afforded a hearing before he is condemned. There must be a hearing first, and judgment can be rendered only after trial." Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827, 828, 92 S. E. 637, 638. See Mott v. State Board, 148 Ga. 55, 59, 95 S. E. 867; Shippen Lumber Co. v. El-[176 S.E. 24]liott. 134 Ga. 699, 70......
  • City Of Macon v. Anderson, (No. 3447.)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • May 18, 1923
    ...to be heard are fundamental requirements of due process. Riley v. Wright, 151 Ga. 609, 107 S. E. 857; Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 828, 92 S. E. 637; Mott v. State Board of Optometry, 148 Ga. 55, 95 S. E. 867; City of Jackson v. Kinard, 154 Ga. 692, 115 S. E. 69. But this provision of the city ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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