Ashley v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2234-03-4 (VA 8/31/2004), Record No. 2234-03-4.
| Decision Date | 31 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 2234-03-4. |
| Parties | MICHAEL RAY ASHLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Frederick County, John R. Prosser, Judge.
Roger A. Inger (Roger A. Inger, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Clements, Felton and McClanahan.
Having entered a conditional plea of guilty in the Circuit Court of Frederick County for driving after having been declared an habitual offender in violation of Code § 46.2-357, Michael Ray Ashley appeals the denial of a motion to suppress evidence. Ashley contends the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that his actions gave the police reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was attempting to evade a roadblock.1 Reasonable suspicion justifies an investigative stop, and supports the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop. Logan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 441-43, 452 S.E.2d 364, 367-68 (1994). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
When addressing an allegation of error arising from a ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, together with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 704, 712, 589 S.E.2d 17, 21 (2003). On August 30, 2001, the Frederick County Sheriff's Office and the West Virginia State Police set up a traffic roadblock on Route 50 at the state line between Frederick County, Virginia and West Virginia. Five deputies and two to three Virginia State Troopers were present at the roadblock. The police officers present at the roadblock wore vests, the police cars were marked units with their lights on, and a three-foot sign on the side of the road announced the traffic roadblock. The roadblock was near the intersection of Route 50 and Twine Lane. Approximately two hundred and twenty-four feet from the intersection, a dirt driveway serving a private residence connects Route 50 and Twine Lane and bypasses the intersection.
Deputy Sardelis saw Ashley's car pull up to the end of the line of cars waiting to pass through the roadblock. The car stopped there for one to two seconds, and then abruptly turned into the dirt driveway. Ashley's car drove past the house served by the driveway, and continued until it emerged on Twine Lane, bypassing the roadblock. Deputy Sardelis stopped the car as it reached Twine Lane. After being stopped, Ashley told Deputy Sardelis that he did not know the residents of the house served by the driveway and that he was just going to a business, though he failed to specify exactly which business. As a result of the stop, Deputy Sardelis determined that Ashley did not have a driver's license and had been declared an habitual offender in Virginia.
Ashley testified at the suppression hearing that when he stopped in the line of traffic before the roadblock, he did not see the roadblock and thought that there might be an accident causing the traffic backup. Ashley also testified that he was using the driveway to reach a car dealership that was across Twine Lane.
The trial court found that Deputy Sardelis had a reasonable suspicion that Ashley was attempting to evade a legal traffic roadblock in order to make the stop, and denied Ashley's motion to suppress. Ashley subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Ashley argues that there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was attempting unlawfully to evade a roadblock. He states that his turn onto the driveway was a lawful driving maneuver that, without more, could not provide the necessary level of suspicion to support a stop. See Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 525 S.E.2d 921 (2000); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 384 S.E.2d 125 (1989). We disagree.
In both Murphy and Bass, stops made by police officers who believed that the appellants in those cases had been trying to avoid traffic roadblocks were held improper. In Murphy, the driver made a turn onto a dead-end street three hundred and fifty feet from a traffic checkpoint, after which the driver was stopped by a police officer for attempting to evade a traffic checkpoint. The Court stated that making a legal turn before reaching a traffic checkpoint is not enough to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion unless it "is coupled with other articulable facts, such as erratic driving, a traffic violation, or some behavior which independently raises suspicion of criminal activity." Murphy, 9 Va. App. at 145, 384 S.E.2d at 128. Similarly, in Bass, the driver approached a traffic checkpoint and made a turn five hundred feet from the checkpoint into a gas station parking lot, which he passed through, and exited onto the roadway in the opposite direction from the traffic checkpoint. The Supreme Court held that the turn was a legal maneuver and provided the officer with only a "hunch," not articulable reasonable suspicion, that the defendant chose to avoid the traffic checkpoint. Bass, 259 Va. at 477-78, 525 S.E.2d at 925.
Although Ashley argues that the actions taken by the drivers in Murphy and Bass were more suspicious than his maneuver, the trial court in the instant case noted that the facts in those cases did not involve a stop before the legal turn. The trial court considered this distinction critical.
Based on two prior cases of this Court bearing a striking resemblance to the instant case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Ashley's motion to suppress. See Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 120, 554 S.E.2d 688 (2001); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 724, 508 S.E.2d 889 (1999). In Lovelace, the driver approached a traffic roadblock and as he neared it, slowed down and came to a complete stop. After a second or two, he then turned left onto a private driveway. The...
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