Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, No. 11–1699.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: WOLLMAN
• Citation: 666 F.3d 1148
• Parties: LaVera Granetha ASHANTI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellant, v. CITY OF GOLDEN VALLEY, as representative defendant for all other municipal defendants similarly situated, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 11–1699.
• Decision Date: 27 January 2012

666 F.3d 1148

LaVera Granetha ASHANTI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF GOLDEN VALLEY, as representative defendant for all other municipal defendants similarly situated, Appellee.

No. 11–1699.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 15, 2011.Filed: Jan. 27, 2012.

[666 F.3d 1149]

A.L. Brown, argued, Maplewood, MN, Anthony J. Nemo, on the brief, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Monte A. Mills, argued, Clifford Greene and Samuel Clark, on the brief, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

LaVera Granetha Ashanti appeals the district court's ¹ grant of summary judgment to the City of Golden Valley (Golden Valley) on her federal and Minnesota constitutional claims arising from a criminal forfeiture proceeding. Because we conclude

[666 F.3d 1150]

that Ashanti's claims are barred by res judicata, we affirm.

I. Background

On June 15, 2008, Ashanti loaned her car to her son, Jesse Holloman. That same day, a Minnesota State Patrol officer arrested Holloman in Golden Valley for driving the car while under the influence of alcohol. As part of the arrest, the officer seized the car. The next day, Ashanti received separate letters from the Minnesota State Patrol and an attorney employed by Golden Valley notifying her that her car had been seized in connection with Holloman's arrest and was subject to forfeiture under Minnesota law.

On July 21, 2008, Ashanti challenged the forfeiture by filing a “Petition for Judicial Determination of Forfeiture and Return of Property” in Hennepin County District Court. Judge Regina M. Chu of the Hennepin County District Court issued a scheduling order on September 28, 2008, setting the trial for September 14, 2009. Ashanti moved for summary judgment on December 11, 2008. The Minnesota State Patrol opposed the motion. An attorney for Golden Valley prosecuted the seizure proceedings on behalf of the Minnesota State Patrol as permitted under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63 subd. 1(i). Judge Chu granted Ashanti's summary judgment motion on January 12, 2009, based on Ashanti's “innocent owner” defense under section 169A.63 subd. 7(d), and judgment in Ashanti's favor was granted on January 16, 2009.

On May 19, 2010, Ashanti filed a purported class action against Golden Valley in federal court. She asserted federal constitutional claims under the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and the Unreasonable Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment. She also asserted Minnesota state constitutional claims under the Takings Clause of Article I, Section 13, the Due Process Clause of Article I, Section 7, and the Unreasonable Seizure Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. Golden Valley moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 because the parties “submitted letters that are not matters of public record” in connection with Golden Valley's motion to dismiss. Dist. Ct. Order of March 24, 2011, at 4. Specifically, the district court referred to copies of the letters from the Minnesota State Patrol and Golden Valley's municipal prosecutor accompanying the Notice of Seizure and Intent to Forfeit Vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment to Golden Valley on the basis that the Minnesota State Patrol—not Golden Valley—seized Ashanti's car and, therefore, no reasonable juror could find that Golden Valley violated Ashanti's rights.

II. Analysis A. Motion for Summary Judgment

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Rynders v. Williams, 650 F.3d 1188, 1194 (8th Cir.2011) (citing Wierman v. Casey's Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir.2011)). “Summary judgment is proper if, after viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, no genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Rau v. Roberts, 640 F.3d 324, 327 (8th Cir.2011)).

Ashanti argues that the district court erred in converting Golden Valley's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a

[666 F.3d 1151]

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). “Though matters outside the pleading may not be considered in deciding a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, documents necessarily embraced by the complaint are not matters outside the pleading.” Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir.2004) (quotations omitted). Documents necessarily embraced by the pleadings include “documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading.” Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir.2003) (citing In re Syntex Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir.1996)). The contents of the Notice of Seizure and Intent to Forfeit Vehicle and the letter by Golden Valley's attorney that accompanied the notice were alleged in the complaint and thus necessarily embraced by the complaint. The contents of the separate letter from the Minnesota State Patrol were not alleged in the complaint.

The letter from the Minnesota State Patrol constituted a matter outside the pleadings, thus the district court properly treated the motion as one for summary judgment. Any lack of formal notice by the district court that it would convert the motion to one for summary judgment was harmless considering Ashanti's adequate opportunity to respond to Golden Valley's motion and the lack of any showing that any material facts were disputed or missing from the record. See Davis v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 21 F.3d 866, 867 (8th Cir.1994) (“[A]ny lack of formal notice by the district court that it would rule on the motion for summary judgment rather than on the motion to dismiss was harmless in view of Davis's adequate opportunity to respond to the summary judgment motion and the lack of any showing that any material facts were disputed or missing from the record.”) (citations omitted).

B. Res Judicata

Golden Valley argues that res judicata bars Ashanti from pursuing her constitutional claims in federal court because Ashanti could have litigated those claims in her previous state court action. Golden Valley made this argument before the district court, which disagreed and dismissed Ashanti's claims on other...