Ashford v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.

Decision Date04 March 2013
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 6:11CV155
PartiesJEANETTA C. ASHFORD v. COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On March 30, 2011, Plaintiff initiated this civil action pursuant to the Social Security Act (The Act), Section 205(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of Plaintiff's application for Social Security benefits. The case was assigned to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

I. HISTORY

On July 3, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning April 13, 2007. See Transcript ("Tr.") at 12 (Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision). The claim was denied initially on December 11, 2007, and on reconsideration on February 7, 2008. Id. The Plaintiff sought review of the denial. An administrative hearing was conducted before the ALJ on August 21, 2009. Id. at 12, 40-85 (hearing transcript). Plaintiff appeared and testified, represented by counsel. In addition, a vocational expert, Karyl Kuuttila, also testified.

The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on November 3, 2009, Tr. at 9-24, and Plaintiff sought review. On January 29, 2011, the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. at 1. Therefore, the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07, 120 S. Ct. 2080, 147 L. Ed. 2d 80 (2000). Plaintiff then filed the instant action for review by this Court.

II. STANDARD

Title II of the Act provides for federal disability insurance benefits. Judicial review of the denial of disability benefits under section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is limited to "determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the proper legal standards were used in evaluating the evidence." Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (quoting Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990)); Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only where there is a conspicuous absence of credible choices or no contrary medical evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citing Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). Accordingly, the Court "may not reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute [the Court's] judgment for the [Commissioner]'s, even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s decision." Bowling, 36 F.3d at 434 (quoting Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); see Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992); Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 392 (5th Cir. 1985). Rather, conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to decide. Spellman, 1 F.3d at 360 (citing Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990)); Anthony, 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Patton v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1983)). A decision on the ultimate issue of whether a claimant is disabled, as defined in the Act, rests with the Commissioner. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2000); SSR 96-5p.

"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance - that is, enough that a reasonable mind would judge it sufficient to support the decision." Pena v. Astrue, 271 Fed. Appx. 382, 383 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir.1994)). Substantial evidence includes four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the plaintiff's age,education, and work history. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1302 n.4 (5th Cir. 1987). If supported by substantial evidence, the decision of the Commissioner is conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971). However, the Court must do more than "rubber stamp" the ALJ's decision; the Court must "scrutinize the record and take into account whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality of evidence supporting the [Commissioner]'s findings." Cook, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985). The Court may remand for additional evidence if substantial evidence is lacking or "upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding." 42. U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000); Latham v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 482, 483 (5th Cir. 1994).

A claimant for disability has the burden of proving a disability. Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1991). The Act defines "disability" as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 416(I)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or mental impairment" is an anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormality which is demonstrable by acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner must utilize a five-step, sequential process. Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022. A finding of "disabled" or "not disabled" at any step of the sequential process ends the inquiry. Id.; see Bowling, 36 F.3d at 435 (citing Harrel, 862 F.2d at 475). Under the five-step sequential analysis, the Commissioner must determine at Step One whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. At Step Two, the Commissioner must determine whether one or more of the claimant's impairments are severe. At Step Three, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairmentsthat meet or equal one of the listings in Appendix I. Prior to moving to Step Four, the Commissioner must determine the claimant's Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC"), or the most that the claimant can do given his impairments, both severe and non-severe. Then, at Step Four, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is capable of performing his past relevant work. Finally, at Step Five, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant can perform other work available in the local or national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f). An affirmative answer at Step One or a negative answer at Steps Two, Four, or Five results in a finding of "not disabled." See Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022. An affirmative answer at Step Three, or an affirmative answer at Steps Four and Five, creates a presumption of disability. Id. To obtain Title II disability benefits, Plaintiff must show that he was disabled on or before the last day of his insured status. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 912, 102 S. Ct. 1263, 71 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1982). The burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps, but shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five if the claimant shows that he cannot perform his past relevant work. Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following findings in his November 3, 2009, decision:

The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2011.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 13, 2007, the alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 et seq.).
The claimant has the following severe impairments: obesity and rheumatoid arthritis (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) in a sit/stand/walk at-will type work environment. She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, kneel, crouch, and crawl; she is limited in handling/feeling to no more than frequently. The claimant cannot climb ropes or ladders. She can perform a 1-2 step job. She has no visual, communicative, or environmental limitations. She does not have a severe mental impairment that would prevent her from performing light work.
The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 C.F.R. § 404.1565).
Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant also can perform (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from April 13, 2007, through the date of this decision (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)).

Tr. at 14, 15, 19, 20. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(I) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act. Id. at 20-21.

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that she cannot work because of her "Rheumatoid Arthritis." See Tr. at 135 (undated Disability Report - Adult). She asserts that this condition limits her ability to work because "My hands are deformed from the arthritis. I have pains in my back and in my left hip. I can't lift and carry very much. My hands tremble and shake if I try to do too much." Id. She reported that her condition changed as of about July 1, 2007, in that "both hands hurt more and my wrist my left leg hurt and foots below my little toes my foot an both side is spreaded out." Id. at 156 (undated Disability Report - Appeal) (as in original...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT