Artis v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0198-13-2
| Decision Date | 23 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0198-13-2 |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | EMMANUEL ARTIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Humphreys, Alston and Decker
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG
Andrew T. Bodoh (Thomas H. Roberts; Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
Benjamin H. Katz, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Emmanuel Artis was convicted of trespass in violation of Code § 18.2-119. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that an authorized person excluded him from the headquarters building of the Petersburg Bureau of Police. He further avers that the trial court erroneously excluded a video recording. Finally, he argues that the public areas of the headquarters property were not covered by Code § 18.2-119 and that the trial court erred in refusing his proffered jury instruction on this legal principle. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove that an authorized person barred the appellant from the headquarters property. However, we also conclude that the trial court erred in excluding the video recording, which was relevant to the fact finder's determination of whether the Commonwealth's witnesses were biased against the appellant. We further hold that this error was not harmless. Lastly, we conclude that the trial court erred in rejecting the contention that whether the appellant was on apublic thoroughfare, a type of property excluded from Code § 18.2-119, was a question for the jury based on the facts of this case. Consequently, we reverse the appellant's conviction and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion if the Commonwealth be so advised.
In the early morning hours of Sunday, April 1, 2012, the appellant was arrested for trespassing at the headquarters building of the Petersburg Bureau of Police, property owned by the City of Petersburg. The appellant entered the public area of the headquarters building at around 4:30 a.m. in order to lodge a complaint about alleged police corruption. It was undisputed at trial that officers responded to a dispatch regarding the appellant's complaint. Other evidence regarding the appellant's arrest was disputed.1
The Commonwealth's evidence was that the appellant interacted with the dispatcher and shift commander in the headquarters public lobby and on the landing just outside the building. Dispatcher Karen Richardson testified that the appellant entered the lobby and asked specifically to speak to a captain. According to Richardson, because no captain was on duty, she entered a call for service requesting a sergeant. She said that although the appellant spoke calmly and quietly to her, he was pacing and seemed agitated. Richardson testified that the appellant spoke with at least one officer in the lobby but she did not recall the identity of the officer.
Detective Sergeant Jason Sharp was the first person to respond to the call for service. Sharp testified that he was the officer responsible for the portion of the city in which the headquarters building was located and for the officers assigned to patrol that area. Sharp met theappellant in the lobby within two minutes of receiving the call. The appellant told Sharp that he wanted to make a complaint against a police officer. Sharp explained the process for filing a complaint and offered the appellant the necessary paperwork. The appellant became disruptive, used profanity, and refused to calm down, "yelling something like, you . . . are just going to team up on me anyways." Based on the appellant's ongoing disruptive behavior, Sharp ordered him to leave headquarters property or be arrested for trespassing.
Sharp further testified that around that time, Officer Dillard, one of the patrol officers under his command on the midnight shift, came from the interior headquarters area. Dillard joined them in the lobby and "exchanged conversation" with the appellant. Sharp testified that he again instructed the appellant to leave the building but that the appellant went only as far as the patio area just outside the public entrance and refused to leave. Sharp directed Dillard to arrest the appellant and watched as Dillard did so. Sharp testified without equivocation that the appellant was on the patio at the time of the arrest. He also acknowledged that he knew by the time of the appellant's arrest that Dillard was the officer about whom the appellant had come to the police station to complain.
The appellant did not dispute that it was Officer Dillard who arrested him. However, he presented evidence that in the moments leading up to the arrest, he interacted not with Sergeant Sharp but with Officer W.L. James. He also contended that this interaction occurred in the parking lot rather than the lobby or patio area. Officer James, called by the defense as a hostile witness, testified that on the morning of the appellant's arrest, he was at headquarters when he received a call over the police radio about an individual in the parking lot. He went immediately on foot to the parking lot and encountered the appellant. According to James, he attempted to engage the appellant in conversation in order to "[t]actfully . . . calm him down." The appellant told James that he wanted to speak to a captain immediately about "police corruption." Nocaptain was on duty at that time, and James thought that the appellant "needed to talk to someone a lot higher than a sergeant." Consequently, James told the appellant that he should come back during business hours on Monday. James advised the appellant that if he wanted to take immediate action, he could file a written complaint at the front desk at headquarters, but the appellant insisted that he wanted to speak to a captain.
James further testified that he asked the appellant to leave numerous times during their exchange but his statements to the appellant were merely "recommendation[s]." He specifically disclaimed "order[ing]" the appellant to leave. James stated that once Dillard pulled up in his vehicle, James "stepped back from the situation." According to James, Dillard spoke with the appellant briefly and then, "on his own initiative from the appearances of it," arrested the appellant. James remembered "the important things that were told to [the appellant], . . . what he was instructed to do," but James gave no indication that Officer Dillard said anything to the appellant about trespassing. When asked if "any other officers [were] near [the appellant] right before his arrest," Officer James did not mention Sergeant Sharp.
The appellant also elicited testimony from Dispatcher Richardson that at some point that morning, the appellant was in the headquarters parking lot saying that he had "footage of corruption [and that he] just got thrown out of [a Petersburg nightclub]." She also noted that the appellant "ma[de] threats against the police department," demanded to see a captain, and did not believe that there was no captain on duty.
The appellant defended the trespassing charge on numerous grounds. He contended that he was not barred from the headquarters property by an authorized person prior to his arrest. He also argued that the arrest occurred on a part of the property that was a public thoroughfare and, therefore, was not covered by the trespass statute. He attempted to enter into evidence a video recording of an earlier encounter between him and several police officers. He indicated that thealleged encounter served as the basis for his presence at police headquarters to lodge a complaint. He argued that the video showed the bias of the police officers against him as well as his good-faith belief that he had a right to remain on headquarters property to report the earlier incident. The trial court ruled that the video was not relevant and refused to admit it. The court instructed the jury on the appellant's good-faith claim of right. However, it refused his proffered instruction regarding whether the area he occupied was a public thoroughfare that was not subject to the trespassing statute.
The jury found the appellant guilty of trespassing. At sentencing, the appellant testified about his version of events that had occurred at the Cockade Grill in the hours prior to his arrest at police headquarters. He explained that he provided free "video production" for clubs. He stated generally that he had been having problems with the Petersburg police since 2007. The appellant said that since that time, he had worked on occasion with a group of people to conduct video "surveil[lance of] police officers [reportedly engaged in] corruption[]" but that "[m]ost of [the time], [he] just ke[pt] a camera [with him] and stuff happen[ed]." According to the appellant, he and the group routinely posted online their video recordings of police activity. He testified that on the evening at issue, as he was leaving the Cockade after video recording a band, a group of six or seven police officers attempted to keep him from departing on foot. The appellant claimed that these officers followed him with their hands on their weapons and threatened to arrest him for walking in the street and on a public sidewalk. He explained that this was the incident about which he had gone to police headquarters to complain immediately prior to his arrest for trespassing there.
The jury returned a sentencing verdict recommending a $300 fine. The trial court sentenced the appellant in accordance with the jury's verdict.
The appellant contends that the evidence failed to prove that he was excluded from the property by a proper party under Code § 18.2-119. This issue presents a mixed question of law and fact. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo on appeal. Baker...
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