Ash v. City of N.Y., 16-cv-9548 (RJS)
| Decision Date | 18 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-cv-9548 (RJS),16-cv-9548 (RJS) |
| Parties | DAMON ASH, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, LIEUTENANT LEAHY, and OFFICER McKENZIE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Damon Ash, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York and "Lieutenant Leahy" and "Officer McKenzie" of the New York Police Department. Now before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Ash's Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Ash's Second Amended Complaint contains only barebones allegations, many of which are difficult to follow. In sum and substance, however, Ash alleges that between September 2012 and March 2016, police officers of the 7th Precinct violated his rights in various ways. (See SAC at 4.) First, Ash alleges that on an unspecified date, while he was sitting in a park, he was approached byDefendant Leahy and another officer, who "fals[e]ly accused [him] of [possessing] an open container," and detained him in jail for 20 days without bringing him before a judge, until the case was dismissed and he was released. (Id.) Second, Ash alleges that on April 22, 2015, he was "falsely arrested [b]y Officer McKenzie . . . for assault." (Id. at 4-5.) According to Ash, McKenzie called him "the devil and a demon," and then "purposely wrote [his first] name as Demon [instead of Damon] on [his] arrest [documents]," which carried over to court records. (Id.) Ash asserts that this "def[a]mation of character caused [him] to suffer mental[l]y and physically." (Id.) Finally, Ash alleges that on January 26 or 27 of an unspecified year, "during the N.Y.C. snow storm," he had his "[d]oor [i]llegally kicked in by the 7th precinct, with no [search] warrant or arrest [warrant]," and that he was then "illegally taken to [B]ellevue against [his] will." (Id.)
On December 9, 2016, Ash filed his initial complaint in this action, naming the City of New York as the sole Defendant. (Doc. No. 2.) Ash also filed a request to proceed without prepayment of fees - that is, in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 1.) On April 4, 2017, pursuant to the statute governing requests to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Chief Judge McMahon conducted an initial review of Ash's case and construed the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, multiple incidents of false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, failure to investigate reports of police misconduct in violation of the Due Process Clause, and discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. No. 6 at 3-8.) Chief Judge McMahon granted the request to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 5), but concluded that Ash's complaint failed to show that he was plausibly entitled to relief, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), because "[t]he complaint simply makes general allegations about threats and harassment by the police, without specific factsshowing that whatever he experienced constituted a violation of his constitutional rights." (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) Chief Judge McMahon therefore dismissed the complaint but granted Ash leave to amend with the admonition that any amended pleading must "detail his Fourth Amendment claims" and name as defendants the individuals allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. (Id. at 9.)
On May 16, 2017, Ash filed an amended complaint identifying as defendants "Lieutenant Leary," "Officer McKenzie" with shield number 942888, and two John Doe detectives. (Doc. No. 8.) Shortly thereafter, the case was reassigned to my docket. On September 11, 2017, Ash filed his Second Amended Complaint, naming as defendants "Lieutenant Leahy" (whom he had previously misidentified as "Lieutenant Leary"), Officer McKenzie, and the City of New York. (Doc. No. 29-1.) Construed liberally, the Complaint appears to raise two false arrest claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim for unlawful entry under Section 1983, and a state-law claim for defamation. (See id. at 4-5.) On February 12, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that Ash's false arrest and municipal liability claims are time-barred or otherwise fail on the merits.2 (Doc. No. 45.) The motion was fully briefed on April 2, 2018. (Doc. No. 50.)
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "provide the grounds upon which [the] claim rests." ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (). To meetthis standard, a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. ATSI Commc'ns, 493 F.3d at 98. That tenet, however, "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, a pleading that offers only "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If the plaintiff "ha[s] not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [its] complaint must be dismissed." Id. at 570.
Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, a court must liberally construe the complaint and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests. Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). "The policy of liberally construing pro se submissions" arises out of the understanding that "[i]mplicit in the right to self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training." Id. "[D]ismissal of a pro se complaint is nevertheless appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to meet minimum pleading requirements." Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F. Supp. 3d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1997)).
As noted above, the Complaint raises two claims for false arrest, a claim for unlawful entry, and a defamation claim. The Court will consider each of these claims in turn and then address the issue of municipal liability.
Ash asserts two claims for false arrest under Section 1983. First, he asserts a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Leahy in connection with an arrest for an open container on an unspecified date between September 2012 and March 2016. (Doc. No. 29-1 at 4.) Defendants argue that this claim is time-barred, and should therefore be dismissed with prejudice, because the City's arrest records show that Ash was arrested for an open-container violation on May 16, 2013, and Ash did not file his original complaint in this action until December 2016, after the three-year statute of limitations had expired. (Mem. at 12.); see Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (). If accurate, this chronology would surely justify dismissal of this false arrest claim with prejudice. See Case v. Clivilles, No. 12-cv-8122 (GBD) (MHD), 2013 WL 12325133, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013); Raul v. Am. Stock Exch., No. 95-cv-3154 (SAS), 1996 WL 627574, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1996) (). As a general matter, however, a court may grant a motion to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds only if the defense "appears on the face of the complaint." Wechsler v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A, No. 15-cv-5907 (JMF), 2016 WL 1688012, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2016), aff'd sub nom. Wechsler v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 674 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2017). Moreover, at this stage of the litigation, the Court is not convinced that the City's extrinsic evidence can be used to establish the date of the arrest described in the Complaint. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (); Liang v. City of New York, No. 10-cv-3089 (ENV) (VVP), 2013 WL 5366394, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013) () Because it is not clear from the face of the Complaint that the alleged open-container arrest falls outside of the applicable limitations period, the Court declines to dismiss the false arrest claim against Defendant Leahy at this stage of the proceedings.3
Second, Ash alleges that Defendant McKenzie "falsely arrested" him "for assault" on April 22, 2015. (SAC at 4-5.) Although this claim is, on its face, timely made, Defendants nevertheless assert that the allegations in the Complaint are wholly conclusory and therefore cannot support a false arrest claim. The Court agrees.
The elements of false arrest under Section...
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