Arzate-Miranda v. Farley
| Decision Date | 09 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 7:11-CV-116-KKC |
| Parties | RIGOBERTO ARZATE-MIRANDA, Petitioner, v. ROBERT FARLEY, Warden, USP-Big Sandy, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Rigoberto Arzate-Miranda is a former federal inmate1 who was confined for a period of time in the United States Penitentiary-Big Sandy ("USP-Big Sandy") in Inez, Kentucky. While there, Arzate-Miranda, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging a September 7, 2010, prison disciplinary conviction at a federal prison in Texas, where he was confined prior to his transfer to USP-Big Sandy, and the resulting loss of 27 days of good time credit to his sentence. [R. 1] In this habeas petition, Arzate-Miranda also asserted claims related to conditions of his confinement at USP-Big Sandy.
The Court conducted the required preliminary screening of Arzate-Miranda's habeas corpus petition. For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order of October 16, 2013, the Warden was directed to respond to Arzate-Miranda's claims asserted in his habeas petition. [R. 37] The Warden has filed his response [R. 43]. Having reviewed theWarden's response, the Court will dismiss Arzate-Miranda's habeas petition for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing same.
On August 27, 2010, while Arzate-Miranda was housed at the Federal Correctional Complex in Beaumont, Texas ("FCC-Beaumont"), he was charged in Incident Report #2059499 with assaulting another person, a Code 101 violation.2 Arzate-Miranda was placed in Administrative Detention pending an investigation of the incident. On August 28, 2010, he was provided with a copy of the Incident Report.
On August 28, 2010, the Incident Report was investigated. Petitioner was advised of his rights and was provided with an opportunity to provide a statement. He stated to the investigating Officer: "I didn't assault the officer, I was only reacting to him grabbing my shoulders from behind, by turning around quickly and pushing his hands from off me. [Incident Report - 2059499 - August 27, 2010 - Section III, Investigation; R. 43-4, Page ID# 400]. The investigating officer concluded that the charge was warranted as written and referred it to the Unit Disciplinary Committee ("UDC") for a hearing. Id.
On August 30, 2010, an UDC hearing was held on the Incident Report. The UDC referred the charges to the DHO for further hearing because sanctions for 100 level codes cannot be imposed at the UDC level. See Declaration of Carlos J. Martinez, ¶ 5, Attachment C,Incident Report - Section II - Committee Action [R. 43-4, Page ID#401]. On August 30, 2010, Petitioner was advised of his rights before the DHO and was given notice of the hearing before the DHO. Petitioner was asked whether he would like to have a staff representative and/or present a witness at the hearing. However, Petitioner declined to have a staff representative and/or present a witness at the hearing. Id.
On September 2, 2010, the DHO hearing was held. Prior to the hearing the Petitioner was advised of his rights. At the hearing, Petitioner denied the charges and denied assaulting the officer. Petitioner stated that somebody grabbed him from behind and that is all he remembers from the incident. During the hearing, the DHO considered the following evidence: 1) the Incident Report; 2) the Investigation; 3) the statements from the Petitioner; and 4) the statements from staff who witnessed the incident. Upon the DHO's review of the evidence, he concluded that the greater weight of the evidence supported a finding that Petitioner had committed a less serious offense, the prohibited act of assaulting any person in violation of Code 224,3 and the Incident Report was amended to reflect the DHO's finding of the less serious offense.
The DHO sanctioned the Petitioner to a Disciplinary Transfer, a loss of commissary, visitation and telephone privileges for 6 months, and a loss of 27 days of good time credits. On September 7, 2010, Petitioner was advised of his right to appeal the DHO decision within 20 calendar days from the receipt of the DHO report through the Administrative Remedy process.On September 8, 2010, Petitioner was provided with a copy of the DHO report. [R. 43-5, Page ID# 404].
Petitioner timely appealed his disciplinary conviction to the South Central Regional Office ("SCRO"). In this appeal, Petitioner stated that he was filing a "sensitive" complaint for a violation of his constitutional rights by Officer Lovelace because he filed Incident Report 2059499 as code 101 violation, and the DHO found him guilty of code 224 violation. Petitioner claimed that Officer Lovelace had violated his Eighth Amendment rights and that the DHO had violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights for finding him guilty "of any charge". Petitioner also asserted claims of discrimination, unprofessional conduct (misconduct) and a hostile environment. The Appeal was rejected because the issues raised were found not to be sensitive, and Petitioner was notified that he should file his request or appeal at the appropriate level via regular procedures. See Declaration of Carlos J. Martinez, ¶ 8, Attachment F, Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval [R. 43-7, Page ID# 412].
Instead of refiling his appeal at the SCRO as a regular appeal (instead of a "sensitive appeal"), as he was advised to do in the Rejection Notice, Petitioner filed an appeal to the BOP's Central Office, which received the appeal on November 29, 2010. In this appeal, Petitioner appealed the September 2, 2010 DHO Hearing (Incident Report # 2059499) and sanctions. On December 29, 2010, the BOP's Central Office rejected the appeal because it was submitted to the wrong level. Petitioner was instructed to file the appeal at the Regional Office level. See Declaration of Carlos J. Martinez, ¶ 8, Attachment F, Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval [R. 43-7, Page ID# 414].
There is no evidence of record that Petitioner refiled his appeal with the Regional Office (SCRO).
Although 28 U.S.C. §2241 contains no statutory exhaustion requirement, federal courts consistently require federal prisoners to fully exhaust the BOP's available administrative remedies before filing a petition seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to Section 2241. In particular, the Sixth Circuit has held that a §2241 applicant is first required to exhaust his administrative remedies through the BOP's administrative grievance procedures prior to filing a habeas corpus petition. Little v. Hopkins, 638 F.2d 953, 953-954 (6th Cir. 1981) per curiam. See also Hacker v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2006 WL 2559792, 5 (E.D. Mich. 2006) () citing Urbina v. Thoms, 270 F.3d 292, 295 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001); Fazzini v. Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, 473 F.3d 229, 231-32 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242, 251 (6th Cir. 1996); Sesi v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 238 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2000)(A federal prisoner must first exhaust his available administrative remedies before filing a § 2241 petition); United States v. Oglesby, 52 F. App'x 712, 714, (6th Cir. 2002) citing United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992); Grant v. U.S. Eastern District Court of Kentucky, 2007 WL 4328037 (E.D. KY 2007) (); Irvin v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2009 WL 1616676 (W.D. KY 2009).
The Supreme Court has identified several sound policy reasons for the mandatory exhaustion requirements. These include: (1) to avoid premature interruption of theadministrative process; (2) to let the agency develop the necessary factual background upon which decisions should be based; (3) to permit the agency to exercise its discretion or apply its expertise; (4) to improve the efficiency of the administrative process; (5) to conserve scarce judicial resources; (6) to give the agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors; and (7) to avoid the possibility that frequent and deliberate flouting of the administrative process could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-195 (1969); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Thereby, absent exhaustion of administrative remedies judicial review is not available under 28 U.S.C. §2241. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) ().
In particular, administrative exhaustion permits the agency to review and possibly correct its own errors without court intervention and facilitates any potential judicial review. See Bethea v. DeWalt, 2010 WL 55924 (E.D. KY 2010) (); Smith v. Thompson, 937 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1991) (); Barney v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 2009 WL 3711612, 12...
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