Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst

Decision Date20 September 1957
Docket NumberNo. 33978,33978
Citation11 Ill.2d 601,145 N.E.2d 105
PartiesIrene ARVIDSON, Appellant, v. The CITY OF ELMHURST, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Vogel & Vogel, Chicago (L. H. Vogel, R. C. Vogel, and Robert B. Johnstone, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Sears & Streit, and George E. Billett, Chicago (Barnabas F. Sears, George E. Billett, and Lloyd J. Tyler, Jr., Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

BRISTOW, Justice.

This cause is heard on plaintiff Irene Arvidson's petition for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court reversing without remanding a judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County, entered on a jury verdict awarding plaintiff damages in the amount of $9,000 for personal injuries sustained when plaintiff fell on an allegedly defective sidewalk maintained by the defendant city of Elmhurst.

The sole issue is whether the Appellate Court erred in entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that defendant was not negligent as a matter of law.

The operative facts are not controverted. It appears that at 4:00 p. m. on October 20, 1950, plaintiff parked her car adjacent to the curb on the west side of York street, in the business section of Elmhurst. She got out of the car on the driver's side, and her two children and their friend remained in the car while she went on her errand. She walked to the parking meter at the front of the car, deposited some coins in the meter, turned around, walked back toward the car, called to the children to put another coin in the meter if she stayed longer than expected, took about three steps on the sidewalk, covering about 1 1/2 slabs of concrete, and then stepped with her right foot in such a manner that her heel was on one slab and the sole of her shoe was on the adjoining slab, which was on a lower level. As a result, her ankle turned, and she fell and fractured her left ankle. She was wearing shoes with cuban heels, and a strap and buckle on the side.

According to the testimony of plaintiff and that of a witness who was employed by the abutting store owner, the difference in level between the adjoining slabs of sidewalk on which plaintiff fell was about 2 inches. The difference in height of the slabs was also attested to by the woman who had been sitting in the car parked behind plasintiff's, and who got out to help plaintiff after she fell. From their testimony and the photograph in the record, it appears that the lower level slab slanted toward the street, and the difference in level progressively increased in the direction toward the street, and decreased in the direction of the abutting building. The balance of the sidewalk in the region, however, appears to be level, and there were no crevices or other defects in the adjoining slabs of the sidewalk.

Neither plaintiff nor the city had actual knowledge of the sidewalk condition before plaintiff's fall, although the condition existed for at least a year or longer prior thereto. There was no evidence of injuries to other persons as a result of the condition, and no previous complaints to the defendant respecting the sidewalk, which was subsequently repaired.

The alderman who was superintendent of streets testified that he was in charge of streets and alleys at the time of plaintiff's accident, and did not inspect the sidewalks of the city in their entirety, although that might have been included in the duties of his job. He was appointed inspector of sidewalks some eight months later, although prior thereto no one had specifically held that job.

On the basis of substantially the foregoing evidence and the medical terstimony which was not disputed, the court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and submitted the cause to the jury, which entered a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $9,000, upon which judgment was entered. In reversing that judgment, the Appellate Court held that the defendant, as a matter of law, was not negligent, and that its motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been allowed.

In determining the propriety of that judgment, we are cognizant of the exhaustive case law involving the issue of whether inequality between adjoining slabs of sidewalk constitutes a question of fact for the jury, or a question of law for the court. 37 A.L.R.2d 1189; 119 A.L.R. 162; 25 Am.Jur., sec. 488. Any attempt to reconcile, or even enumerate the decisions would only prolong the opinion without improving the fabric of the law. Kuhn v. City of Chicago, 319 Ill.App. 525, 49 N.E.2d 562; Puck v. City of Chicago, 281 Ill.App. 6. A survey of the decisions does indicate, however, that the law does not exact of a municipality the duty of keeping all sidewalks in perfect condition at all times, and that slight inequalities in level, or other minior defects frequently found iun traversed areas, are not actionable. Storen v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill. 530, 27 N.E.2d 53; 19 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., sec. 54.80.

