Artis v. McCann

• Decision Date: 10 June 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11-3613 (WJM)
• Parties: MARK N. ARTIS, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MCCANN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

MARK N. ARTIS, Plaintiff,

v.OFFICER MCCANN, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11-3613 (WJM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Dated: June 10, 2013

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

MARK N. ARTIS, Plaintiff pro se

Special Treatment Unit

JUSTIN L. CONFORTI, Counsel for Defendants

State of New Jersey

Office of the Attorney General

Department of Law

MARTINI, District Judge

Plaintiff Mark Artis, a civilly committed patient at the Special Treatment Unit ("STU") in Avenel, New Jersey, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants Senior Corrections Officers Darlene McCann, Teofilo Moreno, Craig Hammel, Shannon Kelly and Lieutenant Erik Qualls ("Defendants") for violation of his constitutional rights. This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.There was no oral argument. FED.R.CIV.P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a New Jersey resident who was confined at the STU in Avenel, New Jersey, at all times relevant to the complaint. (Defs.' Br., Decl. of Deborah Maloney ("Maloney Decl."), Ex. D, Treatment Progress Review Committee Annual Review Report of Mark Artis.) On July 7, 2010, Defendants McCann, Hammel, Kelly, Moreno and Qualls were assigned to work at the STU. (Id. at Ex. A, Special Custody Report of SCO Darlene McCann.) At approximately 1:10 p.m. on that date, Defendant McCann was in the STU therapy building pat frisking residents prior to their entry to group therapy sessions. (Id.) When Defendant McCann was finished pat frisking the residents, she entered a nearby office area with a resident to empty the trash. (Id.) While she was entering the office area, Plaintiff and two other residents were entering the therapy building to attend a group therapy session. (Id.) Defendant McCann told the three residents to wait for her to finish emptying the trash in order to pat frisk them before their entry into the group session. (Id.) When Defendant McCann exited the office again, the two other residents were waiting to be pat frisked, but Plaintiff had gone into his group session. (Id.) She informed Plaintiff that he must be pat frisked before entering the group therapy room. (Id.) Plaintiff then exited the group room and stood in position to be pat frisked, with his hands above his head. (Id.) While being pat frisked, Plaintiff's elbow made contact with the left side of Defendant McCann's chin. (Id; Defs.' Br., Decl. of Justin L. Conforti ("Conforti Decl."), Ex. A, Dep. of Mark Artis ("Artis Dep.") 25:5-7.) Plaintiff "immediately apologized and said 'I didn't do it on purpose. It was an accident.'" (Id. at 27:14-15; 51:23-24.) Defendant McCann then called a "Code 33," to which Defendants Kelly, Hammel, Moreno and Qualls responded. (Maloney Decl., Ex. A.) Defendants state that Plaintiff was handcuffed without incident and taken to the infirmary, where he was examined by Nurse Elizabeth Ward. (Id., Maloney Decl., Ex. A, Special Custody Report of Nurse Elizabeth Ward.) Defendants do not acknowledge any physical altercation with Plaintiff. In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that after Defendant McCann called the code, he put himself in a "dismissed" position. (Artis Dep. 38:10-11.) Specifically, he was "facing the wall. [His] hands were on the wall. [His] forehead was touching the wall. [His] hands were interlocked behind his head. [He] was on his knees." (Id. at 38:13-16.) He further testified that

[Officer Moreno] jumps with his foot fully extended out, kicks me in my side underneath my left armpit...Then Officer Hammel proceeded to grab me and slam me into the ground. I'm not sure if it was necessarily from the force of the kick or Officer Hammel facing me or throwing me down on the ground, but I ended up laying flat on the ground. My shirt was practically ripped off of me. It was torn completely, from the shoulder sleeve down to the end of the shirt.

...

[Officer Hammel, Officer Kelly and Officer Moreno] just started pounding and kicking and stomping me and I just was crying. I was just saying that I didn't do it on purpose. I didn't hit her. I didn't hit her. They just kept stomping me and they kept kicking me and they kept punching me.

(Id. at 39:4-6; 39:8-15; 40:11-18.)

Defendants state that according to an examination by the nurse, Plaintiff did not have any visible trauma or injuries and that Plaintiff "denied any pain or discomfort." (Maloney Decl., Ex. A, Special Custody Report of Nurse Elizabeth Ward.) Nurse Edith Feldman reported that Plaintiff had no visible trauma and that he was crying. (Id., Ex. B, Electronic Medical Record of Mark Artis, July 7, 2010.) In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that, as a result of the altercation, he had a "busted up lip," "scrapes along [his] ribcage" and "abrasions under [his] armpit." (Artis Dep. 53:5-25.) He also stated that he had a "slightly bruised eye" that appeared the following morning. (Id.)

On the day of the incident, the Special Investigations Division of the Department ofCorrections conducted an investigation. (Maloney Decl., Ex. C, SID Administrative Investigation Report.) Investigator Rudy Valentin interviewed Plaintiff, who admitted to making contact with Defendant McCann during the pat frisk search. (Id.) The report further stated that Plaintiff denied sustaining any injuries during the incident and refused to submit a written report detailing his involvement. (Id.)

Plaintiff testified that since the incident, he has not experienced any physical pain, but that he suffers from anxiety, "emotional and mental issues" and "vivid dreams." (Id. at 64:12-67:5.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery [including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and is material if it will affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court considers all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).

Federal courts "have traditionally given pro se litigants greater leeway where they have not followed the technical rules of pleading and procedure." Folsom v. Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex Vicinage, 2008 WL 1782236, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr.17, 2008) (quoting Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993)). As such, "[w]here a nonmoving pro se litigant fails to file a responsive Local Civil Rule 56.1 statement of undisputed material facts, a court may draw therelevant facts underlying the claims from available sources such as the complaint, deposition testimony, the moving litigant's Local Civil Rule 56.1 statement of undisputed material facts and supporting exhibits." Athill v. Speziale, 2009 WL 1874194, at *2 (D.N.J. June 30, 2009); see also Folsom, 2008 WL 1782236, at *4 (holding that although plaintiff failed to submit a response to defendant's Rule 56.1 statement of material facts, he asserted his own version of the facts in his submissions to the court and thus, the facts adduced by plaintiff that varied from defendant's Rule 56.1 statement were deemed denials of defendant's statement of facts); Stewart v. Kelchner, 358 F. App'x 291, 294 n.9 (3d Cir. 2009) ("In light of the fact that [Plaintiff] was acting pro se, we hesitate to adopt the District Court's approach of accepting the defendants' statement of material facts as uncontested solely because Stewart failed to submit a paragraph-by-paragraph response.")

As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff is held to a more lenient standard than a licensed attorney. In addition to his complaint, he has provided the Court with an opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, which includes a firsthand account of the incident and points to supportive evidence contained in Defendants' exhibits. Therefore, to the extent the facts contained in these materials vary from Defendants', they will be deemed denials of Defendants' statement of facts.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants seek summary judgment on the following claims: (1) compensatory damages; (2) excessive force claim against Defendants McCann, Hammel, Kelly and Moreno; (3) failure to protect claim against Defendant Qualls; (4) punitive damages.

A. Excessive Force

Although an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner. Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that an excessive-force claim from aninvoluntarily committed state hospital patient should be evaluated under the same standard as an excessive-force claim brought by pretrial detainee). Because an involuntarily committed psychiatric patient is confined for treatment rather than incarcerated for the purpose of punishment following conviction, the Eighth Amendment does not apply. See Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324-325 (1982) (concluding that an involuntarily committed patient has substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment was not the proper standard of liability); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 (1989) ("The State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after...