Ashbach, In re

Decision Date20 March 1958
Docket NumberNo. 34442,34442
Citation13 Ill.2d 411,150 N.E.2d 119
PartiesIn re Sol Henry ASHBACH, Attorney, Respondent.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Robert B. Johnstone, Chicago, for respondent.

Charles Leviton, Chicago, amicus curiae.

DAVIS, Chief Justice.

This is a proceeding to disbar the respondent pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 59. Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, c. 110, § 101.59. On April 20, 1954, the committee on inquiry of the Chicago Bar Association filed complaint with its committee on grievances, commissioners of this court, charging respondent with accepting a blank power of attorney from a client; endorsing the names of clients on drafts or causing such endorsements to be made without due authorization acting as a witness to releases purporting to bear the signatures of clients, which he knew were not true and genuine; making settlement of claims, executing releases on behalf of clients without authority, and withholding information of such settlements; converting the proceeds of the settlement of such claims, as well as funds of clients, to his own use; and refusing to account for proceeds of settlement made on behalf of such clients and for funds belonging to them. Such charges pertained to certain clients named in the complaint.

The respondent filed answer substantially denying the charges. At various times during 1954, 1955, and 1956, proofs were taken by the committee on grievances of the Chicago Bar Association, sitting as commissioners, after which the hearings were closed. Thereafter respondent moved to reopen the proofs, which motion was allowed, and the report of the commissioners was served upon him. Respondent made further motion to reopen proofs which was likewise allowed: three further hearings were held, and the matter was taken under advisement. On January 16, 1957, the commissioners' supplemental report was served on respondent and objections filed. Both the original and supplemental report found the respondent's conduct, with respect to the first four counts of the complaint, tainted with moral turpitude and recommended disbarment. Objections to the reports were overruled and such reports were transmitted to this court. On April 4, 1957, the commissioners denied respondent's motion to again reopen proofs, and he filed supplemental objections.

Since the recommendations of our commissioners are advisory only, we have carefully examined the record pertaining to the four counts which they sustained, and conclude that a proper consideration of the charges in issue requires a brief re sume of the evidence relative to each count.

Count I-The Spicer Matter:

Harvey Spicer was involved in an attomobile accident in which in suffered injuries to his person and damages to his property. He was referred to respondent by the personnel of the garage where his car was taken, and on February 4, 1952, respondent procured from Spicer a power of attorney and a one-third contingent-fee contract. On July 10, 1952, respondent settled Spicer's claim for $2,500 and executed releases by signing, or causing to be signed, the names of Harvey Spicer and his wife Mary Spicer, and signed his own name as a witness to their simulated signatures. He similarly endorsed, or caused to be endorsed, the names of both Harvey and Mary Spicer on the settlement check which he cashed in July, 1952. Spicer testified that he talked to respondent several times after August, 1952, and was advised that his case had not been settled. In the early part of 1953, Spicer told respondent that he had a letter from the insurance company and respondent asked to see him at once. The next day Spicer obtained another attorney, and on August 7, 1953, at a meeting in that attorney's office, respondent first offered to pay Spicer $1,200, which offer was refused, and subsequently paid him $1,850 by four money orders, and in addition paid the garage bill of $649.10, although there is no evidence of the date this bill was paid.

Respondent offered no defense to the forgery of Mary Spicer's name on the release and check, but attempted to excuse it as a minor matter. He claimed that the delay of a year between the settlement and remittance resulted either from Spicer's absence from Chicago or his request for more money, and that he retained $1,200 of the proceeds of the settlement in cash for Spicer in a steel filing cabinet. It is clear and undisputed that he forged the name of Mary Spicer to the release and check, simulated the signature of Harvey Spicer on the release, which he witnessed as genuine, and endorsed the check by affixing the name of Harvey Spicer thereon; that he did not execute the release or check under the power of attorney; that he withheld information of the settlement from Spicer; and that Spicer did not obtain his share of the settlement until a year following its consummation and after he had been forced to contact the insurance company and obtain another lawyer.