While courts are in marked disagreements as to when the sidewalk irregularity or defect is so slight that the question is one of law, and where it is one of fact for the jury, nevertheless, the decisions recognize that no mathematical standard can be adopted in fixing the line of demarcation, and that each case must be determined upon its own particular facts and circumstances. 19 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., sec. 54.80; 37 A.L.R.2d 1187 et seq. In fact, courts have criticized and rejected the fixing of arbitrary standards with mathematical precision as to what constitutes minor defects (Loughran v. City of New York, 298 N.Y. 320, 83 N.E.2d 136; Parker v. City and County of Denver, 128 Colo. 355, 262 P.2d 553, 37 A.L.R.2d 1177; City of Louisville v. Wheeler, 301 Ky. 222, 191 S.W.2d 386), as was originally done by the New York court in Beltz v. City of Yonkers, 148 N.Y. 67, 42 N.E. 401, upon which the early Illinois cases were predicated. City of Chicago v. Norton, 116 Ill.App. 570; Powers v. City of Fast St. Louis, 161 Ill.App. 163.

The Illinois courts, however, have not followed, either in theory or practice, the rule obtaining in the District of Columbia, Georgia and Missouri that the question of liability is always one of fact for the jury, and that defects, no matter how slight, are for jury consideration. 37 A.L.R.2d 1196; City of Rome v. Richardson, 62 Ga.App. 85, 7 S.E.2d 927; City of Brunswick v. Glogauer, 158 Ga. 792, 124 S.E. 787; Bornhoft v. City of Jefferson, Mo.App., 128 S.W.2d 1080; Butler v. City of University City, Mo.App., 167 S.W.2d 442. Nor can we accept plaintiff's contention that the decisions of Dowler v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 5 Ill.2d 125, 125 N.E.2d 41; Pitrowski v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 4 Ill.2d 125, 122 N.E.2d 262; and Bonnier v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 2 Ill.2d 606, 119 N.E.2d 254, are determinative of the relative spheres of court and jury in negligence cases. These decisions, involving Federal Employers' Liability Act cases, are governed by uniformity requirements imposed by the United States Supreme Court in such cases and have no application to the case at bar.

The rule in Illinois, reiterated in the case law, is that a jury question on the issue of the city's negligence is presented only when the defect in the sidewalk is such that a reasonably prudent man should anticipate some danger to persons walking upon it. Walter v. City of Rockford, 332 Ill.App. 243, 74 N.E.2d 903; Storen v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill. 530, 27 N.E.2d 53; White v. City of Belleville, 364 Ill. 577, 5 N.E.2d 215; Luse v. City of Chicago, 321 Ill.App. 628, 53 N.E.2d 262; Orban v. City of Chicago, 313 Ill.App. 144, 39 N.E.2d 84; Kuhn v. City of Chicago, 319 Ill.App. 525, 49 N.E.2d 562.

The decisions, furthermore, reflect a conscientious attempt by the Illinois courts to apply this rule. In White v. City of Belleville, 364 Ill. 577, 5 N.E.2d 215, the Illinois Supreme Court remanded to the Appellate Court to consider other errors a case where there was a depression in the walk from 2 to 3 inches in depth at the point where plaintiff fell, and a crevice sufficiently wide to permit the heel of a woman's shoe to enter. The court held that this condition, as established by the testimony, constituted evidence in support of the charge that an unsafe condition of the sidewalk existed, and consequently the directed verdict, which had been entered on the ground that there was no actionable negligence as a matter of law, was not proper. The Appellate Court herein endeavors to distinguish that case on the ground that the facts are different. However, no two sidewalk cases present identical defects, and it is significant that the court held in the Belleville case that a jury question was presented where, as in the instant case, there was a variance in the levels of the slabs of concrete in a sidewalk.

In Luse v. City of Chicago, 321 Ill.App. 628, 53 N.E.2d 262, it was held that the city could not be...

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  • Monson v. City of Danville
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • August 2, 2018
    ...if a reasonably prudent person would not foresee some danger to persons walking on it. Id. ¶ 21 (citing Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst , 11 Ill. 2d 601, 605, 145 N.E.2d 105 (1957) ). ¶ 43 There is no mathematical formula or bright-line test for determining whether a sidewalk defect is de mini......
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    ...witness measured the cracks to be no more than 3/32 inch deep and about 1/8 inch wide. The village cites Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst (1957), 11 Ill.2d 601, 145 N.E.2d 105, and its progeny for the proposition that, where all reasonable minds would agree that a defect is so minor that no dan......
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