Ashley v. Sec'y, Case No. 3:15-cv-7-J-34JRK
| Decision Date | 14 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:15-cv-7-J-34JRK |
| Parties | ANTWAIN D. ASHLEY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Antwain D. Ashley, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on January 5, 2015, by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition; Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He filed an Amended Petition (Doc. 8) on January 14, 2016. In the Amended Petition, Ashley challenges a 2007 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for armed robbery and armed burglary. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Amended Petition. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response; Doc. 15) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On June 9, 2016, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. 10), admonishing Ashley regarding his obligations and giving Ashley a time frame in which to submit a reply. Ashley submitted a brief in reply. See Petitioner's Response to Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Reply; Doc. 16). This case is ripe for review.
On March 8, 2007, the State of Florida charged Ashley with armed robbery (counts one and two) and armed burglary (count three). See Resp. Ex. 1 at 39-40, Amended Information. On August 6, 2007, Ashley entered a guilty plea to all three charges. See Resp. Exs. 1 at 63-64; 2 at 97-105, Transcript of the Plea Proceeding (Plea Tr.). On September 21, 2007, the court sentenced Ashley to a term of imprisonment of seventy-five years for count one with a twenty-year minimum mandatory term for actual possession and discharge of a firearm; a term of imprisonment of fifty years for count two with a ten-year minimum mandatory term for actual possession of a firearm, to run consecutively to count one; and a term of imprisonment of fifty years for count three with a ten-year minimum mandatory term for actual possession of a firearm, to run consecutively to count two. See Resp. Exs. 1 at 65-72; 10 at 205-26, Transcript of the Sentencing Hearing (Sentencing Tr.).
On March 4, 2008, with the benefit of counsel, Ashley filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) (Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion). In the Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, he requested a new sentencing hearing, at which the court could exercise its discretion as to whether to impose concurrent sentences instead of consecutive sentences. See Resp. Ex. 3 at 1-9. On April 28, 2008, the trial court denied the Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. See id. at 10-160.
On direct appeal, Ashley, with the benefit of counsel, filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See Resp. Ex. 4. Ashley filed a pro se brief, arguing that the trial court erred when it: denied his motion to correct illegal sentence (ground one), and imposed a sentence that violated the Eighth Amendment (ground two). See Resp. Ex. 6. On February 4, 2009, the appellate court affirmed Ashley's conviction and sentence per curiam, see Ashley v. State, 4 So.3d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Resp. Ex. 7, and later denied his motion for rehearing on March 20, 2009, see Resp. Ex. 8. The mandate issued on April 7, 2009. See Resp. Ex. 7.
On June 11, 2009, Ashley filed a pro se motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 motion) and an amended motion (Amended Rule 3.850 motion) on April 1, 2010. See Resp. Ex. 9 at 1-20, 49-57. In his requests for post-conviction relief, he asserted that counsel (Robert Carl Davis) was ineffective because he failed to: file a motion to suppress evidence of a gun that he was charged with possessing and firing during the commission of his crimes (ground two); conduct an adequate pretrial investigation and raise a viable defense (ground five); and research the law on the court's discretion to sentence him as a youthful offender (ground seven). Additionally, Ashley stated that counsel misadvised him that the court would sentence him to no more than twenty years ofincarceration if he entered an open plea (ground one). He also asserted that the trial court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction because the Information was defective (grounds three and four), and his sentence was illegal because the factual basis for his plea did not support a finding that he possessed and/or used a gun during the commission of the crimes (ground six). The State responded, see id. at 45-48, 116-27, and Ashley replied, see id. at 150-51. On March 3, 2011, the Court held an evidentiary hearing, at which Davis (his former trial counsel) testified. See Resp. Ex. 10 at 243-300, Transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing (EH Tr.). On March 6, 2013, the court denied his requests for post-conviction relief. See id. at 164-226. On January 28, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the court's denial of post-conviction relief per curiam, see Ashley v. State, 132 So.3d 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Resp. Ex. 13, and the mandate issued on March 5, 2014, See Resp. Ex. 13.
During the pendency of the post-conviction proceedings, Ashley filed a pro se motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) (Rule 3.800(a) motion) on October 31, 2013. See Resp. Ex. 14 at 1-170. The court denied the Rule 3.800(a) motion on December 26, 2013. See id. at 171-85. On June 3, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the court's denial per curiam, see Ashley v. State, 139 So.3d 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014);Resp. Ex. 15, and the mandate issued on July 1, 2014, see Resp. Ex. 15.
On October 7, 2015, Ashley filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus or second successive motion for post-conviction relief. See Resp. Ex. 16. The court dismissed Ashley's motion on September 26, 2017. See https://core.duvalclerk.com, case number 16-2006-CF-016512-AXXX-MA, docket entry 312.
The Petition appears to be timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent factsof this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Ashley's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 1203 (2017); Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277,1285 (11th Cir. 2016). Regardless of whether the last state court provided a reasoned opinion, "it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301 (2013).1 Thus, the state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 100.
If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
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