ARTHUR YOUNG & CO. v. SUTHERLAND, 89-CV-777

Citation631 A.2d 354
Decision Date26 August 1993
Docket NumberNo. 89-CV-777,89-CV-777
PartiesARTHUR YOUNG & COMPANY, Appellant, v. Vernell M. SUTHERLAND, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Columbia District

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, SYLVIA BACON, J.

THIS PAGE CONTAINED HEADNOTES AND HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.

Carl D. Liggio, with whom Geoffrey P. Gitner, Richard B. Nettler, Paul J. Ostling, and Elizabeth B. Healy were on the brief, for appellant.

Douglas B. Huron, with whom James H. Heller was on the brief, for appellee.

Before FERREN, TERRY, and STEADMAN, Associate Judges.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

Vernell Sutherland sued her former employer, Arthur Young & Company (hereafter "Young" or "Arthur Young"),1 seeking damages for employment discrimination in violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C.Code §§ 1-2501 et seq. (1992) ("DCHRA"), for retaliation against her for pressing her claim of discrimination, also in violation of the DCHRA, and for breach of contract. Young counterclaimed for breach of contract2 and abuse of process. After a lengthy trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Sutherland on all three of her claims and on Young's abuse of process counterclaim. It awarded her $175,000 for lost income and $15,000 for "embarrassment, humiliation, and indignity" on the discrimination and retaliation claims, $34, -300 on her breach of contract claim, and $75,000 in punitive damages. The jury found for Young on its breach of contract counterclaim and awarded it $57,875 in compensatory damages. Young filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative, judgment notwithstanding the verdict or remittitur. The trial court denied the motion, and Young noted this appeal. Although this case presents a multitude ofdifficult issues, we find no reversible error and accordingly affirm the judgment.3

I. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

Arthur Young hired Sutherland in January 1986 as a manager4 to head its Advance Office Systems Group in Houston, Texas. Sutherland's immediate supervisor in Houston was Stephen Greer, a partner in the firm. In April 1986 Greer told Sutherland that he would support her promotion to principal because he felt she was doing the work of a principal. In the same month Greer gave her an "excellent" performance evaluation. Sutherland was not promoted, however, because other partners in the Houston office felt that she had been with the firm for too short a time. Sutherland testified that Greer told her she would in all likelihood be promoted the following year.

In July 1986 Sutherland learned that Young's Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Reston, Virginia, was forming a new group to provide computer training services to its clients and was seeking someone to manage that group. Sutherland was interested in that position, so she traveled to Reston to be interviewed by David Wilson, the partner in charge of the National Education Systems (NES) program at OSS, and Joseph Camardese, the partner in charge of the Instructional Technology Group (ITG), a unit within NES. Sutherland told both men that she hoped to be promoted to principal the following year. They offered her a position as manager and practice director of ITG, and she accepted the offer, believing that the new job would increase her chances of being promoted to principal and eventually to partner.

As Sutherland began preparing for her move from Texas to the Virginia suburbs of Washington, she became concerned about the higher cost of living in the Washington area. She realized that the proceeds from the sale of her home in Houston would not be sufficient both to pay off the outstanding mortgage and to enable her to make a down payment on a new home in Reston. She therefore asked that her acceptance of the new job be made contingent upon Young's giving her a short-term "bridge" loan to cover the difference. Young had a policy of making such loans to its employees and agreed to lend her $113,000. On October 30, 1986, Sutherland executed a promissory note for that amount, to be secured by a second mortgage on seventy-five acres of land that she owned in New Hampshire and by a second deed of trust on the home in Reston. The loan agreement provided that the loan would mature on either the date of sale of the New Hampshire property5 or March 17, 1987, whichever occurred earlier, and would begin to accrue interest only if it remained unpaid after the maturity date.

