Artz v. Barnhart

• Decision Date: 30 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-3882.,02-3882.
• Parties: Jay ARTZ, Appellant v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

330 F.3d 170

Jay ARTZ, Appellant v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.

No. 02-3882.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued April 7, 2003.

Filed May 30, 2003.

Brian G. Smith, (Argued), Community Health Law Project, Inc., Collingswood, NJ, for Appellant.

Anthony J. LaBruna, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Christopher J. Christie, United States Attorney, District of New Jersey, Newark, NJ, Karen T. Callahan (argued), Social Security Administration, Office of General Counsel — Region II, New York, NY, for Appellee.

Before ALITO, FUENTES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALITO, Circuit Judge.

This appeal requires us to interpret and apply a provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1)(A)(ii), that provides that disability insurance benefits and certain other benefits are not to be paid to a person who "is confined by court order in an institution at public expense in connection with ... a verdict or finding that the individual is not guilty of [a criminal] offense by reason of insanity." Relying on this provision, the Commissioner suspended Jay Artz's claim for disability benefits for a 14-month period during which he was involuntarily confined in psychiatric institutions at public expense. The District Court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner, Artz v. Barnhart, 214 F.Supp.2d 459 (D.N.J.2002), and we now affirm the order of the District Court.

I.

Before turning to the facts of Artz's case, we will briefly discuss the provision of the Social Security Act that is at issue in this appeal, and we will summarize New Jersey's treatment of persons who are found not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI").

A. Before 1994, a provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1) (amended 1994) provided that benefits were not to be paid to felons while incarcerated unless they were actively and satisfactorily participating in an approved rehabilitation program and were expected to be able to engage in substantial gainful activity upon release and within a reasonable time. In 1994, Congress broadened this prohibition to apply to several other categories of persons who are institutionalized at public expense following criminal proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1)(A). Specifically, as amended in 1994 and as it now stands, the statute applies to any person who

(i) is confined in a jail, prison, or other penal institution or correctional facility

pursuant to his conviction of a criminal offense,

(ii) is confined by court order in an institution at public expense in connection with —

(I) a verdict or finding that the individual is guilty but insane, with respect to a criminal offense,

(II) a verdict or finding that the individual is not guilty of such an offense by reason of insanity,

(III) a finding that such individual is incompetent to stand trial under an allegation of such an offense, or

(IV) a similar verdict or finding with respect to such an offense based on similar factors (such as a mental disease, a mental defect, or mental incompetence), or

(iii) immediately upon completion of confinement as described in clause (i) pursuant to conviction of a criminal offense an element of which is sexual activity, is confined by court order in an institution at public expense pursuant to a finding that the individual is a sexually dangerous person or a sexual predator or a similar finding.

The House Committee Report provided the following explanation for including persons found not guilty by reason of insanity within this prohibition:

Social Security is intended to replace earnings and provide basic income for food, clothing and shelter to workers who retire or become disabled. Individuals who have been committed to an institution pursuant to committing a crime are already relying on public funds to cover the costs of their basic living expenses. It is particularly inequitable that, in some instances, criminally insane individuals so institutionalized receive higher benefits than their victims or their victims' survivors....

In making these changes, the Committee is seeking to establish greater consistency in the policy that Congress enacted in 1980 banning Social Security benefit payments to incarcerated felons. That limitation recognizes that prisoners receive full support from public resources in the form of food, clothing, lodging, and basic health care. In the Committee's view, the same situation exists in the case of criminally insane individuals who are confined to institutions at public expense.

H.R.Rep. No. 103-491 (1994), 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3266, 3268, 3273.

