Ashcraft v. Knoblock

• Decision Date: 05 November 1896
• Docket Number: 17,775
• Citation: 45 N.E. 69,146 Ind. 169
• Parties: Ashcraft et al. v. Knoblock
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

45 N.E. 69

146 Ind. 169

Ashcraft et al. v. Knoblock

No. 17,775

Supreme Court of Indiana

November 5, 1896

From the St. Joseph Circuit Court.

Affirmed.

Baker & Miller, and F. J. L. Meyer, for appellants.

Andrew Anderson, for appellee.

Hackney J. Howard, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.

OPINION

Hackney, J.

This was a suit by the appellee, Knoblock, against the appellants Ashcraft and Ward, to enjoin the enforcement of an execution, from the Elkhart Circuit Court, in favor of Ashcraft, and held by Ward as the sheriff of St. Joseph county. The amended complaint was drawn upon the theory that the judgment upon which such execution had issued had been rendered in an action of trespass against Knoblock, Weaver and Hogan jointly, in which they had defended jointly, and in which the damages had been awarded and judgment rendered for one sum against Knoblock, and for another sum against Weaver and Hogan, upon a finding that such three defendants were guilty of a joint trespass and, further, that Weaver and Hogan had paid the judgment so rendered against them, thereby compensating for the joint trespass, and, in legal effect, discharging the entire liability, including that against Knoblock.

To the amended complaint a demurrer of the appellants for the want of sufficient facts was overruled, and the appellants answered in two paragraphs, the first being a general denial, and the second, setting up the pleadings in the action for trespass, including a complaint, an answer in two paragraphs and a reply in denial; also the instructions of the court, the verdict of the jury and certain facts seeking to show that the trespass was upon separate pieces of property; that the alleged trespassers had, upon the trial, severed in their defense; that the court had tried the case by the admission of evidence and its instructions to the jury, upon the theory that it embraced several trespasses defended separately and by the defendants severally. Facts were pleaded also to the effect that the defendants had not, by motion or other means, objected or excepted to the severance of the damages by the instructions of the court, the verdict of the jury and the judgment rendered. The appellee replied in denial of the answer, and upon a trial a decree was rendered in favor of the appellee, enjoining the enforcement of said execution, and the appellant Ashcraft was directed to cause the judgment against the appellee to be receipted as satisfied.

Two errors are assigned in this court, the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to the complaint and the overruling of a motion for a new trial.

The pleadings in the action for trespass, as set out in the answer in this case, showed an action against Knoblock, Hogan and Weaver jointly, charging them with breaking and entering the Reynolds House, a hotel occupied by Sarah A. Ashcraft, and in ejecting her from said hotel, by removing her furniture and fixtures therefrom and in breaking and injuring certain of such furniture; that said hotel consisted of Nos. 114 and 116 South Michigan street, in the city of South Bend, and which No. 114, it was alleged Mrs. Ashcraft held as Knoblock's tenant. The answer was joint as to all of the defendants to said action, and the second paragraph denied the tenancy of Mrs. Ashcraft, and justified the entry of No. 114 and the removal of the furniture and fixtures therefrom under a writ of restitution, in the hands of Hogan, as constable, and Weaver, as his deputy, issued upon a judgment in favor of Knoblock and against Chauncey E. Ashcraft, husband of the appellant. The acts alleged to have constituted the trespass, it was averred, were committed on the 17th, 18th and 19th days of March, 1892, without severance, as to parties, with reference to the two numbers, and the answer did not seek to distinguish, as to time, between those acts affecting the furniture in No. 114 and that in No. 116. In our opinion there was no possibility, upon the pleadings in that case, of regarding the action or the defense as separate with reference to parties, time or property.

Upon the trial of this case the court admitted evidence tending to show that in the trespass case the court had admitted evidence and had instructed the jury upon the theory that the trespass was upon different pieces of property, at different times, and that Knoblock was not a participant, so far as the trespass upon No. 116 was concerned. But, it is manifest from the result of the trial in this case that the court was not controlled by such evidence.

Counsel for the appellant say: "We admit that where a suit is against several joint wrongdoers as to one wrong, the judgment must be for a single sum assessed against all of the parties found responsible, and further, that the principle of severance does not apply to the award of damages, and no apportionment of damages can be made, although all of the defendants may not be equally culpable, and we are aware of the fact that hundreds of decisions can be found in support of this doctrine, but we insist that no case can be found where distinct and separate trespasses are committed by different defendants at different times, that damages cannot be assessed against the defendants separately and the amount of the plaintiff's damages apportioned." Besides the concession in this statement, appellants' counsel do not controvert the proposition of the appellee that the payment by one of several joint-tort-feasors of all, or such portion of the damages as will discharge him who makes the payment, will work the discharge from liability of all who may have been so jointly liable.

One question, therefore, and the most important question in this case, is as to whether the payment of the several judgments against Weaver and Hogan was the payment of a joint liability as to the three trespassers. This question turns principally upon the inquiry as to whether separate judgments were authorized. Upon the pleadings, as we have seen, they were not authorized. The theory of a case must be determined from the pleadings. Bremmerman v. Jennings, 101 Ind. 253; Hasselman v. Carroll, 102 Ind. 153, 26 N.E. 202; Brown v. Will, 103 Ind. 71, 2 N.E. 283; Armacost, Admr., v. Lindley, Admr., 116 Ind. 295, 19 N.E. 138; Shirk v. Mitchell, 137 Ind. 185, 36 N.E. 850; Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. McCorkle, 140 Ind. 613, 40 N.E. 62.

Whatever may be the rule as to several recoveries, where the issue presents several liabilities, it cannot be admissible to present the issue of a joint liability against a number and to recover against them severally. This does not, of course deny the statutory rule that where a number are sued a recovery may be had against one or against some jointly, when others may...