Arundel Corp. v. Ayers

• Decision Date: 22 November 1934
• Docket Number: No. 29.,29.
• Citation: 175 A. 586
• Parties: ARUNDEL CORPORATION et al. v. AYERS.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

175 A. 586

ARUNDEL CORPORATION et al.

v. AYERS.^*

No. 29.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 22, 1934.

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Eli Frank, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Carrie Ayers, claimant, for the death of her husband, opposed by the Arundel Corporation, employer, and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, insurer. From an adverse decision, employer and insurer appeal.

Reversed.

Argued before BOND, C. J., and URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

Robert D. Bartlett and C. Damer McKenrick, both of Baltimore, for appellants.

Avrum K. Rifman, of Baltimore (Stuart M. Yeatman, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

SLOAN, Judge.

The question here submitted is whether the alleged accident so happened as to bring it within the jurisdiction of the state of Maryland or within the federal jurisdiction.

John E. Ayers, a machinist's helper, was employed by the Arundel Corporation, the owner of a dredge named "Caracul" on which some repairs were being made preparatory to doing some dredging in Craighill Channel. The dredge drew about fourteen feet of water; did not run on its own power; it had to be towed. When Mr. Ayers was taken sick or complained of illness on August 21, 1931, he was aboard the dredge at Sparrows Point, whence it had been towed because it was the only place about Baltimore where there was a crane capable of handling a tumbler which was to be put in the dredge. There is no dispute that the dredge could not float in any but navigable waters. It had been brought from Florida about a year before and ever since had been lying idle in Baltimore Harbor, in what was called the "Flats" with nothing but a skeleton crew aboard, until called into service for work at Craighill Channel to dig mud. While at Sparrows Point the machinist saw that Ayers did not look well, asked him if he felt badly, and was answered, "Yes, I believe I got an attack of acute indigestion, something I have not had for a long time"; he was rubbing his chest. He was sent to the dispensary, where he died a few minutes after his arrival, the attending physicians diagnosing the case as angina pectoris.

On November 4, 1931, his widow, Carrie Ayers, appellee, filed her claim for compensation with the Industrial Accident Commission on the ground that her husband had died as the result of an accidental personal injury sustained on the 21st day of August, 1931. Hearings were had by the commission on April 10, 1933, and on July 22, 1933, at the request of the insurer, to determine the following issues: "Q. (1) Whether or not the death of John Ayers was the result of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment; (2) Upon such other and further ground, both legal and equitable, as may appear at the hearing; (3) Whether the State Industrial Accident Commission has jurisdiction." On July 1, 1933, the commission found for the employer on the third (jurisdictional) issue and disallowed the claim. No action was taken on the first and second issues. From this decision the claimant appealed to the superior court of Baltimore city, and it is from an adverse decision in that court that the employer and insurer appeal to this court.

There was hut one issue submitted to the jury, and that was, "Has the State Industrial Accident Commission jurisdiction under the Workmen's Compensation Act, to award compensation for the alleged injury to and death of the deceased employee, John E. Ayers?" At the conclusion of the reading of all the evidence taken before the commission, the employer and insurer submitted three prayers for instructions of which their first was granted and their A and B, the two latter for instructed verdicts, were refused. The claimant submitted to the court seven prayers, of which the first and seventh were granted and the others refused. The only exception taken by the employer and insurer, appellants, is to the rulings adverse to them on the prayers, which are:

"Employer's and Insurer's A Prayer

"The court rules as matter of law that from the undisputed evidence the alleged accident resulting in the death of John E. Avers happened upon a vessel floating in navigable waters of the United States and that the motion to dismiss the appeal presented by the appellees is therefore granted. (Refused.)

"Employer's and Insurer's B Prayer "The Court instructs the Jury that the so-called accident alleged to have resulted in the death of John E. Ayers, took place on territory outside of the jurisdiction of the State Industrial Accident Commission and the answer of the jury therefore to the issue before it must be 'No.' (Refused.)

"Claimant's First Prayer

"The Court instructs the Jury that if they find a verdict in favor of the claimant, Carrie Ayers, the surviving widow of John Ayers, then their answer to 'Employer's and Insurer's Issue No. I' should be 'Yes' and the verdict thereby be in favor of the claimant, Carrie Ayers. (Granted.)

"Claimant's Seventh Prayer

"The Court instructs the Jury that in passing on and weighing the evidence in the case relating to the employer's and insurer's Issue No. 1, the Jury may take into consideration, in connection with all the other testimony in the case, the presumption that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, the claim now under consideration comes within the provisions of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Law, under which provisions the claim was filed on behalf of the surviving widow, Carrie Ayers, the claimant in this case. (Granted.)"

The day before the trial in the superior court, the employer and the insurer filed a motion to dismiss the appeal from the decision of the Accident Commission for the reason that, from the undisputed evidence, the alleged accident resulting in the death of John E. Ayers happened upon a vessel floating in navigable waters of the United States, which said waters are without the jurisdiction of the State Industrial Accident Commission. No action was taken upon this motion until the conclusion of the case on appeal, when a prayer (a) instructing the jury to find for the employer and the insurer on the motion was refused. On the record from the commission there was no dispute as to how, when, and where the alleged accidental injury occurred. Therefore, the question was one of law, and the motion, for the reasons hereinafter given, should have been granted. As it was, this was the only question submitted, the appellants contending that the question was one of law for the court, and the appellee that it was one of fact for the jury. The appellants rely upon the federal decisions in support of their contention, while the appellee depends on three decisions of this court and article 101, § 64, cl. (a), that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation it shall be presumed "that the claim comes within the provisions of this Article." Under the Federal Constitution, the judicial power shall extend "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Article 3, § 2. This provision was made effectual by section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 76), whereby the District Courts of the United States were given "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, * * * saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it," and so continued in the Judicial Code, § 24(3), 28 USCA § 41(3). The Supreme Court has frequently decided that no state can assume jurisdiction in admiralty or maritime matters, and that this extends to workmen's compensation claims unless the claim for compensation comes under the so-called "Optional Contracts." Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 42 S. Ct. 157, 66 L. Ed. 321, 25...