Ashford v. State

• Decision Date: 12 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 1856,1856
• Parties: Trone Tyrone ASHFORD v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

807 A.2d 732

147 Md. App. 1

Trone Tyrone ASHFORD v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 1856, Sept. Term, 2001.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

September 12, 2002.

William E. Nolan, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Ann Bosse, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Attorney General, Diane E. Keller, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Jack Johnson, State's Attorney for Prince George's County of Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR. (retired, specially assigned), RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR. (retired, specially assigned), JJ.

MOYLAN, J.

This appeal will twice take us down memory lane, if "memory lane" is an appropriate trope for revisiting the turbulent constitutional law revolution of the 1960's. The appellant, Trone Tyrone Ashford, was convicted by a Prince George's County jury, presided over by Judge William B. Spellbring, Jr., of first-degree felony murder and of the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. On this appeal, he raises three very generic contentions, each of which breaks down into a series of subcontentions. The generic challenges are

1. that Judge Spellbring erroneously denied his pretrial motion to suppress based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation,

2. that Judge Spellbring erroneously failed to exclude his incriminating statement, and

3. that Judge Spellbring erroneously permitted the admission into evidence of an allegedly confidential spousal communication.

1. THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUE

The appellant's contention that Judge Spellbring erroneously denied his motion to suppress the physical evidence (a shotgun that turned out to be the murder weapon) actually consists of the three subcontentions:

a. that the warrant application lacked probable cause because of its failure to establish the veracity of the confidential informant;

b. that the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule was not available to the State because of the police affiant's bad faith in applying for the warrant; and

c. that the appellant's inculpatory statement was the suppressible "fruit of the poisonous [Fourth Amendment] tree."

All three subcontentions are based on the claim that the search and seizure warrant for the appellant's home was not supported by an adequate showing of probable cause. The application for the search warrant was not intended to be part of the investigation of this case. It was part of the investigation of an unrelated murderous episode that occurred one month after the murder in this case.

The Investigation of a Second Murder Led to the Solution of the First Murder

September-October of 1998 was an unusually busy time for the appellant, "and thereby hangs [the] tale."¹ Late on the evening of September 12, 1998, the appellant and three of his colleagues stopped the Buick Regal in which they were riding on the side of Horsehead Road, just off Brandywine Road, in Prince George's County. The purpose of the stop was "to rob someone, just to get some cash and leave." As a lure, they raised the hood.

It was at that point that Jayson Brently Youmans drove up in a 1986 Ford Bronco. Youmans stopped in order to give the stalled car a jump start. One of the appellant's colleagues, "Ted," killed Youmans with a single blast from the shotgun owned by the appellant. Another colleague, "John," then fired five shots into Youmans with "Ted's .45" just "to make sure he was dead." For a month, the Youmans murder, known in Prince George's County as the "Good Samaritan Murder," remained unsolved.

On October 15, the appellant and two colleagues perpetrated a double murder (plus a third attempted murder) in what came to be known in Prince George's County as the "Dunkin Donuts" murders. Ironically, it was the unraveling of the "Dunkin Donuts" murders that led to the appellant's being implicated in the "Good Samaritan" murder. The search warrant for the appellant's home in the "Dunkin Donuts" case produced the shotgun that was the murder weapon in the "Good Samaritan" case. The appellant's interrogation in the "Dunkin Donuts" case led to his confession in the "Good Samaritan" case.

The appellant was convicted on June 17, 1999, of felony murder and related offenses for his role in the "Dunkin Donuts" case. He received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. This Court affirmed those convictions in an unpublished opinion in Ashford v. State (No. 1342, September Term, 1999, filed on September 25, 2000). His sentence in this case of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is to be served consecutively to his sentence in the "Dunkin Donuts" case.

