Ashby v. Quiros, Civil Action No. 17 Civ. 916 (CSH)

• Decision Date: 10 March 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 17 Civ. 916 (CSH)
• Citation: 443 F.Supp.3d 232
• Parties: Lazale ASHBY & Jesse Campbell, III, Plaintiffs, v. Angel QUIROS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

443 F.Supp.3d 232

Lazale ASHBY & Jesse Campbell, III, Plaintiffs,

v.Angel QUIROS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 17 Civ. 916 (CSH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Filed March 10, 2020

Lazale Ashby, Somers, CT, pro se.

Jesse Campbell, III, Somers, CT, pro se.

Thomas J. Davis, Jr., Janelle Medeiros, Office of the Attorney General, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:

Pro se Plaintiffs Lazale Ashby and Jesse Campbell are death row inmates at the Connecticut Northern Correctional Institution ("Northern"). Their complaints in this consolidated action assert constitutional due process claims arising out of the conditions of their confinement. Defendants are officers of the Connecticut Department of Correction ("DOC") or prison administrators at Northern.

In a prior opinion, familiarity with which is assumed, the Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' due process claims. See Ashby v. Quiros , No. 17 Civ. 916 (CSH), 2018 WL 6704744 (D. Conn. Dec. 20, 2018) (" Ashby I "). Discovery then ensued.

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the due process claims. Doc. 43 ("Mot. for Summ. Judg."). They support that motion with evidence produced during discovery or otherwise submitted for the first time in the litigation. Mot. for Summ. Judg. exs. 1–26. Plaintiffs resist Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Doc. 46 ("Defs.' Mem."). This Ruling resolves that motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the Parties' submissions pursuant to Local Rule 56(a) and the affidavits and exhibits attached thereto. See Doc. 43-28 ("Defs.' Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Mot." or "Defs.' 56(a)"); Doc. 46-2, at 23–67 ("Pls.' Resp. To Defs.' 56(a)" or "Pls.' 56(a)"). Unless otherwise noted, the facts recounted below are undisputed or indisputable.

Plaintiffs Ashby and Campbell are death row inmates at Northern, a maximum-security prison for adult males operated by DOC. Defs.' 56(a) ¶ 1. Both Plaintiffs were convicted for murder. Campbell was sentenced to death in 2007; Ashby in 2008. Id. ¶¶ 20 –21.¹

Following an altercation on March 29, 2010, between a corrections officer and another inmate on death row, then-DOC Commissioner Brian Murphy directed a full review of the management of death row inmates. Id. ¶ 31.² The review and subsequent policy decisions impacted Plaintiffs in two ways.

First, Plaintiffs were placed in restraints whenever they left their cells. According to a new "Death Row Restraint Policy Recommendation" memorandum issued on April 5, 2010, by Northern's Warden, Defendant Angel Quiros, all death row inmates would now be:

• Handcuffed behind their back for routine out-of-cell movement: an inmate would be placed in handcuffs prior to exiting his cell; an officer would escort him to the showers, recreation yard, dayrooms, or social visits; the restraints were removed when the inmate was secured in the area; and the process was reversed upon the inmate's return to his cell.

• Placed in full restraints in front for professional visits: an inmate would be placed in handcuffs, leg-irons, and a tether chain for visits with attorneys, legal calls, medical and mental health appointments, and other visits which required correctional staff to be present in a particular area with an inmate. The restraints would remain on at all times until an inmate returned to his cell.

• Placed in full restraints behind the back for out-of-unit movement within Northern: an inmate would be placed in handcuffs, leg-irons, and a tether chain in the back, except when a medical or dental procedure required otherwise.

Doc. 43-3, at 25 ("Quiros Decl."). The stated goal of the policy was to "enhance staff safety and security when interacting with death row inmates." Id. It was approved by Commissioner Murphy in May 2010 and codified in Administrative Directive 9.4 in July 2010 (the "restraint policy"). Defs.' 56(a) ¶ 33. To accommodate the policy, DOC officials installed small handcuff traps in the doors at Northern so staff could remove the restraints when an inmate had been escorted and secured at a particular destination, such as a unit dayroom. Id. ¶ 34.

