Arthurs v. Aiken County

• Citation: 338 S.C. 253,525 S.E.2d 542
• Decision Date: 06 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. 3084.,3084.
• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Parties: Steven ARTHURS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Deborah Munn, Appellant, v. AIKEN COUNTY, South Carolina Sheriff's Department, Respondent.

338 S.C. 253

525 S.E.2d 542

Steven ARTHURS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Deborah Munn, Appellant, v. AIKEN COUNTY, South Carolina Sheriff's Department, Respondent.

No. 3084.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard November 2, 1999.

Decided December 6, 1999.

Rehearing Denied January 29, 2000.

Robert T. Williams, Sr., and Jonathan R. Hendrix, both of Williams, Hendrix, Steigner & Brink, of Lexington, for appellant.

Vinton D. Lide and Paul H. Derrick, both of Lide, Montgomery & Potts, of Columbia, for respondent. ANDERSON, Judge:

Steven Arthurs, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Deborah Munn (Arthurs), filed this action against the Aiken County Sheriff's Department (the Department) alleging negligence and/or gross negligence by the Department resulting in Deborah Munn's death. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Department. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 30, 1994, Deborah Munn (Victim) was shot to death in her home by her estranged husband, John Munn (Husband). Earlier that day, Victim called 911 and complained that her husband had tried to run her off of the road on her way home from work that morning. Later that evening, Victim asked her nephew, Steven Greg Arthurs (Nephew), who is the son of the Personal Representative, to fix her broken water line. While Nephew and a friend were on Victim's property attempting to fix the water line, they encountered Husband, who asked Nephew if he and his friend were "the gang that's supposed to jump on him." According to Nephew, Husband said "if you want to hit me go ahead and hit me." Husband then "reached back behind his back to where [a] gun was in his back pocket and he slung a beer" in Nephew's face. Nephew returned home and told his mother what had occurred. She called 911 and reported the incident. Victim, who had witnessed the incident, also called 911.

Deputy Charles Cain and Investigator Stacy Coleman from the Aiken County Sheriff's Department responded to the call. Deputy Cain interviewed the Nephew and Victim, who told Deputy Cain she "was in fear of" her husband. Victim told Deputy Cain that right before the officers arrived on the scene her husband had been "raising hell in the front yard." A BOLO ("be on the lookout") alert was issued for Husband's truck. Deputy Cain suggested to Victim that if her husband came back she should "stay behind a locked door and dial 911." He further stated: "`Just call us and we'll come down here with all of us, we'll take care of him down [here] in the front yard.... [L]et us take care of a gun problem. You stay inside but whatever you do, don't unlock the door for him.'" Investigator Coleman looked for Husband but could not locate him.

After the deputies left, Nephew saw Husband at a garage located approximately three hundred yards from Victim's residence. When Husband saw Nephew, he said: "[S]tart something with me now.... [G]o get your Mama and Daddy and I'll send both of them to hell." Nephew's mother again called 911. Deputies from the Department arrived and searched for Husband with flashlights but could not find him. The Deputies departed the scene.

Approximately one hour later, Husband forced a neighbor at gunpoint to knock on Victim's door while Husband hid behind the neighbor. When Victim answered the door, Husband forced his way into the trailer and shot Victim in the head. Victim was pronounced dead at the scene.

ISSUES

I. Did the trial court err in granting a directed verdict in favor of the Department on the ground the Department did not owe Victim a special duty?

II. Did the trial judge err in granting a directed verdict to the Department on the ground that the Department owed no duty to Arthurs under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Futch v. McAllister Towing, 335 S.C. 598, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999); Collins v. Bisson Moving & Storage, Inc., 332 S.C. 290, 504 S.E.2d 347 (Ct.App.1998). See also Weir v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 312 S.C. 511, 435 S.E.2d 864 (1993)

(Illustrating an appellate court must apply the same standard when reviewing the trial judge's decision on such motions). When the evidence yields only one inference, a directed verdict in favor of the moving party is proper. Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 334 S.C. 469, 514 S.E.2d 126 (1999). If more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, the case must be submitted to the jury. Mullinax v. J.M. Brown Amusement Co., 333 S.C. 89, 508 S.E.2d 848 (1998). In ruling on a directed verdict motion, the trial court is concerned only with the existence or non-existence of evidence. Jones v. General Elec. Co., 331 S.C. 351, 503 S.E.2d 173 (Ct.App.1998).

