Ashley v. Sutton
| Decision Date | 26 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil. No. 06-063-HU. |
| Citation | 492 F.Supp.2d 1230 |
| Parties | Billie ASHLEY, Plaintiff, v. Steven SUTTON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Michelle R. Burrows, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff.
Gerald L. Warren, Kenneth S. Montoya, Salem, OR, for Defendant.
Magistrate Judge Hubel has issued a Findings and Recommendation [46] in this action. It recommends that plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [17] be denied, and defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [21] be granted in part and denied in part.
Both parties filed objections to the Findings and Recommendation and the case was referred to this court. When a party objects to any portion of a Magistrate's Findings and Recommendation, the district court must make a de novo determination of that portion of the Magistrate's report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981).
The parties' objections were filed in a timely manner. The court has given the file of this case a de novo review, and has also carefully evaluated the Magistrate's Findings and Recommendations, the objections, and the entire record. Magistrate Judge Hubel provided a thorough analysis of the facts and circumstances regarding this litigation, and this analysis need not be repeated here. This court concludes that the Findings and Recommendation is sound, correct, and entitled to adoption.
Plaintiff's objections are addressed first. Plaintiff accepts the Findings and Recommendation except in one regard: the conclusion that the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), bars plaintiff's wrongful seizure claim.
The Findings and Recommendation reasoned:
under Heck, the plaintiff must show that her conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
* * *
But absent any evidence that her convictions have, as of now, been reversed or expunged, she cannot assert a § 1983 claim based on wrongful seizure because it would necessarily call into question her conviction for resisting arrest. I conclude that [plaintiff's] wrongful seizure claim is barred by Heck.
Findings and Recommendation at 37-38.
Plaintiff argues that the Findings and Recommendation erred because the unavailability of habeas relief permits a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to proceed despite the reasoning of Heck. It is true that there is some authority endorsing the idea that the unavailability of habeas relief permits a § 1983 action, "regardless of whether the success of the action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence." Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998)); see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n. 2, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875-77 (9th Cir.2002) ().
It is also true that much of Heck's analysis — and the analysis of some of its progeny — pertains to "the intersection of the two most fertile sources of federal-court prisoner litigation — the basic federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the federal habeas corpus statute for state prisoners." Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1139 (internal quotation and citations omitted).
However, the Findings and Recommendation relied upon another aspect of Heck's scope. The Findings and Recommendation quoted the Supreme Court's reasoning that a § 1983 action "would not lie" in a situation in which a "state defendant is convicted of and sentenced for the crime of resisting arrest, defined as intentionally preventing a peace officer from effecting a lawful arrest" because "to prevail in this § 1983 action, [the state defendant] would have to negate an element of the offense of which [the defendant] has been convicted." Findings and Recommendation at 36 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 2364).
The Supreme Court addressed this hypothetical situation in its explicit holding that:
in order to recover damages for ... harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiffs] conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (footnote omitted).
That hypothetical situation has arisen in the facts of this case. The existence of a line of decisions examining Heck's applicability in certain cases in which habeas relief was unavailable fails to negate the Findings and Recommendation's correct reasoning that Heck also addressed the precise, and independent, situation presented here: a state defendant who has been convicted of and sentenced for a crime similar to intentionally preventing a peace officer from effecting a lawful arrest. The explicit indication from the Heck court is that the state defendant cannot prevail in a § 1983 action because the state defendant would have to negate an element of the offense of which the defendant has been convicted. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 2364. The Supreme Court made no exception in these circumstances for instances in which that state defendant was not incarcerated or otherwise had no involvement with habeas relief. Plaintiffs objections are overruled.
Defendants also object to the Findings and Recommendation. Defendants challenge the conclusions that their motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims for excessive force and battery claims, and on the qualified immunity defense, should be denied. Specifically, defendants contend that the Findings and Recommendation erred in (1) ignoring authorities that suggest that determining the reasonableness of police detentions requires a balancing of interests; (2) ignoring that plaintiffs arresting officer had a right to question plaintiff and to give her a lawful order to stop so he could conduct his investigation; (3) denying summary judgment on the question of excessive force; (4) denying summary judgment to defendant Gallaher under a "ratification theory;" and (5) denying summary judgment to Officer Sutton on plaintiffs battery claim.
These objections reiterate argument and analysis already presented to the Magistrate Judge. The reasoning in the Findings and Recommendation addresses these issues fully, and this court's adoption of the Findings and Recommendation need only summarize that reasoning.
Defendants assert that the Findings and Recommendation ignored certain judicial decisions and their teachings that balancing factors should be considered in determining the reasonableness of a police detention. Defts,' Objections at 1. To the contrary, the Findings and Recommendation provided a careful analysis of the applicable law regarding police detentions. Findings and Recommendation at 17-26. Defendants complain, essentially, that the balancing factors that they rely upon should have compelled a favorable summary judgment ruling. Instead, the Findings and Recommendation concluded correctly that summary judgment was inappropriate in light of the circumstances presented. Defendants' objections underscore the existence of material issues of fact and are more properly viewed as factual argument going to the weight of the evidence presented.
Defendants also contend that the Findings and Recommendation erred because the plaintiffs actions should be construed as "taking flight" — "turning and fleeing into the crowded gymnasium area and ignoring [an officer's] command to stop." Defts.' Objections at 7. Defendants' interpretation of the facts regarding plaintiffs arrest fail to establish that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the questions defendants raise. The Findings and Recommendation analyzed the arguments presented correctly.
Next, defendants assert that the Findings and Recommendation erred in concluding that a jury question exists regarding allegations of excessive force. The Findings and Recommendation reasoned correctly that "[d]etermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Findings and Recommendation at 26-27 (citation omitted). The Findings and Recommendation concluded that "[f]actual issues preclude summary judgment in Sutton's favor on the excessive force claim." Findings and Recommendation at 28.
Defendants' objections address the law and fact-intensive nature regarding excessive force claims at some length. Defts.' Objections at 12-16. The discussion presented by defendants underscores the necessity of determining the reasonableness of a police...
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