The Warrant Application

On the early evening of October 15, an individual who had witnessed the entire "Dunkin Donuts" criminal episode came into the Homicide Section Office of the Prince George's County Police Department and gave a full firsthand account of the crime. In that witness's account, the nickname "Trone" refers to the appellant, Trone Tyrone Ashford. The warrant application recited:

On October 15, 1998 at approximately 1900 hours, a witness that was present during this incident responded to the Homicide Section of the Prince George's County Police Department and advised the following. The witness stated that he was present when three persons known to him as "John Epps", "Trone" and "Alicia", entered the Dunkin Donuts, John Epps was armed with a shotgun. The witness further advised that he saw "John Epps" jump over the counter top. All three victims were ordered to the rear of the store. The "Alicia" subject was seen by the witness, attempting to open the cash registers of the Dunkin Donuts. The Epps suspect then returned to the vehicle and retrieved a gas can. The witness also advised that he heard several gunshots coming from inside the Dunkin Donuts. "John Epps", "Trone" and "Alicia" fled the store, after setting it on fire. All three entered a vehicle that was also occupied by this witness. While fleeing the scene, the witness was told by the "Trone" suspect that he "killed three people in there."

The witness last saw the "Trone" suspect exit the suspect vehicle with the shotgun in hand. "Trone" entered his residence located at 4002 28th Avenue # 103, Temple Hills, Md. The witness had known the Epps subject for several years. He also knows the Trone and Alicia suspects. The witness had been in Trone's residence before in the recent past and had seen the shotgun inside the residence. The witness also identified the Epps and Trone suspects by photograph. The Epps suspect has been identified as (John Lemon Epps, B/M/9-5-78). The Trone suspect has been identified as (Trone Tyrone Ashford, B/M/6-9-72). Warrants have been issued charging both Epps and Ashford with two counts each of First Degree Murder.

Largely on the basis of that eyewitness account, Judge Thomas J. Love issued a warrant, on October 16, for the search of the appellant's residence. The subsequent search produced the shotgun that had been used in the murder of Jayson Youmans, as well as in the "Dunkin Donuts" murders. In denying the appellant's motion to suppress the shotgun in the present case, Judge Spellbring ruled:

Based on my review of the four corners of the warrant, I find that the warrant— the application for the warrant does contain probable cause; finding that the informant—I'm not sure that's the correct term—the witness who reports the information to the police has—is competent, based on the allegations contained in the warrant; is reliable because he reports matters against his own interests; and consequently, there is sufficient probable cause within the four corners of the application for the signature of the warrant by Judge Love. Invoking the Merrick-Barber Rule:

The "Merrick-Barber Rule"?

The appellant challenges the probable cause for the search warrant by invoking what he refers to as the "Merrick-Barber Rule." Initially, we were somewhat nonplussed, never having heard of the "Merrick-Barber Rule." The appellant refers to the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Merrick v. State, 283 Md. 1, 389 A.2d 328 (1978) and the opinion of this Court in Barber v. State, 43 Md.App. 613, 406 A.2d 668 (1979). From the two, the appellant distills the ostensible rule that if a confidential informant is not identified by name in a warrant application, then the fact that the information from the informant is a declaration against penal interest does not establish sufficient credibility to permit the information from the informant, standing alone, to constitute probable cause.

Just for the moment looking at the Merrick and Barber cases in their own right in their own time, we note immediately that the "Merrick-Barber Rule" is reduced to the "Barber Rule." Merrick does not stand for the rule which invokes its name. In Merrick, the informant was identified by name. The issue before the Court of Appeals was limited.

"The narrow issue in this appeal is whether the statements of one who admits involvement in a criminal enterprise meets the `veracity' prong because the statements appear to amount to a declaration against penal interest."

283 Md. at 6 n. 4, 389 A.2d 328. The holding was that a declaration against penal interest ipso facto establishes the declarant's credibility.

[T]he probable credibility of the informant here was sufficiently shown on the sole basis of his statements against his penal interest.

283 Md. at 16, 389 A.2d 328.

The Merrick opinion expressly refrained from expressing an opinion on the subject for which the appellant cites it as authority.

In the facts and circumstances of the case sub judice, we do not reach the question of the credibility of an unidentified informant on the sole basis of his declarations against penal interest.

283 Md. at 16 n. 11, 389 A.2d 328.

Barber, on the other hand, does stand for the proposition for which the appellant cites it....