In September 1986 Sutherland began working at ITG, where her immediate supervisor was Mr. Camardese.6 Later that year the ITG office moved to the District of Columbia. In early February 1987 Sutherland approached Camardese about her chances of being promoted to principal in April. He told her that, because of the office's poor financial performance, no one would receive a promotion that year and that, in fact, he and Mr. Wilson would both have to take a salary cut.7 Sutherlandthen went to Wilson to discuss her possible promotion. Wilson told her that he could not recommend her for a promotion based on her performance to date, but that she was free to seek support from other Young partners. Although she realized that her chances for a promotion without Wilson's backing were slim, she nevertheless solicited support from other partners with whom she had worked. The evaluations she received in her bid for a promotion were mixed.

At about the same time, Sutherland began to have problems working with Mr. Camardese. She believed that he was not providing her with sufficient support in her efforts to obtain equipment and training for her staff and that his inaction was significantly hampering her group's success and, consequently, her own as well. She met with Mr. Wilson's supervisor, Al Roberts, in an effort to obtain better support from both Wilson and Camardese. As a result of this meeting, Sutherland began reporting directly to Wilson rather than Camardese.

The theory underlying Sutherland's discrimination claim was that Arthur Young had discriminated against her because she was a woman. She introduced evidence which suggested that Young discriminated generally against women in its Reston and Washington offices. This evidence included proof of some patently sexist comments by both Wilson and Camardese. For example, Sutherland testified that Camardese denied overtime payments to one of her female staff members because she "made enough for a woman." There was also evidence that Camardese denied the same staff member's request for meal reimbursements because "she should have been at home cooking." Sutherland testified in addition that Camardese told her she should be "meek and mild" if she wanted to get ahead in the firm. She said that Wilson told her that she was being "emotional" for protesting the treatment given to her and her staff, and that the firm was having the "same problems with women partners that we used to have with blacks." Concerning the only female principal in the Reston office, Wilson said that "she made a lot of money for a woman." Sutherland also stated that at a going-away party for a male employee there was a cake in the shape of a scantily clad woman, and that the employee made "very derogatory" comments about women while cutting the cake even though there were several women present.8

Meanwhile, on March 17, 1987, the loan matured. The New Hampshire property had not yet been sold, and Sutherland had not delivered the promised second deed of trust on her Reston home. The evidence was in dispute as to what Sutherland and Wilson decided to do at this point. Sutherland testified that Wilson agreed, on behalf of Arthur Young, to extend the due date for one year, until March 17, 1988, and to refrain from any effort to collect on the loan during that year. Wilson, on the other hand, testified that he asked Sutherland to begin making payments on the loan and told her it would have to be fully repaid within twelve months. No agreement about the repayment of the loan was ever reduced to writing, and Sutherland never made any payments on the loan.

On April 9, 1987, Sutherland signed a second deed of trust on her Reston home. Her husband, however, refused to sign it, making it unenforceable. On April 16 Mr. Wilson asked Mrs. Sutherland to have her husband sign it. She responded with a letter on April 28, stating that her husband would not sign the deed of trust because it allowed Young to foreclose on the home in the event of a default on the loan, contrary to her husband's understanding that Young had agreed not to foreclose.9 In the sameletter Mrs. Sutherland wrote that her husband thought Young's treatment of them under these circumstances was "quite likely discriminatory."

On April 28 Wilson and Camardese conducted Sutherland's annual performance review. The evaluation form, which Camardese filled out, listed eleven categories of job skills and allowed performance in each category to be rated "Outstanding," "Competent," "Improvement needed," or "Unsatisfactory." Camardese's evaluation of Sutherland found "Improvement Needed" in three of the eleven categories10 and ranked her performance as falling between "Improvement Needed" and "Competent" in two other categories.11 He deemed her performance "Unsatisfactory" in one category,12 "Competent" in four categories,13 and somewhere between "Competent" and "Outstanding" in the remaining category.14 Sutherland believed, and testified, that evaluations with "Improvement Needed" ratings were reserved for employees "on their way out."

On May 4, less than a week later, Wilson told Sutherland that the whole office was moving back to Reston, where it would be restructured, and that her group would become part of a larger group that he would lead. Mr. Camardese in turn would become the head of NES, which meant that everyone in Sutherland's group would then be accountable to Camardese. Sutherland testified that, because of this restructuring and the return of...

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