B. In State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed the broad principle that the standard for the involuntary commitment of persons found NGRI should be substantially the same as that applied to others who are civilly committed. Id. at 297-99. The Court then prescribed procedures to implement this principle. Under Krol, when a defendant is found NGRI, the criminal court may order that the defendant "be confined in a suitable mental institution for a period of 60 days for observation and examination." Id. at 300. The Krol Court continued:

Within this period, the State may move for indefinite commitment on the ground that defendant is mentally ill and, if permitted to remain at large in the general population without some restraints, is likely to pose a danger to himself or to society. If, following a hearing, the court finds that the State has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant is mentally ill and is likely to pose such a danger, it should order suitable restraints placed upon defendant's liberty so as to protect the public and provide defendant with appropriate treatment.

Id. (footnotes omitted). The Court added that orders requiring institutionalization or lesser restraints may be modified upon proper proof by a preponderance of the evidence by the party seeking modification. Id. at 303-04. "Once, however, [a] commitment order is unconditionally terminated the defendant must be treated thereafter like any other person for purposes of involuntary commitment." Id.

In State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574 (1978), the state supreme court imposed additional requirements. The Fields Court held that persons who are civilly committed after a verdict of NGRI are entitled to periodic review of the continued validity of the restraints on their liberty and that the state must bear the same burden of proof at these proceedings as it bore when the person was first committed. Id. at 580. The Krol and Fields procedures are now codified by statute and court rule. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8; N.J. Court Rules 3:19-2 and 4:74-7.

Under the New Jersey procedures, NGRI acquittees are generally treated the same as others when civil commitment is initially sought and when a periodic review proceeding is held, but there are some differences. "[W]hat is required is not absolute equality, but `substantial equality.'" In the Matter of the Commitment of Edward S., 118 N.J. 118, 570 A.2d 917, 922 (1990). "Indeed, the cases note that there are differences." Id. at 923 (emphasis in original). Perhaps most importantly, the burden of proof differs. In most civil commitment proceedings, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that "mental illness causes the person to be dangerous to self or dangerous to others or property." N.J. Court Rule 4:74-7(f)(1). In the case of a person who has been found NGRI, however, "during the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed, as an ordinary term of imprisonment, for any charge on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity," a preponderance of the evidence burden applies. N.J.S.A. 2C: 4-8. See also Krol, 344 A.2d at 300 & n. 9. Furthermore, "the fact that [an NGRI acquittee] has actually engaged in dangerous conduct otherwise criminal should weigh heavily in [a] court's assessment of the need for the continued imposition of restraints upon his liberty." Fields, 390A.2d at 587. In addition the prosecutor has a statutory right to appear in any proceeding regarding the commitment or discharge of an acquittee following an NGRI verdict and in any subsequent periodic review. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8b(3). And when an NGRI murder acquittee seeks release into the community, the proceeding must generally be open to the public. In the Matter of Commitment of Edward S., supra.

C. Artz has a long history of mental illness. See Artz, 214 F.Supp.2d at 461. In 1981, Artz was arrested for the murder of his mother, but he was found NGRI, and his case was then handled in accordance with the procedures summarized above. He was confined by the criminal court for 60 days for observation and evaluation. After that evaluation, it was determined that he was a danger to himself or others. He was therefore involuntarily committed to the Ancora Psychiatric Hospital, and his status was reviewed as required by Fields. In June of 1989, following such a review, a New Jersey Superior Court Judge ordered that Artz be released from the Ancora facility on certain conditions, including the following: that he refrain from drinking alcohol and using illegal controlled substances; that he take prescribed psychoactive medications; that he attend regular counseling sessions; and that he remain available for monitoring and evaluation. App. at 144-46.

As a result of this continued monitoring and evaluation, Artz was readmitted to the Ancora facility from July 7 to 20, 1993, and from February 23 to March 30, 1994. Id. at 149. On July 22, 1994, he was committed to another psychiatric hospital after a judicial determination that he posed a danger to himself and others because he was no longer taking his medication. On March 14, 1995, Artz was transferred to the Ancora facility. He was conditionally released on April 10, 1996.

In January 1982, while confined in the Ancora facility, Artz applied to the...