Ashmore v. Hartford Hosp.

• Decision Date: 04 June 2019
• Docket Number: SC 20052
• Citation: 331 Conn. 777,208 A.3d 256
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Marjorie ASHMORE, Administratrix (Estate of William Ashmore ), et al. v. HARTFORD HOSPITAL et al.

331 Conn. 777

208 A.3d 256

Marjorie ASHMORE, Administratrix (Estate of William Ashmore ), et al.

v.HARTFORD HOSPITAL et al.

SC 20052

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 4, 2018

Officially released June 4, 2019

John L. Cordani, Jr., Hartford, with whom was Isabella M. Squicciarini, for the appellant (named defendant).

James J. Healy, Hartford, with whom was Eric P. Smith, New Haven, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Christopher P. Kriesen, Hartford, and Lorinda S. Coon, Hartford, and Geraldine Macaisa and Chelsea Sousa, certified legal interns, filed a brief for the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Alinor C. Sterling, Bridgeport, Jeffrey Wisner, Bridgeport, Matthew Blumenthal, Bridgeport, Julie V. Pinette, Stamford, and Karen K. Clark, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C.J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins and Kahn, Js.^*

PALMER, J.

In this wrongful death action alleging medical malpractice, the named defendant, Hartford Hospital,¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which denied a motion for remittitur after a jury awarded $ 1.2 million in noneconomic damages to the named plaintiff, Marjorie Ashmore, as the administratrix of the estate of the decedent,² her late husband William Ashmore, and $ 4.5 million to the plaintiff for her own loss of spousal consortium. The defendant contends that, in the absence of exceptional or unusual circumstances that are not applicable in this case, a loss of consortium award ordinarily should not substantially exceed the corresponding wrongful death award to the directly injured spouse. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. In 2011, the decedent visited the defendant hospital for routine elective heart surgery. The surgery was completed successfully and without complication. During the procedure, the surgeon connected standard epicardial pacing electrodes to the decedent's heart to assist with heart rate and rhythm management in the event that he should experience any postoperative complications. In the case of an abnormal rhythm, such wires can be quickly and easily connected to a system that provides a small electrical stimulation to return the heartbeat to its normal rhythm.

The decedent initially recovered well, but, during the second night at the hospital following the operation, he began to experience atrial fibrillation, a common postoperative condition. Over the course of the next hour, his heart rate dropped precipitously, he displayed various signs of serious distress, and alarms repeatedly sounded. Although this was precisely the condition for which the epicardial wires had been installed, hospital staff failed to connect the wires or to contact the decedent's surgeon until after the decedent had experienced cardiac arrest. Hospital staff ultimately were able to restart his heart using electrical shock, but the lack of a heartbeat for seventeen minutes resulted in oxygen deprivation so severe that the decedent had to be placed on life support. He never regained consciousness. Several days later, with no reasonable possibility that her husband of forty-five years would recover, the plaintiff was forced to make the agonizing decision to terminate the decedent's life support. He died moments later.

The plaintiff filed the present action, alleging wrongful death in her capacity as executor of the decedent's estate, and loss of spousal consortium in her individual capacity. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The jury found that the negligence of the defendant's employees was the proximate cause of the decedent's death and awarded the decedent's estate approximately $ 75,000 in economic damages and $ 1.2 million in noneconomic damages. The jury also awarded the plaintiff $ 4.5 million in damages for loss of consortium.

The defendant then filed a motion seeking a remittitur of the loss of consortium award pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-216a and 52-228c, and Practice Book § 16-35. The trial court denied the motion and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

As an initial matter, we address the parties' disagreement as to the standard that governs appellate review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for remittitur. The plaintiff, relying on cases such as Munn v. Hotchkiss School , 326 Conn. 540, 574, 165 A.3d 1167 (2017), and Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co. , 304 Conn. 679, 706, 41 A.3d 1013 (2012), contends that binding precedent establishes, and our recent cases reaffirm, that a trial court's decision to grant or deny remittitur is reviewed according to a deferential abuse of discretion standard. The defendant invites us to overrule those cases and to adopt a plenary standard of review or, failing that, to review de novo the decision of the trial court in the present case insofar as that decision was predicated on an incorrect legal determination. We decline the defendant's invitation to overrule Munn , Patino , and their many progenitors.

A

As we explained in Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC , 303 Conn. 276, 32 A.3d 318 (2011), the standards that govern appellate review of a trial court's granting or denial of a motion for remittitur must be understood in light of the underlying legal standards that govern remittitur itself. See id., at 280, 284–85, 32 A.3d 318. We frequently have stated that, "[i]n determining whether to order remittitur, the trial court is required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.... Upon completing that review, the court should not interfere with the jury's determination except when the verdict is plainly excessive or exorbitant.... The ultimate test [that] must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether the jury's award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury [was] influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.... The court's broad power to order a remittitur should be exercised only when it is manifest that the jury [has awarded damages that] are contrary to law, not supported by proof, or contrary to the court's explicit and unchallenged instructions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Munn v. Hotchkiss School , supra, 326 Conn. at 575–76, 165 A.3d 1167. "Accordingly, we consistently have held that a court should exercise its authority to order a remittitur rarely—only in the most exceptional of circumstances ... and [when] the court can articulate very clear, definite and satisfactory reasons ... for such interference." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 575, 165 A.3d 1167.

Also relevant to our review is § 52-216a, which provides the general statutory authority for remittitur. That statute provides in relevant part that, "[i]f the court at the conclusion of the trial concludes that the verdict is excessive as a matter of law , it shall order a remittitur and, upon failure of the party so ordered to remit the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial...." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-216a.

With respect to appellate review, in Saleh , we explained that "our review of the trial court's decision [to grant or deny remittitur] requires careful balancing." Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC , supra, 303 Conn. at 285, 32 A.3d 318. "[T]he decision whether to reduce a jury verdict because it is excessive as a matter of law ... rests solely within the discretion of the trial court.... [T]he same general principles apply to a trial court's decision to order a remittitur. [Consequently], the proper standard of review ... is that of an abuse of discretion.... [T]he ruling of the trial court ... is entitled to great weight and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 281–82, 32 A.3d 318. The chief rationale that has been articulated in support of this deferential standard of review is that the trial court, having observed the trial and evaluated the testimony firsthand, is better positioned than a reviewing court to assess both the aptness of the award and whether the jury may have been motivated by improper sympathy, partiality, or prejudice. See, e.g., Munn v. Hotchkiss School , supra, 326 Conn. at 577, 165 A.3d 1167 ; W. Maltbie, Connecticut Appellate Procedure (2d Ed. 1957) § 187, pp. 230–31; W. Maltbie, supra, § 197, pp. 244–45.

Even under this deferential standard of review, however, we have not shied away from ordering remittitur when the record failed to support the jury's award of damages. Indeed, "[t]his court has a long history of ordering plaintiffs to accept a remittitur or [to] submit to a new trial." Earlington v. Anastasi , 293 Conn. 194, 208, 976 A.2d 689 (2009) ; see also Doroszka v. Lavine , 111 Conn. 575, 579, 150 A. 692 (1930) ("[a]s early as [1838], and frequently since, we have ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff would remit a part of the verdict"); W. Maltbie, supra, § 200, p. 248 ("[t]he [S]upreme [C]ourt often orders a new trial unless the plaintiff remits a certain amount of the damages").

B

The defendant does not dispute that we have, in most instances, reviewed decisions to grant or deny remittitur according to this deferential standard of review. Nevertheless, the defendant emphasizes that the legislature has determined that remittitur should be granted only when a verdict is deemed to be ...