Artim Transp. System, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division

Decision Date29 June 1971
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 1170A191,1170A191,1
Citation271 N.E.2d 494,149 Ind.App. 137
PartiesARTIM TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION et al., Appellees
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

William L. Travis, James E. Schreiner, Hammond, for appellant; Travis & Tinkham, Hammond, of counsel.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., of Ind., Darrel K. Diamond, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

This matter comes to us for a judicial review of a decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division. Claimants, some 76 employees of Artim Transportation System, appellant herein, filed individual applications for unemployment compensation benefits for approximately three weeks of unemployment arising out of a work stoppage at the Artim truck terminal in Hammond, Indiana. Artim notified the Indiana Employment Security Division that the claimants' unemployment was due to a labor dispute and should not, therefore, be compensable under § 1504 of the Indiana Employment Security Act as found in IC 1971, 22--4--15--3, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 52--1539c (Burns' 1964). Thereafter, a hearing was had before a referee which resulted in a finding that claimants had not participated in a labor dispute and were thereby eligible for benefits. Artim appealed to the Review Board which affired the decision of the referee.

In affirming the referee's decision the Review Board stated the relevant evidentiary facts and inferences drawn therefrom, as follows:

'STATEMENT OF FACTS: The record is in agreement that the claimants were unemployed during week ending April 15, 1967, when they returned to work, as recalled by the employer herein, subsequent to the establishment of a new agreement between the employer and Teamsters Union Local 142, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. It is shown that the agreement between the employer and said union had expired on March 31, 1967.

'An association representing the employer herein, as well as other trucking companies, began negotiations with representatives of the employees' bargaining unit early in March 1967, and had frequent meetings until an agreement was reached on or about May 4, 1967. There is no evidence of probative value showing that an impasse in negotiations had been reached at any particular time, however, it is shown that negotiations continued in a fluid state.

'The employer herein unilaterally determined that a 'labor Dispute' existed and, therefore, ceased operations during week ending April 15, 1967, recalled claimants to work week ending April 22, 1967, and then again ceased operations from week ending April 29, 1967, to May 4, 1967. The record establishes that during the cessation of operations by this employer, work was available, claimants were available, the employer's place of business was not being struck, nor were the claimants picketing.

'The employer's position is that since an association members place of business was being struck, 'a strike against one is a strike against all."

Based on the foregoing statement of facts the Review Board entered the following findings and conclusions:

'FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:

The Review Board finds that the collective bargaining agreement between the employer herein and Teamsters Union Local 142, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen ahd Helpers of America, expired on March 31, 1967.

'It further finds that the employer was a number of an association of motor freight operators who began negotiations with the claimants' bargaining unit in early March 1967, to establish a new agreement.

'It further finds that good faith negotiation meetings occurred frequently and remained in a fluid state until May 4, 1967, when a new contract was agreed upon.

'It further finds that good faith negotiations between labor and management do not in or of themselves constitute a labor dispute.

'It further finds that this employer unilaterally determined that a 'labor dispute' existed and, therefore, ceased operations for week ending April 15, 1967, pending negotiations during said week.

'It further finds that the claimants were recalled by the employer and worked week ending April 22, 1967.

'It further finds that the employer again ceased operations for week ending April 29, 1967, to May 4, 1967, and the claimants returned to work, as recalled.

'It further finds that during the claimants' unemployment, as set forth herein, they were available for work, the employer's establishment was not being struck, the claimants were not picketing, and neither is it shown that the claimants were withholding their services.

'The Review Board concludes that the claimants are not disqualified from receiving benefit rights under § 1504 of the Act since there was no labor dispute between the employer and claimants at the employer's establishment or place of business * * *.

'It further concludes that the claimants were unemployed through no fault of their own and cause for their unemployment is therefore attributable to the employer within the meaning of the Act.'

As provided by the Indiana Employment Security Act in IC 1971, 22--4--17--12, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 52--1542k (Burns' 1964), appellant assigns error in that the decision of the Review Board is contrary to law. As further provided by Burns' § 52--1542k, said assignment is sufficient to present to the reviewing court both the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision, and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of fact.

Appellant seeks to establish the ineligibility of claimants for unemployment compensation under the disqualification provision of the Act, as set forth in IC 1971, 22--4--15--3, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 52--1539c (Burns' 1964), which reads:

'An individual shall be ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights: for any week with respect to which an employee of the division, designated by the director and hereinafter referred to as the deputy, finds that his total or partial or part-total unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he was last employed; Provided, That this section shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the deputy that: he is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and he does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute; and he has not voluntarily stopped working, other than at the direction of his employer, in sympathy with employees in some other establishment or factory in which a labor dispute is in progress * * *.'

It is contended by appellant that the evidence is insufficient to support the Board's finding that the claimants are not disqualified from receiving benefit rights under Burns' 1539c, supra.

It is a well settled premise of judicial review of administrative decisions that this court is not at liberty to weight the evidence and that we must accept the facts as found by the Review Board. However, this court and our Supreme Court have established several important exceptions to this general rule, which if proven by the party seeking reversal, can provide the basis for reversing the decision of the Review Board. In Williamson Co. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div. (1969), Ind.App., 250 N.E.2d 612, 616, these exceptions were clarified and restated as follows:

'(1) The evidence on which the Review Board based its conclusions was devoid of probative value;

'(2) The quantum of legitimate evidence was so proportionately meager as to lead to the conviction that the finding does not rest upon a rational basis;

'(3) The result of the hearing before the Review Board was substantially influenced by improper considerations;

'(4) There was no substantial evidence supporting the conclusions of the Review Board;

'(5) The order of the Review Board, its judgment or finding, is fraudulent, unreasonable or arbitrary;

'(6) The Review Board ignored competent evidence;

'(7) Reasonable men would be bound to reach the opposite conclusion from the evidence in the record.'

In support of its assigned error, appellant relies upon all of the aforementioned exceptions as the basis for reversal of the Review Board's decision.

After carefully reviewing the record, we do not agree with appellant's argument that the Review Board's findings fall within the Williamson, supra, exceptions. The record reveals that the evidence concerning the facts was conflicting, and because it was conflicting we cannot say that reasonable men would have reached a different conclusion than that reached by the Review Board herein.

In a judicial review of an administrative decision, the burden of proof rests upon the appellant to show that the Board erred in reaching its decision. Bootz Mfg. Co. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div. (1968) 143 Ind.App. 17, 237 N.E.2d 597.

Appellant herein has failed in its burden of proving that the Review Board erred in its finding that a labor dispute did not exist at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which the claimants were last employed. It can be inferred from the evidence that a labor dispute did exist at the C.P.T., another member of the employer bargaining association, truck terminal. However, the strike by other members of claimants' local union against their employer who was a member of appellant's bargaining association does not affirmatively establish the existence of a labor dispute at appellant's truck terminal.

To overcome its failure to affirmatively establish a labor dispute at its truck terminal, appellant has urged this Court to adopt the interpretation that a strike...

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