The Parties dispute the exact amount of time each day during which Plaintiffs were restrained. Defendants conducted a series of timed restraint movements at Northern in order to determine how long an inmate would remain in restraints if he were placed in restraints for movement from one secured location to another. Doc. 43-5 ¶ 2 ("Eshou Decl."). The tests revealed that the duration required to apply handcuffs on an inmate behind his back through a cell trap door, remove him from his cell, escort him to a unit outdoor recreation enclosure, secure him in the outdoor enclosure, and remove his handcuffs was two minutes and one second. Id. ¶ 5. In a typical day, if an inmate traveled to outdoor recreation and took a shower, he would have been involved in "restraint application" for approximately five minutes and forty-two seconds. Defs.' 56(a), at 62. Plaintiff Ashby, on the other hand, contends that the restraints were on for "longer than a minute or two depending on staffing, the location of an inmate's cell, and whether other inmates were out on the tier." Doc. 46, at 47 ¶ 83 ("Ashby Decl."). Similarly, Plaintiff Campbell claims that he was subject to a daily minimum of ten minutes in handcuffs stemming from the restraint policy. Doc. 46, at 30 ¶ 36 ("Campbell Decl."). Regardless of the amount of time that Plaintiffs were restrained under the policy, it is undisputed that following the implementation of the policy, security-related incidents and assaults decreased on death row. Defs.' 56(a) ¶ 49.

The restraint policy remained materially unchanged for several years until Connecticut abolished the death penalty. See supra n.1. Thereafter, DOC's Commissioner at the time, Defendant Scott Semple, directed his staff to conduct a review to determine how the agency would implement section 18-10b, which mandated that death row inmates be resentenced to life imprisonment without release. Defs.' 56(a) ¶ 54.

As a result of the review, in June 2016, DOC revised Administrative Directive 9.4—which also contained the restraint policy—to provide for a new "Special Circumstances Status." Id. ¶ 57. This status was conferred upon death row inmates who were resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, per section 18-10b. Id. And, notable for Plaintiffs, any inmates who were resentenced would no longer be subject to the restraint policy as a matter of course (though they would still undergo a risk assessment to determine if any restrictions, such as out-of-cell restraints, were necessary for security reasons). Id. ¶ 58.

Meanwhile, in July 2016, DOC began gradually revising the restraint policy itself for all death row inmates who had not been resentenced. Id. ¶ 60. Over the course of two years, the policy became less restrictive, until January 2018, when it was ended altogether, except for out-of-facility travel (such as inmates' court proceedings). Id.

Plaintiffs' claim regarding the restraint policy therefore focuses on the approximately eight-year period, from March 2010 to January 2018, when the policy was in effect. Over this period, according to Plaintiffs, no notice was provided to Plaintiffs regarding the new policy, no hearing was held, and no process was permitted during this period for Plaintiffs to challenge the policy. Pls.' 56(a), at 60 ¶ 14. Nor were there any individual assessments or periodic reviews of Plaintiffs' status throughout this time period. Id. at 62 ¶ 22.

Secondly, the restraint policy had an additional consequential effect for Plaintiffs: their prison employment duties changed. Prior to March 2010, Plaintiffs were tiermen—or janitors—who swept and mopped the floor of Northern's One East Unit. Id. at 58 ¶ 1. When Defendants implemented the restraint policy in March 2010—and Plaintiffs were restrained when they were outside of their cells—Plaintiffs' duties not surprisingly changed to accommodate their new circumstances. Id. at 59 ¶ 7. They were no longer able to carry out their tierman duties because the restraints prevented them from sweeping and mopping. Id. at 59 ¶ 8. Under the restraint policy, Plaintiffs instead were paid to clean their cells, the showers, and the day rooms. Id. at 59 ¶ 9.³ Plaintiffs had never been paid to clean their own cells in the past. Ashby Decl. at 45 ¶ 71.

Plaintiffs claim that these new responsibilities violate Connecticut law, which they claim required DOC to provide death row prisoners with "employment." According to Plaintiffs, they were provided "undefined responsibilities"; and though they were paid, they did not actually do any work. Id. at 51 ¶ 104.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Redd v. New York Div. of Parole , 678 F.3d 166, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2012). A "genuine issue" exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. See Celotex v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the initial burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present "specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs. , 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and...