Count II-The Grace Guarnieri Matter:

Grace Guarnieri was injured in a W. T. Grant Co. store in July, 1951, signed a contingent-fee contract employing the respondent on August 6, 1951, and thereafter talked with his office from time to time. On August 15, 1951, respondent wrote a letter to W. T. Grant Co. stating that he represented Grace Guarnieri and enclosed a notice of attorney's lien bearing his signature as her attorney. On September 8, 1952, respondent settled the claim for $175 without Mrs. Guarnieri's authorization. The release delivered to the insurance company purported to bear the signatures of Mrs. Guarnieri and Albert Guarnieri, her husband, but was never presented to them and the signatures were forged. The draft was endorsed with the forged signatures of Grace Guarnieri and Albert Guarnieri, her husband, and the genuine signatures of respondent and Mordecai More. About two months later, Mrs. Guarnieri received respondent's personal check for $50.

Respondent seeks to evade responsibility for this transaction by shifting the blame to Mordecai More, a younger attorney who was a clerk in his office and handled cases for him. However, the testimony of More and respondent is in complete conflict pertaining to the processing of this claim, yet it stands undisputed that the original contract of employment was with respondent; that he sent a letter and notice of attorney's lien to the W. T. Grant Co., and that he endorsed the draft. He cannot now contend that he had no connection with this claim. An attorney cannot avoid his professional obligations to a client by the simple device of delegating work to others.

Count III-The Bacon and Pittman Matter:

Joyce Bacon and Anna Marie Pittman were injured in an automobile accident on November 3, 1952. On November 4, respondent called on Miss Bacon and they proceeded to the home of Mrs. Pittman where both women retained him to prosecute their claims for a fee of one third of the recovery. A dispute exists as to whether both women signed blank powers of attorney, but only one executed power of attorney was offered in evidence. In February, 1953, respondent settled both cases. While he claimed authority to settle the cases under the controverted powers of attorney, he admitted that in writing the signatures of his clients or in causing them to be written on the releases, he had attempted to imitate such signatures 'to expedite the matter and not run into any red tape.' Mrs. Pittman's case was settled for $150 and Miss Bacon's for $1,350. The drafts were endorsed in the same mnner as the releases and were cashed by respondent. Miss Bacon called respondent often in March and on all occasions he withheld information of the settlement, and finally, on May 1, 1953, after she told him she knew the case had been settled, he told her to come in and he would give her the money. On May 1, Mordecai More gave her respondent's check for $270, and gave Mrs. Pittman respondent's check for $75. Miss Bacon did not deposit this check until May 29, 1953, when it was returned because respondent's account had been closed. In August, 1953, Miss Bacon retained another attorney to represent her...

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  • Vrdolyak, In re
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 30, 1990
    ...had knowledge of, or had reason to know. (In re Weston (1982), 92 Ill.2d 431, 437, 65 Ill.Dec. 925, 442 N.E.2d 236; In re Ashbach (1958), 13 Ill.2d 411, 415, 150 N.E.2d 119.) Here, it is agreed upon by all parties that respondent did not possess any knowledge of the misplaced funds. While t......
  • Yamaguchi, In re, 64463
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • November 16, 1987
    ...(In re Czachorski (1969), 41 Ill.2d 549, 244 N.E.2d 164) or to prevent him from establishing a legitimate defense (In re Ashbach (1958), 13 Ill.2d 411, 150 N.E.2d 119). Therefore, we find that the hearing panel did not err in weighing all of respondent's testimony (including his Ebert testi......
  • Weston, In re
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 22, 1982
    ...attorney cannot avoid his professional obligations to a client by the simple device of delegating work to others." (In re Ashbach (1958), 13 Ill.2d 411, 415, 150 N.E.2d 119.) Thus, respondent's contentions that his associate was responsible for the estate, and that respondent never came int......
  • Anglin, In re
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 18, 1988
    ...of fact are advisory and not binding (In re Wigoda (1979), 77 Ill.2d 154, 158, 32 Ill.Dec. 341, 395 N.E.2d 571; In re Ashbach (1958), 13 Ill.2d 411, 418, 150 N.E.2d 119). Deference will be accorded to findings of fact, for the hearing panel is able to observe the demeanor of witnesses, judg......
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