The trial court can only be reversed by this Court when there is no evidence to support the ruling below. Swinton Creek Nursery, supra.

When reviewing the grant of a directed verdict, the appellate court should not ignore facts unfavorable to the opposing party. Collins, supra. Rather, it must determine whether a verdict for the opposing party would be reasonably possible under the facts as liberally construed in his favor. Jones, supra. See also First State Sav. & Loan v. Phelps, 299 S.C. 441, 385 S.E.2d 821 (1989) (in reviewing the granting of a motion for directed verdict, we should determine the elements of the action alleged and whether any evidence existed on each element).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. PUBLIC DUTY RULE

Arthurs argues the trial court erred in finding no special duty exception to the public duty rule existed in the instant case. Arthurs claims the Department owed a special duty to Victim. We disagree.

The public duty rule was originally adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown, 195 S.C. 35, 10 S.E.2d 625 (1940):

The law necessarily grants certain discretion to its officers in handling the public business. In one instance it may be wise for a public officer to pursue one course, in another instance, another course. Those charged with protecting the public interest should view that interest as supreme, should consider what is best for the public, and should be free at all times to prosecute the course that appears to be in the public interest.... It is well settled that an individual has no right of action against a public officer for breach of a duty owing to the public only, even though such individual be specially injured thereby. Where a duty is owing to the public only, an officer is not liable to an individual who may have been incidentally injured by his failure to perform it.

Throop on Public Officers, Section 708 (page 668), states:

"A private action cannot be sustained, for failure to discharge a duty owing exclusively to the public, even by a person specially injured thereby."

Parker, 195 S.C. at 52, 10 S.E.2d at 632. Under South Carolina's public duty doctrine, public officials are not liable to individuals for their negligence in discharging public duties as the duty is owed to the public at large rather than to anyone individually. Tanner v. Florence Co. Treasurer, et al., 336 S.C. 552, 521 S.E.2d 153 (1999); Jensen v. Anderson County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 304 S.C. 195, 403 S.E.2d 615 (1991).

The public duty rule is not a separate legal doctrine. Rayfield v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 297 S.C. 95, 374 S.E.2d 910 (Ct.App.1988). It is a special application of the broader principle that an action for negligence based upon an alleged violation of a statute cannot be maintained if the statute was enacted for a purpose other than preventing the injury of which complaint is made. Id. The rule applies to the special case of statutes which create or define the duties of a public office. Id.

An essential element in a negligence cause of action is the existence of a legal duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Wyatt v. Fowler, 326 S.C. 97, 484 S.E.2d 590 (1997). Without such a duty, there can be no actionable negligence. Rogers v. South Carolina Dep't of Parole and Community Corrections, 320 S.C. 253, 464 S.E.2d 330 (1995). To prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by a negligent act or omission; and (3) damage proximately resulting from the breach. Tanner, supra.

The court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the law recognizes a particular duty. Steinke v. South Carolina Dep't of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142 (1999). See also Rogers v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 222 S.C. 66, 71 S.E.2d 585 (1952) (whether defendant is under legal duty to plaintiff is question of law for court); Araujo v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 291 S.C. 54, 351 S.E.2d 908 (Ct.App.1986) (question of whether defendant owes duty, the breach of which may constitute negligence, is a question of law, not of fact). If there is no duty, then the defendant in a negligence action is entitled to a directed verdict. Steinke, supra.

A. Public Duty Rule as Juxtaposed to Tort Claims Act

The public duty rule is often invoked as if it were a rule of immunity for public officers. Rayfield v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 297 S.C. 95, 374 S.E.2d 910 (Ct. App.1988). It is not, however, a species of immunity. Id.

Appellate courts in this state have recognized the difference between the public duty rule and immunity under the Tort Claims Act. See Tanner v. Florence County Treasurer, et al., 336 S.C. 552, 521 S.E.2d 153 (1999)

; Wells v. City of Lynchburg, 331 S.C. 296, 501 S.E.2d 746 (Ct.App.1998); Rayfield, supra. In Wells, this Court explicated:

The public duty rule is distinguishable from immunity. Immunity is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and can be waived. One who pleads immunity conditionally admits the plaintiffs case, but asserts

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